CONFIDENTIAL 051157Z
FRAN INFO BONN DIR CITE MUNI 8018
UTILITY IN BONN ALL THIS WEEK. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE DETERMINE
HIS PLANS FOR A MEETING PRIOR 11 NOVEMBER.
CONFIDENTIAL
C/S COMMENT: SCHEDULED VISIT BORN ON THE FIFTEENTH.
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: BONN
ACTION: EE 6
INFO: ADOP, Cl, Cl/OPS, Fl, FI/JNT 2, WE 4, VR

SECRET 081305Z
MUNI INFO DIR FRAN CITE BONN 5493
OGTIDE
REF MUNI 8018 (IN 55466) XEP/B,P.

IN VIEW FACT THAT AND BOTH LONDON THIS WEEK,
IT SEEMS POSSIBLE UTILITY MAY BE THERE TOO.
SECRET
UTILITY WILL BE IN MUNICH 14 AND 15 NOVEMBER AND CAN SEE EITHER DAY BUT HE WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE 16TH. HE WILL BE IN BONN 18TH BUT WE REALIZE THIS NOT CONVENIENT WITH SCHEDULE.
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: FRANKFURT
ACTION: EE 6
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, YR

SECRET 091032Z
MUNI BRLN BONN HAMB INFO DIR CITE FRAN 3152

1. VIEW REF MORNING 12 NOVEMBER RESERVED FOR CHIEF HOB
ON ASSUMPTION CHIEFS MLB AND MOB WILL COMPLETE THEIR BRIEFINGS
IN MUNI.

2. REVISED SCHEDULE AS FOLLOWS:
   A. DEPART FRAN 13 NOV LH 096 2045 HOURS, ARR MUNI 2150.
   B. DEPART MUNI 15 NOV LH 126 0745 HOURS, ARR COLOGNE 0900.
   C. DEPART COLOGNE 15 NOV PA 642 1930 HOURS, ARR BRLN 2100.
   D. DEPART BRLN 17 NOV PA 663 0845 HOURS; DEPART FRAN VIA
   SWISS AIR 205 FOR ZURI 1100 HOURS, ARR ZURI 1150.

SECRET

Declassified and Released by
Central Intelligence Agency
Sources Method Exception 3021
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
Date 2005
4. U.S. Trip: \[\text{-} \] \[\text{-}\] asked UTILITY when he would be coming to the States again and noted that there was still an open invitation. UTILITY replied that in view of governmental changes in Bonn, he expects to be very busy for the next six months and cannot consider a trip until the Summer of 1964.
SECRET 151436Z

FROM: INFO BONN CITE KUNI 8133

TO: DIRECTOR

ACTION: C/EE 3

MEMO: ADDP, C/C1, C/F1 2, C/F1/INT 2, C/AF 3, C/KE 3, VR

DATE 2005

SECRET

14 NOVEMBER. UTILITY FRIENDLY AND EXPANSIVE. SOME SUBJECTS COVERED SEPARATE TELETAPES. DETAILED MEMO OF CONVERSATION BY POUCH EGMA 63356.

FOLLOWING ITEMS OF POSSIBLE CURRENT INTEREST:

A. UTILITY DOES NOT PLAN VISIT WASHINGTON DURING NEXT SIX MONTHS.

B. IT PREFERABLE ODOYOKO NOT MAKE ANY STATEMENTS CONCERNING CATIDE INVOLVEMENT CALLIKAX BUT IF REPLY TO OFFICIAL GERMAN INQUIRIES REQUIRED STATEMENT SHOULD REFER CATIDE EXTERNAL INTEL MISSION AND CATIDE INVOLVEMENT CALLIKAX BASED ON JOINT OPS WITH AMERICANS, IF IT NECESSARY TO REFER LEVEL AT WHICH ARRANGEMENTS MADE, STATEMENT SHOULD BE THIS DONE THROUGH OFFICE CATIDE CHIEF.

C. POSITION EGOA 28796 ON WELL RECEIVED.

DETAILS TELETAPED EGMA 63355.

D. UTILITY PROVIDING REPORT CONCERNING SOVIET ORIENTATION MANY PEASONS CREEK GOVT. WE WILL FORWARD REPORT ATHENS FOR

E. UTILITY NOT SATISFIED CATIDE COVERAGE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382 E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
F. CATIDE TAKEOVER IONOSPHERIC INSTITUTE BREISACH SURFACED.

SEE EGKA 63421 FOR PREVIOUS INFO. UTILITY INTIMATED FRENCH CLOSELY INVOLVED SINCE THEY ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED INSTITUTE.

G. TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM IRAQ TO MOROCCO.

SECRET
TO: CHIEF, EE
INFO: CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE
FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY
SUBJECT: CAT-ID/CHRISTMAS PRESENT FOR UTILITY

PLEASE BUY AND POUCH TO ME VOLUME ENTITLED "TREASURES OF THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART." I PLAN TO GIVE IT TO UTILITY FOR CHRISTMAS.

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
2-EE
2-MLB

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 302E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT LATE 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO
EGOT-21083
18 NOV 63

SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EGOS-13140

DISTRIBUTION BY TAPE
2-COS/G
2-MIB

CROSS REFERENCE TO
EGOS-13140
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
D IS PAT C H

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

TO
CHIEF, EE

INFO.
CHIEF, MLB

FROM
CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

SUBJECT
CATIDE/CHRISTMAS PRESENT FOR UTILITY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES
EGOT-13140 DATED 19 NOVEMBER 1963

ASSUME 'GREAT PAINTINGS FROM METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART' IS BOOK WE WANT. DIFFICULT REMEMBER EXACT TITLE. RELY ON YOUR JUDGMENT AND THAT OF C. REMEMBERS IT AS BEING EXCEPTIONALLY HANDSOME VOLUME.

DISTRIBUTION
BY TAPE
2 - CHIEF, EE
2 - C/MLB

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE
21 NOVEMBER 63

ORIGINATING
EGOT-2114B

COORDINATING

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INT'L SECURITY AGENCY
SOURCE: NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2005

RELEASING

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

DATE

OFFICE

OFFICER

COORDINATING

OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH
SECRET 271952

PRIORITY FRAN INFO PRIORITY MUNI DIR CITE. 37693

1. REQUEST MUNI ARRANGE CALL ON UTILITY 30 NOV TO DISCUSS CRITICAL COLLECTION PROBLEMS IN UAR.

2. ATTEMPTING ARRANGE TRAVEL VIA FRAN 28 OR 29 NOV. WILL CONTACT ON ARRIVAL.

3. REQUEST MUNI MAKE RESERVATION BAYERISCHERHOF 29 AND 30 NOV.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR NYXIS USED

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ITALY ADJUSTED BY EXEMPTION 3 (6)
WEitez THE DISCLOSURE ACT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans) [29 Nov. 63]

SUBJECT: Condolences from General Gehlen
On the Death of President Kennedy

1. This memorandum is for your information.

2. At 1600 hours on 22 November 1963, the West German Intelligence Service Liaison Officer in Washington, called Chief, EE/Germany to advise that he had just received a cable from General Reinhard Gehlen, President of the West German Intelligence Service, expressing General Gehlen's personal condolences at the untimely death of President Kennedy.

Acting Chief
Eastern Europe Division

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005
FORWARDED HERewith IS ONE COPY "GREAT PAINTING FROM THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART" AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCE.
1. As it turned out, the weekend stopover in Munich provided the opportunity for a longer and more relaxed conversation with Gehlen than I have had in many years. Our first conversation was in the familiar setting (originally Martin Borman's bedroom and for seven years my office) of his office, starting at half past three on the 29th of November when I was accompanied by [ ]. At Gehlen's suggestion, I stayed on after [ ] had departed in order to visit [ ] who was recovering from a series of two operations following a complicated case of appendicitis. Gehlen's driver (16 years in this capacity on the coming 27th of February) delivered me to my hotel in Munich after six and picked me up at twelve noon on Saturday the 30th to spend Saturday afternoon with Gehlen and his family at home in Berg/Starnberger See.

2. My specific purpose in seeing Gehlen was taken care of in less than thirty minutes on the first afternoon, and was limited exclusively to a discussion of the operational environment in the UAR, the nature of the very high priority USSR technical targets in Egypt, our estimate of the access enjoyed by Germans to critical targets, and a proposal that our cooperation in this area (the targets are all critical for the NATO Forces in Europe) be intensified. I brought him best wishes from Salah Nasir in Cairo; we talked very briefly about the Middle East situation.

3. Because much of what Gehlen had to say about Germany, the new Government, his own problems and the European situation seemed to me to fall into the category of information with which my colleagues in Germany are familiar, I have not attempted to reconstruct our conversation in detail; instead I attempted to set down the more important impressions and some of the specifics which relate to them. My preparation for discussing things German or European consisted of a weekend conversation in Athens with [ ] who described his recent exchange with Gehlen, a dinner conversation with Gordon Stewart in Frankfurt on the 28th of November (travelling from Cairo to Munich via Frankfurt in order to see Stewart in advance of my own meeting with Gehlen), and a hurried luncheon conversation with [ ] immediately after my arrival in Munich.

4. Until I left Munich in 1956, Gehlen gave almost his entire time and energy to the task of getting the BND established and accepted by Bonn. He took no vacations; he had no avocations; even his responsibilities as the Head of his family were discharged in a brisk and efficient manner in the rare minutes he could allocate for this purpose. Indeed, the pressures that resulted from his wife and children sharing the house in which he had his office in the late 'forties were such that I had conspired with his staff to acquire a modest Bavarian house near Berg on the Starnberger See in which his family could be installed.

5. When I departed from Munich in 1956 [ ] and [ ] joined me in interesting Gehlen in buying the 22 foot, mahogany hull sailing yawl with a 15 square meter mainsail which...
I had owned during all of my years in Munich. Although GEHLEN had never sailed, the proximity of the Starnberger See to his home, and the fact that his children were reaching the age when sailing would be appealing to them, resulted in his purchasing my boat for DM 700. An afternoon with GEHLEN and his family confirms reports that GEHLEN has become an avid sailor, a member of the Ammer See Yacht Club, a designer of experimental rigging, and the owner of three sailing craft - my old conservative "M" class boat which has been reconditioned and has the appearance of a new boat, a smaller "H" class yawl which is the most popular (and very sporting) racing class in Germany's inland lakes and, finally, a larger and heavier British boat with twin keels, a small cabin and an auxiliary motor. The British boat, also in magnificent condition, was on a trailer in the rear of GEHLEN's home covered over with a polyethylene cover. It is this boat that GEHLEN and his family moved from the Chiem See to Starnberger See and to the Ammer See. GEHLEN has found a more or less retired boat builder in Starnberg who, I would guess, spends much of his time making minor modifications on GEHLEN's boats. Sailing and his three boats has apparently provided the outlet for GEHLEN's insuppressible interest in gadgetry; I observed that the 1963 Mercedes 220 has remained relatively "stripped down". GEHLEN confided that he is looking forward with interest to the annual British boat show in London in January 1964.

6. GEHLEN has aged little in the recent years. He seemed to have a vigorous appetite. Perhaps he smokes fewer cigars. As always, he does not drink alcohol in any form. A noticeable limp is, I learned, the result of a recent twisting of the leg in the "H" yawl, and neither gout nor the circulatory problems that one might suspect. He has obviously sunk his roots into the little village of Berg. In contrast to former years, he seems to have lost his inhibitions about acknowledging his residence there. Aside from the usual trained German Shepherd watch dog, there were no signs of unusual security arrangements. In a most nonchalant manner (no dark glasses) he took me to lunch in the small "Strand" hotel a few hundred yards below his home, pleasantly exchanging greetings with the proprietor and several other guests in the small dining room. In response to my expressed admiration for the unchanged beauty and tranquility of the area surrounding Berg and his home, he replied, "I have become attached to it. I have no other desire than to remain here until the day I die."

THE GEHLEN CLAN

7. I found Catherine temporarily living with her two children in the house adjoining GEHLEN's home. It is a leased property; the housekeeper is the widow of a deceased ex-colonel of the BND; the house normally serves as a guest house for GEHLEN's visitors who qualify for this kind of neighborly treatment. Christoph, having married the attractive daughter of Georg BUNTROCK (one of the original six who saw the end of the war with GEHLEN in the mountain hut above Schliersee), joined us later in the afternoon. He has become a tall, surprisingly poised and rather attractive young man nearing the end of his formal training as a physicist. Although he now lives near Pullach, he and his new wife figure prominently in the photographic record of the sailing during the previous summer. Maria Theresa, the second eldest daughter, has upset her father's plans to send her to us for a period of education in the U.S.A., by becoming engaged to an "acceptable young man". She was sent off to Sweden (under the influence of her cousin from Rome whose mother is Swedish) and
SECRET

successfully completed her interpreter's examinations in Swedish after her return. GEHLEN has living in his household Giovanni's daughter (the cousin from Rome) and a young nephew of nineteen who is convalescing from a heart operation. Peter, another nephew who was a worry to GEHLEN some years back, has emerged as a promising officer in the Bundeswehr. I was impressed throughout the afternoon that all of the young people remotely connected with GEHLEN have gone far in studying foreign languages. I remarked to GEHLEN that the young German general staff officer who had avoided foreign travel and the study of foreign languages in the 'twenties and 'thirties as a means of avoiding intelligence staff duties had indeed gone far astray from the course he plotted for himself. As his children grow up, marry and the size of the clan grows, as he has gradually come to think of his home on the Starnberger See as a new-home for an up-rooted Pomeranian family; and finally, as the members of his family find their personal and official life ever more interrelated, the GEHLEN family has gradually taken on the complexion of a clan. Catherine spoke of family excursions with the several sailboats meeting in the small cove in the southside of the Roseninsel as if it were an established pattern.

THE CASE

8. * has told me after each of his visits to Germany in the past year that he had found the effect of this case on our relations with the BND to be greater than he had believed. I have gotten this same impression from several other people during recent months. When the matter came up, as I had assumed it would, I recounted to GEHLEN a recent conversation with Dick Helms in which he spoke most warmly and unequivocally on the BND and GEHLEN. At the same time, Helms had put the matter in context of the ups and downs of the U.S. and German relations in the past few years, the narrow political margin in which both GEHLEN and we must operate in our respective countries, and the impact of press attacks which take a fragment of near truth and develop from it full-blown press exposes of the most damaging character.

9. After making this point, I changed the subject by drawing from my pocket newspaper clippings giving an account of my youngest brother who, as a student in Innsbruck had been a house guest of the GEHLENs, and had earlier known Catherine when she was a student in New York. I had written a personal note to Catherine on the margin of a clipping and asked him to kindly pass it to her with my best wishes. I think it was at this point that he made the decision to ask me to openly call who was convalescing in the BND hospital in the compound. He sent me in his car and I was ushered into the hospital with no delay -- obviously announced by telephone in the few minutes it took me to reach it. Entering the hospital room alone, I found a rather pale and weak who at first seemed unsure whether he should remain withdrawn and formal or participate in what was obviously a GEHLEN operation to try and clear the air. Thirty minutes later when I took my leave, I had in my hand the address and telephone number of the house he and Catherine will occupy in Paris, a standing invitation to stay with them when passing through Paris, and had made a close examination of the evidence of a double incision on the abdominal wall.

10. With Catherine the next day I found it harder going. Her initial greeting to me as I entered her living room with her father was hospitable but cool. As the afternoon went on and we went through coffee and cake, the arrival from an afternoon nap of
her two small children, a good deal of reminiscing and another hour together with her mother. There were occasional moments in which she lapsed into something approaching the relationship we enjoyed when she lived with us in the U.S. I came away with the impression that she had been hurt rather severely by the whole episode.

GEHLEN AND NATO

11. From the day in 1942 when GEHLEN first articulated to WESSEL his conviction that Germany's defeat in World War II would be followed by the emergence of two great power blocs headed by Russia and America, he has been an unwavering advocate of an Atlantic Community. To achieve this he foresaw an absolute necessity for a Bonn-Washington alliance enjoying undisputed priority in the new German foreign policy. A German-French rapprochement as the basis for uniting Europe was granted undisputed second priority. Bringing the British into the European family was always regarded as an essential though difficult third step. Underlying this formulation of the new world in which Germany would arise from defeat was the oft-voiced conviction that "the National State" and "European Nationalism" would not be important in a world dominated by the immense power of Russia and the U.S.

12. I suspect that GEHLEN has, in the years since he gained official status and a growing degree of independence of our political and material support, been undergoing a continual process of readjusting his earliest concepts and estimate which fitted so well the first decade of the postwar period. It would be neither accurate nor just to attribute his behavior politically to the image of the unreconstructed German Nationalist who has cynically bent before the storms that have swept Germany since World War I and the days of the Reichswehr. A few months ago he told me that looking back over the past fifteen years, the recovery of the European countries individually from the war, the containment of the Communist threat to the Free World and the creation in both the Soviet Bloc and the Free World of conditions conducive to an ultimate settlement of the problems left from World War II, had gone better than he had ever estimated in the first dark years of the Cold War. I personally bear no doubts about the genuineness of GEHLEN's political convictions in the decade following the defeat of HITLER's Germany. He did not foresee a Germany as economically vigorous as the Bundesrepublik is today. Pre-occupied with the qualities of postwar France political life which raised questions of her very survival, he had probably failed entirely to project the image of DeGAULLE's France of today. Finally, he almost certainly was high in his estimate, at the turn of the 'forties and 'fifties, of prolonged internal instability in Western Europe and the likelihood of a Soviet military move to the English Channel.

13. GEHLEN is a man who, while giving fully to the present, has spent his life whiffing the winds of change and has made timely arrangements to readjust his own course. His current re-appraisal probably started in 1955 -- the year of our peace treaty with Bonn (creating the conditions for the legalization of the BND), the year the Soviets exploded the hydrogen bomb in which the present balance in Europe is based, and the last year of his dependence on us for material support.
14. I do not believe that GEHLEN has written off the Atlantic Community, nor has he reached any final conclusion on the ultimate decisive character of the Bonn-Washington relationship. I doubt very much, however, that he sees the world as he did in the early 'fifties, and I suspect that he may be reassessing the role of the European States both individually and collectively.

15. At lunch on the 29th of November, GEHLEN, in discussing the likelihood of an ultimate settlement of Eastern Europe based on a projection of the political developments of the past two years—with emphasis on the U.S. and Soviet detente and the emergence of the Moscow-Peking rift—found it appropriate to review the contact with the Soviets some years ago, and the overtures made to him through Soviet intelligence channels for a reunification of Germany based on acceptance of non-alignment without arms limitations as a National state. This "exchange" ended with the purge of ZHUKOV. It is the Berlin problem far less than the security of West Germany or Europe that lends real urgency to the retention of the U.S. divisions in Germany. Were it not for Berlin it is probable that the Germans would be willing to risk the security of Western Europe on a revised division of defense responsibilities with a drastically reduced U.S. military presence in Europe—assuming of course a continued nuclear tactical capability in Europe. GEHLEN, unlike many of the officials in Bonn acknowledges, while clearly not advocating it, the logic of President Eisenhower's recent statements proposing the redistribution of the elements which make up the Western defense complex. GEHLEN expressed the hope that the U.S. would leave "at least two divisions" in Europe for "political reasons."

16. I do not think it is going too far to conclude that GEHLEN now sees Germany and Europe entering a period in which the circumstances underlying his "special relationship" with us will be, along with the Marshall Plan, a part of a closed chapter of history. His gratitude for our unique contribution will not be diminished; but the relevancy of our position in the past to the day-to-day business in the future will be increasingly limited.

17. There is also the fact that GEHLEN's highly personalized domination of German intelligence extends without interruption back into the late years of the war; he has survived all of his counterparts in NATO; he is in this sense the dean of the Western Intelligence World. In the past few years his own relationships with the Europeans has grown; his personal ties with America have declined. The passing of the DULLES family, ADENAUER'S final desire to consummate the rapprochement of France and Germany in his own lifetime, and the early indifference of the KENNEDY Administration to Germany further contributed to the erosion of GEHLEN's orientation. After GEHLEN's last visit to Washington in 1961 he told his old friend John BOKER in New York that he had "found it difficult to communicate."

18. While there is some disagreement on the severity of the damage, the affect on GEHLEN of the DURRWANGER case has been a major factor in the past year. Perhaps more than the official
embarrassment - which he presumably minimized with a plausible cover story - was the impact on his eldest daughter who, among all of his children, had committed herself most openly to the pro-American image of the early years. I have no doubt that GEHLEN, observing his own diminishing margin of support with ADENAUER in his last year, and the destructive campaign waged against us in the Viet Nam case, has come to fully understand the political wisdom underlying our position. In spite of this, the manner in which we handled the whole affair and inevitable bitterness felt within the family have cast an unhappy shadow on the American image.

19. Had the Government elected to retire GEHLEN - with appropriate gestures of recognition - he would have entered politics. Indeed, GEHLEN has probably a definite intention to enter politics when he retires in a little over three years. While he professes to have no real illusions about the character of DeGaulle's Government, he does not seem entirely confident that Germany may not succumb to a kind of Gaullist movement around the personality of Franz Joseph STRAUSS.

20. Certainly no clear concept of the kind of Europe which he feels might emerge in the next few years became apparent in my brief conversations with GEHLEN; I did sense, however, that he feels that the American presence in Europe passed its zenith during the early 'fifties and, if the general trend in U.S. - Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations continue, it is likely that the American presence will be less in the future than it is today. Whether GEHLEN sees this as a good thing or a bad thing is not really relevant to our consideration of the consequences of this to our own position.

21. Our existing relationship is based on the "most favored service" status that was mutually agreed in the understanding spelled out in specific terms in 1956. The benefits which accrue are largely those which relate to the depth of our continuing day-to-day liaison, and the procedural and physical arrangements which stem from the 1956 agreement. Because the majority of the BND staff directly involved in this liaison will, out of both conviction and habit, continue a profitable substantive professional intercourse, and because GEHLEN is unlikely to press hard for any drastic change in the scope and character of the liaison, it will presumably be possible to preserve the status quo for some time. Attempting to implicate GEHLEN personally in this liaison would almost certainly be counterproductive.

22. While GEHLEN is unsettled and apprehensive about the form of the future, he seems to be a long way from convinced that Europe will evolve the way he tentatively estimates. We should make a sustained effort to stay abreast of his activities and his thinking and not permit him to slip into a position of self-imposed isolation. In his present frame of mind he is a vulnerable target for sophisticated operations by those elements in Europe - and particularly some of the French - who would like to re-enforce the discernible trend in his outlook. In the two brief days of contact with the BND I was struck by the number of senior BND officers who had just been or were about to make visits to Paris or London. It was my impression that GEHLEN himself has visited both several times since his last visit in Washington and has apparently no interest in a visit to the U.S. in the foreseeable future.
23. In summary, the very superficial impression I got on re-visiting the BND was that GEHLEN foresees a growing diminution of the U.S. presence in Europe, is re-enforcing his European ties and initiating a subtle disengagement from the "special arrangements" with us. While political considerations are the principal cause, a number of isolated irritants in the relationship -- including the case -- are factors. In the security field he seems determined to get on with the extremely difficult task of minimizing risks by adopting more stringent measures. Although he feels somewhat isolated from the U.S. and is seeking stronger ties with France and the U.K., he is fully and unhappily aware that neither would be willing or able, should real trouble develop, to play the role that we have played in the past.
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO: MUNICH
FROM: CONF•

DIRECTOR

INFO • D/DCI, DDP, ADOP, VR

CATEGORIES

ON DAY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S DEATH ON DAY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S DEATH

CONVEYED GENERAL GEHLEN’S PERSONAL CONDOLENCES. PLEASE CONVEY TO GENERAL GEHLEN AN APPROPRIATE MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION FROM

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
GATE 2005

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
For your information, while discussing with UTILITY on 29 November his
availability in early January, he informed us that he would be in London
from 6 to 11 January 1964.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

19 December 1963

UTILITY, @Juergens, [Editor's note: J's request]
UTILITY's office
0930 hours

1. Via Juergens I made the appointment to introduce L J to UTILITY. Arriving first, I delivered L J's Christmas gift to Juergens who first asked me to carry one back to L J. Since it was not wrapped, he decided to bring it to the party on the 23rd.

2. UTILITY received us after a short wait and I introduced L J while noting simultaneously that there are many other KUBARKers on our staff whom UTILITY has not met. UTILITY said that they may wonder about his having sent each a Christmas card.

3. At one point UTILITY misunderstood a comment of mine and interpreted it to mean that I had not been able to reach him recently. He pointed to his game leg and said that he had slipped in Starnberg and has been at home nursing it. I explained that I had not been trying to reach him recently.

4. COS: Arranged meeting between L J and UTILITY for 1500 December 30.

5. UTILITY wondered about his schedule for 30 December and Juergens reminded him that was when a school pupil would visit in the morning. UTILITY explained that this student had written saying he had done an article on CATIDE and requested photos. UTILITY invited him down for an interview.

6. Italian: Yellow No. 29791 passed. See ECOM-63490.

7. Degenhardt: On behalf of Chief, KUCHAP I extended an invitation for Degenhardt to visit Washington in March 1964. UTILITY knew I was aware of Degenhardt's illness but hoped he would be well enough by March.

8. EUCOM: I noted that L J had recommended CATIDE invite Col. Sherrard of EUCOM to Munich for briefings. UTILITY thought this a fine idea and wrote down Sherrard's name. He made no mention of Hartwig's having discussed this subject with him several weeks ago.

9. L J told UTILITY that we had agreed upon certain procedures for processing additional arrangements between services; for example where the Air Force and Luftwaffe may want to work out an exchange. UTILITY said they had instructed MOT that only exchanges between intel components were permissible. I noted that that is exactly what is pending between the Air Forces. Anyway, I wanted to pass on these procedures and wondered whether I should give them to Juergens or Sherrard. UTILITY replied that this concerned a policy matter and should be passed to him. He expanded this to include anybody on his immediate staff such as @Holm who is responsible for all policy matters and
Juergens. I promised to give the procedures to Holm after Christmas.

EXTACT:  

10. UTILITY said he had a personal matter to take up with me alone.

11. I extended Christmas wishes and presented a gift from General Walter. He said he had delivered UTILITY's gift to last Monday.

12. Gifts: UTILITY explained how in the past he has had trouble accounting for money used to buy Christmas gifts for his own people. He always was able to get the Chief of the Rechnumghof to sign off. Now there is no chief. UTILITY asked me to sign a receipt showing that I received DM 600 in return for $150.00. I signed as . He in turn gave me a similar receipt, which he signed as Schneider. (We have done this before to account for funds spent on CATIDE picnics.)

13. Karlsson: I asked whether Fleming had yet informed him of the Karlsson case. His reply was that Fleming had been trying to see him but had not had the chance. I provided the bare essentials about the girl refugee having seen Karlsson twice at Camp King and having claimed to have seen him in East Berlin ten years ago. I told UTILITY that I wanted him to know that we considered this a remote security case and that political factors were involved. However, we felt CATIDE should pursue the investigation. He agreed and then proceeded to show me an example of how identification can be wrong. A Greek customs official on the Bulgarian border disappeared sometime ago. His wife sometime later saw a picture in some publication and claimed it was her husband. Actually, it was UTILITY and the photo was taken during his youth. UTILITY then showed me photos of the Greek, his wife and daughter. There was a vague resemblance to UTILITY's youth pictures.

14. UTILITY tried unsuccessfully to buzz Holm on his intercom. He then suggested we pick him up on the way. I assumed correctly that UTILITY thought I was going to the showing of Colonel Abel's films on the Gordon Cooper space flight. I told him that I had already seen them. We exchanged Christmas greetings and I departed.

Typed: 20 December 1963
ROUTINE

SECRET 26 DEC 63

SECRET 2616512

MUNI INFO FROM CITE DIP. 91608

FOR E L AND E L

REF EGOT 21351

E J: STATES E J: PRESENT AT ALL MEETINGS BETWEEN
HIM, UTILITY AND OTHERS EXCEPT FOR ONE LUNCH WITH UTILITY.
ON THAT OCCASSION E J WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE OPS DETAIL
ON EGYPTIAN SCENE, SOME OF WHICH NOT RELATED TO E J LATER.
Otherwise E J: CONVINCED E J HAS ALL FACTS.

SECRET

FOR 29/1023Z

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES: NINETEEN EXPIRATION 3026
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE: 2003

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GROUP I: EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
C/MGB C/OPS OCA RLS PAT GO 50 C/S T C/26 SEC FIN LOG REG
C/LB DC/LB L/OPS L/CF L/PLNS L/IN L/CONS L/INT L/PO
OPERATIONAL CAUTION: □ □ Meeting with UTILTY

Ref.: DIR-91608

1. □ I and E met with UTILTY from 1540 until 1630 hours on 29 November 1963. □ □ then met alone with UTILTY from 1630 until 1815. □ □ visited UTILTY’s home the following day and also lunched with him.

2. Significant items discussed in my presence were the subject of separate communications such as dispatches concerning □ □ and UTILTY’s planned visit to London in January. It is true that □ □ did brief me on some of his talks with UTILTY but he also spent a good part of his last day in Munich writing a report on his conversations. The inference I drew was that the report would be of immediate concern to MIB and not dealt with the Egyptian scene. Would you kindly ask □ □ what disposition he made of his report. I made no attempt to make an official record of what □ □ told me since he indicated that I would be the eventual recipient of his report.

Distribution:
2 - Chief, EE
2 - COG/6

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHODS EXEMPTION 1994
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURES
DATE 2005
DISPATCH

Chief, MIB

[Address]

C/O, Germany; Chief; Aug. 1/52
Chief, SDK, Frankfurt

C/O, Germany; Chief; Aug. 1/52

Ref: A, RKW 1469, 1 December 1954

1. On 29 December, the undersigned had a discussion with the Chief of

Concerning the situation in Germany in general. The Chief mentioned that

the situation had no longer to be discussed in this manner, and that it had even referred directly to NATO for a

Decision in this connection. Both we have an agreement that the

next step in this matter was for NATO to get together with the Chief, NATO.

2. We have reviewed the personal opinion that, if the present

situation continues, the intelligence and exploitation, the greatest

current value would lie in the German internal security area. This should

have the primary responsibility for the administration and the

maintenance, however. If opportunities arise to utilize the extensive

personnel data on occupation personnel for recruitment purposes, then CAGSD

should have primary responsibility. This was said to be the situation as of

present and future capabilities in the recruitment of the GFB personnel. A report on this was not

forwarded to NATO. The Chief was able to view this respect for and, as it were, the

Chief said that he was of the opinion that the entire GFB on the issue of being

reorganized from the ground up which was to be a number of years

before GFB could expect any operations. The Chief in the Chief.

3. A step with this at this point we should take proving

CAGSD or CAGSD at NATO turnover until we have formally established an

agreed position with the CIA/SD. We should agree on

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENT

SOURCES: NATIONAL SECURITY

DATE: 2005

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Distribution:

C/O, MIB w/att
C/O, SDK, Germany w/att
C/O, CIB, Germany w/att
C/O, BON w/att
C/O, BOH w/att
C/O, BOH w/att
C/O, BON w/att

4 January 1954

SECRET

452

72K

E BERT

Policy
Dear General Gehlen:

Thank you so much for your card extending the greetings of the season.

Your thoughtfulness in thinking of me is very much appreciated.

With all good wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Reinhard Gehlen
Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes
Generalleutnant d.R.
January 9, 1964

Dear General Gehlen:

Thank you so much for your card extending the greetings of the season.

Your thoughtfulness in thinking of me is very much appreciated.

With all good wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

/\s/

John A. McCone

Reinhard Gehlen
President des Bundesnachrichtendienstes
Generalleutnant d.R.

cc Christmas file and German desk
1. Alias Kuhne has been told that possibility exists for exchange views between Wessr. E. C. 6 and E. D. et al and Auswertung reps in Bonn on late afternoon or evening 26 Jan. Topic to be Soviet economic and military situation. Alias Kuhne also was told that nature of mission and schedule will most likely not allow meeting with utility. Alias Kuhne has cabled his headquarters.

2. Please convey above to utility and determine whether plan for above meeting should be made.

3. Please inform MIB full background of visit.

SECRET
TOR 15/0714Z

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES/METHOD EXEMPTION 322E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE (C)
DATE 2005

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GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
C/MOB C/LDS C/CA H/LS INT G/0 SO EG NT C/SB SEC FIN LOG REG
C/LB O/ULB L/OPS L/CE L/PLANS L/RE L/C/COMMO L/INT L/PKR.
IN 1860 A IMMEDIATE

ECRET 312031Z

IMMEDIATE MUNI: J: BONN FJ: FRAN CITE: DIR 91942

BY: S. REDWOOD

REF DIR 91660

1. FYI ONLY. PLANNING VISIT ADDEX STATIONS DURING LAST TWO WEEKS JAN. PRIMARY PURPOSE WILL BE TO CARRY WORD TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS REL SOVIET ECON PROBLEMS. WE WILL WANT TO BE CONTINUOUSLY INFORMED OF REACTIONS TO REF YOU OBTAIN FROM SOVIET CONTACTS AS PART OF EXERCISE OF SATISFYING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO TRIP.

2. SINCE PLANS FOR TRIP NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH ODACID, THIS INFO SHOULD BE LIMITED STATION OFFICERS ON NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

3. WHEN PLANS FOR TRIP FIRM, WILL CABLE FURTHER DETAIL.

FROM: S/C NOTE: MUNI ADDED PER BRANCH ROST.

S/ECCR. E

TOR 15/0937Z

ORIGINAL DTG 312031Z

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENT SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 34212A 34212B 34212C 34212D 34212E LOG REG

PLANS

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GROUP 1: EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADE AND DECLASSIFICATION

C/OPS OCA RLS INT GO SO EG NT CM/SEC FIN LOG REG

L/OPS L/CE L/PLANS L/RE L/COMMO L/INT L/POL
IMMEDIATE

DATE: WED JAN 16

TIE-GEL T 12005Z

FROM: FRANK

TO: MINI


ASSAULT IS GIVING DINNER FOR L & 26 JAN.

WHO HERE THIS MORNING WAS WONDERING WHETHER IT MIGHT
BE USEFUL, NOTKNOWING WHETHER THIS WILL BE.

PLEASE ADVISE YOUR PERSONAL REACTION TO US AND

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS: EMBATTLED 3021
KASH WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
15 January 1964

IMMEDIATE FROM: BONN

HUNT

C/MLB

TELENOTE

RTBAT

NO: 01/15 NOT TO BONN

1. I AM SEEKING UTILTY 1900 TODAY TO DETERMINE WHETHER AUGMENTER REPS AVAILABLE MEET WITH KUJAP REPS ON 26 JAN IN BONN. FEEL CONFIDENT ANSWER WILL BE AFFIRMATIVE.

2. I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT UTILTY WILL BE OFFENDED BY ANY STATEMENT THAT MISSION AND SCHEDULE NOT LIKELY ALLOWS MEETING WITH UTILTY. I NOTE REF B THAT PURPOSE C. VISIT IS PRESENT GROUNDS VIEWS AND INTEL ESTIMATES. THIS IS VERY DEFINITELY UTILTY TYPE BUSINESS AND TO CUT HIM OUT COMPLETELY WILL ONLY ADD TO UTILTY'S CURRENT BELIEF THAT SOMEONE IN KUJAP OUT TO GET HIM. IF WE CANNOT SUGGEST TO GERMAN AUTHORITIES WHO ARE TO BE BRIEFED BY C. THAT PERHAPS UTILTY SAINT TO BE PRESENT, THEN I THINK IT IMPERATIVE THAT SOMETHING BE ARRANGED URGENT C. AND UTILTY GET TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH ATTENDANCE AT AMBASSADOR DINNER NOT BEST SOLUTION IT WOULD BE BETTER THAN UTILTY BEING COMPLETELY SNUBBED.

3. SEEKING FURTHER RESOLUTION ABOVE PROBLEM I INTEND TO VISIT UTILTY THAT DETAILS C. SCHEDULE NOT YET KNOWN TO ME.

END OF MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3221 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act DATE 2005
Please convey to UTILITY the attached (under separate cover) New Year's greetings from [Redacted].

Attachment USC
Envelope

DISTRIBUTION:
2 - MIL w/att USC
2 - COS/0 w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO
EJGW-13518 15 January 1964
SECRET 112058Z

IMMEDIATE MUNIPRIORITY FROM BONN CITE DIR 09769

REF DIR 91942

1. ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. E. AND MR. E. KUBARK ECONOMIC EXPERT AND SECURITY OFFICER
PLAN BE IN EUROPE LATER HALF JAN. PLANNING BRIEF BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN AUTHORITIES AT HIGH LEVEL ON LATEST ODYSSEY VIEWS AND ESTIMATES ON USSR, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CURRENT COMMUNIST BLOC MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES.

2. CURRENT TENTATIVE ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: JAN 10-NOON 21 PARIS NOON JAN 21-23 LONDON, JAN 24-25 BONN, JAN 25-28 ROME AND POSSIBLE SHORT STOP MADRID ENROUTE HOME.

3. SUGGEST STATION PROMPTLY CONSULT KULYNK REPORT "CURRENT ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES IN THE SOVIET BLOC AND COMMUNIST ASIA" DATED JAN. 1964, UNCLASSIFIED, WHICH HAS BEEN AIRMAILED TO BONN AND FRANKFURT. STATION SHOULD PULL TOGETHER AVAILABLE MATERIAL AFFECTING ITS AREA WITH POSSIBLE BEARING ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT, PARTICULARLY MATERIAL WHICH REFLECTS LOCAL ATTITUDES. NY TIMES ARTICLES OF 8 AND 9 JAN CITING CIA STUDIES ON SOVIET ECONOMIC SITUATION SHOULD BE CONSULTED.

4. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMUNICATING BY PRIORITY MESSAGE WITH AMBASSADOR GIVING FURTHER DETAILS ON PLANS FOR MEETING WITH SENIOR GOVT PERSONALITIES. PLEASE CONSULT THIS MESSAGE FOR YOUR FURTHER GUIDANCE.

GROUP IV EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

C/HOD C/OPS OCA RLS INT GO SO EG NT CABB SEC FIN LOG REG
C/LE DC/LE L/OPS L/CE L/PLANS L/RE L/COMM L/INT L/FOL
5. FURTHER INFO ON E J'S WISHES WITH RESPECT TO ACCOMMODATIONS, CONSULTATIONS, ETC. FOR YOUR AREA WILL BE FORTHCOMING SEPARATELY.

FROM S/C NOTE: MUNI ADDED PER BRANCH ROST.

SECRET

TOR 15/0930Z
1. Before I could finish query whether Auswerten reps could meet with Chief Kuchapa, utility dug out message from Kuchapa who had reported that I would be in Bonn 27 and 28 January, that he would see only Chancellor and Depmin and that meeting with utility not possible. I maintained I not familiar with S' schedule and could only assume that he might be in Bonn 26 January since Chief Kuchapa would be there then. Holm assumed that perhaps Kuchapa reps wanted meet with Catide before Kuchapa sees Chancellor.

2. Utility said present plans call for his presence Rome from 24 to 31 January. If any pos utility | I might want meet him he would change Rome plans. He explained he chose this time for trip Rome because Chancellor to be there 27 to 29 January. I promised let him know if | I should want meeting.

3. Upon return my office Holm called to say utility had cancelled plans go to Rome and would be available in week 26 January. I do not know exactly what happened but my guess is that utility did not want me to send any message saying he would be out of German during | I visit. I am convinced

SECRET
That he would very much like meet with Y. Personally I feel that such a meeting would give our liaison much needed shot in arm, urge that you take up matter with HQ and would appreciate receiving info copies anything you send. In meantime I am not sending any of my views in command channels.

END OF MESSAGE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

UTILITY's Office 15 January 1964

1. Having learned that Güereges is sick, I phoned Heyl to ask for a meeting with UTILITY. He greeted me on arrival and waited with me until UTILITY opened his door but he did not participate in the discussion. I asked whether Güereges had the grippe. Heyl said it was worse than that - Kreislaufstörung.

2. (a). U. S. Visit: I gave Heyl for Holm Yellow No. 2943 concerning the Lichtenberg/Storer visit to the U.S.A. (Note: At an earlier meeting with @Brook, I gave him a copy also.) Later when Holm joined UTILITY and me I told him that I had given Heyl the memo. Holm knew it.

(b) Personnel: I gave Heyl a sealed envelope for Hartvig containing the attached memorandum from as well as a copy of the House bill on retirement. He promised to forward it.

3. UTILITY came out and ushered me into his office. He asked whether he should summon Holm. I said it would not be necessary but Holm came in later anyway probably as a result of being tipped off by Heyl that I was there.

4. I passed UTILITY Blue No. 2969 concerning procedures for handling service-to-service agreements. I offered to explain any portions that might be unclear.

EXTRACT: L/PNE

5. KUCHAP Visit: See my telnote to FRAN 06/15 which is an accurate account of what was said and order of expression. UTILITY and Holm thought that Kienle, Nortmann and Kuehnert would attend the meeting in Bonn. See MURI-9621. UTILITY as an afterthought said that Degenhardt would go if his health permitted. Holm said he would let me know whether the Auswertung types could make the visit on the 26th. We discussed possible locations for the meeting and UTILITY thought the Embassy would be the best place. Holm phoned me before I got back to the office. He confirmed that the Auswertung officers would go to Bonn and named them. He also said that UTILITY "would not make his trip" and would be here all week.

6. Indonesia: I asked UTILITY whether he had seen Telex 0066 containing EOS report 10/64. He said he had. I asked whether he knew how Bonn had handled it. He said he did not, that they had given it to Westrick and Carstens but had given only that information which could be used but not the background information. He searched around his desk for awhile but could not find the report.

EXTRACT: L/PNE

UTILITY & Hey as indicated
7. Washington Representative: I expressed regret about Martens' illness. UTILITY comments covered in AM-63739. The expressions on both Hula and UTILITY indicated that there had been plenty said on the subject of a Washington representative but they were not ready to spring it upon me.

8. I asked if UTILITY would be in the rest of the week. He said he would be here on Friday but would leave for Bonn and be there next week.

9. On my way out I ran into Mrs. Quergens who was sitting with the front office secretaries. I asked about her husband. She said that he had been working too hard and was exhausted. She hoped he would take a good long rest.
I was assigned to personnel work between January 1957 and June 1960. I mention these dates because what I have to say about the Agency's personnel problems and the things that we did to try to solve them had to do with the period of time that began 10 years after the establishment of the Agency and seven years after the Cold War reached its height with the outbreak of the Korean War. It can be said that every institution or agency comes of age in the field of personnel management after a certain number of years. This was true of our Agency. It had begun to come of age before I was assigned to the personnel office in a sense that most of the senior people in the Agency had become worried and frustrated because it was apparent that:

a. We had reached and in fact somewhat exceeded our ceiling for personnel and yet we seemed to be continuously short of the kind of people we needed to undertake key important assignments.

b. We found ourselves spending a great deal of time trying to find assignments for people in the middle and higher grades, who, although they had served well, were at that time becoming less and less useful.

c. We were unable to hire as many young people as we thought we should in order to provide leadership in the future because of our trouble with the ceiling.
d. People whom we considered in the less useful category occupied positions and grades into which we wished to promote the more capable young people. The fact that we couldn't move the less useful people out of the Agency resulted in a slowdown of promotions.

e. Finally, our system of personnel management was based almost entirely on the existing Civil Service rules and regulations. In saying that these rules did not work for certain parts of our Agency, I do not wish to imply criticism of the Civil Service or of its administration over the years. As I got to know something about
it, my respect for it and for the people who administered it, constantly increased. However, since it is designed to provide the Government with an honest and capable service with which to carry out its internal programs, it was obviously not designed to meet the needs of an agency operating overseas. Nor indeed was it even remotely designed to meet the needs of our kind of Agency.

Up until the time I became Director of Personnel, our Agency had mainly been occupied with hiring people, promoting them, getting them into the right assignments and keeping them happy. During the formative years, and largely at the instigation of our second Director, we had embarked upon a program which provided for the hiring of highly intelligent and capable young college graduates, their training, and then their placement within the Agency. This program is called the Junior Officer Trainees program and it still forms the backbone of our hiring, training, and placement operation. From its earliest inception this program has been a success. There is no doubt in my mind but that the Junior Officer Trainees (JOT's) will in the future form the hard core, particularly of our overseas service. At the time I became Director of Personnel, there was a strong movement on foot to create within our Agency a separate "commissioned" service based on the JOT program and similar to the Foreign Service and the commissioned services of the military establishment (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines). I see no
indication at the present time that we will create a commissioned service, but there are still many capable and influential members of our agency who believe we should. For my part, I have consistently opposed this concept because I feel that in our work we need more flexibility in the management of personnel than is provided by a water-tight system.

It will be seen from the foregoing that my problem in 1957 was not hiring, but firing. It would be a great blessing for every personnel officer if people liked to be fired and an even greater blessing if you could let good, honest, decent people go without prejudicing their chance for future employment. This latter was our main problem and one that we will only partially solve even after the retirement bill we are advocating is passed by the Congress and signed by the President. Before discussing this main problem, that is, separating good, honest but unneeded people, let me mention the problem of getting rid of the bad eggs.

Our basic legislation authorized the Director to separate employees in the interest of the United States, and, in fact, did not impose any restriction on him in this regard. It was, however, clearly the original intent of Congress that he use this authority to protect the security of the organization. When the question arose whether to use this authority for other than security cases, we had a great debate one evening at the Alibi Club. From my point of view, the only useful thing that was said was that you either had to use the Director's authority as given in law or you had to go
back to Congress for further authority. In the latter case, Congress would ask you why you didn't use the authority already in law. Since it was obvious that no one wanted to get that kind of answer from Congress, we decided to go ahead and use our authority.

After experimenting a little bit with special hearing boards and committees, I selected two officers in the personnel department to whom I assigned the task of reviewing all cases other than security cases and taking testimony from witnesses and from the person involved. When the cases were prepared by those officers, I then read them and made my recommendation to the Director. Before the case went to the Director, it would usually be read by the General Counsel or one of his officers. This system may sound cumbersome, but compared with review by an appointed board it was really very efficient. I found that every personnel or security board with which I had to do has included at least one member who became enormously interested in all manner of detail and often emotionally involved in the case. This resulted in a very good and very long hearing for the individual concerned, but frankly was too high a price to pay for the result obtained, i.e., the separation or retention of an admittedly mediocre worker.

The combination of Civil Service regulations for the hiring, advancement, and retirement of personnel on the one hand, and the Agency's special authority to separate insecure and unsuitable personnel on the other, has to the best of my knowledge met most of
the requirements of those sections of the Agency that operate exclusively in Washington. The big problem had to do with our overseas service and its Washington headquarters element. It was with regard to this group that we were uneasy and frustrated.

In getting at this problem, I received help from three sources. First, I came across in my reading a pamphlet written by a young faculty member at Princeton University about the Foreign Service. In the pamphlet the author analyzed the problems confronting the Foreign Service before it had been reformed under the Riston Committee described the reforms and then went on to show how the reforms had affected the service. The author used statistical techniques in his analysis of the service and he demonstrated how important these could be in supporting arguments for change and also in showing the management of the department where they stand at a particular point and time. My second source of support was a very capable personnel officer who also happened to be a good statistician. For a period of two years, he and I worked together in compiling statistics and developing arguments for a revision of our personnel practices. My third source of support was the Senior Assistant to the President's Personnel Adviser. This gentleman, who had had many years of experience in federal management, who had dealt extensively with Congress, and who had had an opportunity to follow the affairs of different parts of the government as seen from the senior top down, was able to show me that our problems were not entirely unique and he encouraged me to propose bold solutions but in such a way that they would be acceptable to Congress.
With the advice and help that we received we decided that we needed for our overseas service a system of recruitment, advancement, separation, and retirement which would produce the following results:

a. Keep the service equipped with a balanced group of officers in terms principally of age.

As a result of the very rapid recruitment that we did during the Korean War, we found ourselves in the mid-50's with an uncommon proportion of our officers in the age group 29-35. Thus, we decided it was necessary, before developing regular and continuing rates of intake and separation, to take special measures to reduce this group. This also offered us an opportunity to separate the good but unneeded officers with a minimum of prejudice.

b. Provide an opportunity for advancement which would permit the outstanding officer to assume his first position of responsibility at a relatively young age and while he is still developing.

NOTE: During its first years of existence, our Agency inherited (from the Office of Strategic Services) or recruited (from among former military intelligence personnel) a strong and capable group of men who at the time of our study ranged in age between 45 and 50. Almost all of the key positions in our foreign service were occupied by men in this age group. If we had allowed nature to take its course and had permitted these officers to continue on in their positions until the mandatory age of retirement in the civil service (70), we
would have blocked the advancement to positions of responsibility of a whole generation of officers. This may sound exaggerated but it is in fact exactly what happened among the agencies created by President Roosevelt in the early 30's. The capable and dedicated young men who came to Washington at that time were still to be found in their offices in the middle 50's. As they reached retirement age, it was almost impossible to replace them since there had been no upward movement and development of executive personnel in these agencies for over a decade.

c. Attract young men to the service by offering a reliable rate of advancement and opportunity.

NOTE: This point is broader than the one that precedes it since it involves a larger number of young men. The problem had been caused by the rapid expansion of the Agency during the Cold War. It is axiomatic that you cannot expand rapidly without promoting rapidly. If you do the latter, you invariably end up with a certain proportion of your medium and higher-graded positions occupied by people who are less able than new people who have since been hired. Obviously this is a situation which one can never avoid entirely and the results of which must be accepted as part of the price we pay for fair and sensible administration. However, when one has gone through a very rapid period of expansion, this problem takes on an acute form and requires special attention.
d. Provide means whereby personnel who were recruited for para-military operations or other such highly specialized fields could be separated without prejudice and with suitable support or annuity before reaching the normal age of retirement.

e. Finally, to have a means whereby we can provide for the hiring of persons in the higher grades in order to introduce into the service skills and knowledge that one might gain in scientific, commercial and other fields.

Once we determined all the goals that we wished to realize in devising the system, we drew up a statistical analysis of the male personnel in our foreign service according to age groups and grade groups. By using the findings of the Civil Service Commission and other government departments, we were able to represent the make-up of the foreign service five, ten, and fifteen years in the future.
graphically. As you can well imagine, the picture of the graph showed the make-up of the service fifteen years in the future was somewhat similar to the officer corps of the Prussian Army at the time of the Battle of Jena. Other and more refined statistical studies showed us in detail where our problems were with regard to rates of advancement and gave us a fairly clear idea of the extent of the job we needed to do in separating people and in arranging for early retirement in order to enjoy a fairly healthy personnel situation.

Most of the measures which we recommended and some of which we have already taken are reflected in the attached proposed legislation (see page 10, H.R. 7216). In reading this Bill, you will find the financial arrangements bewildering. Let me guide you through it. The provision beginning on line 9, page 23, is essentially the provision which Congress accepted in another form and which we used one or two years ago in an attempt to achieve our first objective, i.e., to equip the service with a balanced group of officers in terms of age. On page 24, starting with line 24, and again on page 25, starting with line 6, you will see that we are proposing the reduction of the mandatory age for retirement from 70 to 65 in the case of persons in grade GS-15 and above and from 70 to 60 in the case of all other persons. Even more important I think are the provisions cited on page 22, line 4, and page 23, line 5. These provide for the voluntary and involuntary retirement of officers. Taken together these several provisions that I have cited deal...
specifically with the other goals of our program.

I shall be glad to answer any questions you have about our system. You will recognize that having been away from it for 3½ years, I have ceased to be an expert. The meaning of some of the language in the proposed Bill is obscure to me but that is nothing new. The lawyers who draft such things have their own complicated way of expressing ideas.

Attachment: H.R. 7216
151203Z
02/16 JAN 64
IMMEDIATE FROM C
INFO: MUNI C J
FROM: BOWN C
REF MUNI'S 03/15 AND 04/15 JAN 64
1. C J'S POSITION IS WELL TAKEN, AND HIS ESTIMATES
OF THE GAIN AND LOSSES INHERENT IN THIS SITUATION ARE NOT
OVERDRAWN. I FEEL THAT STATION, CITING US ALL, MUST TAKE
STRONG POSITION THAT C J SHOULD SOMEHOW FIND TIME TO MEET UTILITY
BEST OF ALL WOULD BE PROPOSAL THROUGH ODACID BY
C J THAT UTILITY BE INCLUDED AMONG THOSE ATTENDING HIGH
LEVEL BRIEFING, OR I COULD QUIETLY SUGGEST TO WESTRICK THAT
HE BE INCLUDED ON GERMAN INITIATIVE. I WILL SOUND OUT
AMBASSADOR TODAY ON INVITING UTILITY TO DINNER ON 26TH. AMB.
HAS CALLED STAFF MEETING FOR 1730 TO DISCUSS PLANS.
2. WE HAVE SEVERAL PROBLEMS. ONE IS THAT UTILITY IS
OUT OF FAVOR WITH HIS OWN GOVERNMENT AND MAY WELL NOT BE
THOUGHT OF UNLESS REMINDED BY US. SECOND IS THAT GOVERNMENT
ATTITUDES (READ UTHRBTH) HAVE RUBBED OFF ON AMBASSADOR.
AND THIRD IS THAT VISIT IS COMING INCREASINGLY UNDER ODACID
MANAGEMENT. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE ALL OBLIGED TO POINT OUT
TO ALL CONCERNED THAT FOR C J TO COME INTO GERMANY AND
BRIEF CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER WITHOUT SO MUCH AS A
BY YOUR LEAVE TO UTILITY WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR DISASTER.
(END)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES: NARCISEXEMPTION 3025
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER TODAY PRODUCED FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. WOULD THERE BE ANY OBJECTION TO BRIEFING'S BEING GIVEN JOINTLY TO ERHARD AND SCHROEDER IN CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE?

B. ARE THERE ANY OBJECTIONS TO OTHERS BEING INCLUDED, VON HASSEL, FOR INSTANCE, OR GEHLEN, OR REINKEMEYER (FOREIGN OFFICE SOVIET AFFAIRS EXPERT)?

C. HOW LONG DOES BRIEFING LAST?

2. C J IS INVITED TO STAY WITH AMBASSADOR, BUT THERE WILL BE NO EMBARRASSMENT IF HE PREFERS TO STAY WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. C J'S GROUP IS BOOKED AT DREISEN.
AND I URGED THAT L. J. RECEIVE
UTILITY AND HEAR FROM HIM DIRECTLY THE MAIN OUTLINE CATIDE'S
POSITION REGARD STATUS SOV ECONOMY. THIS SHOULD NOT REQUIRE
MUCH TIME SINCE UTILITY ANYTHING BUT LONG WINDED. IT WOULD
BE APPROPRIATE BECAUSE UTILITY IS REREP'S SENIOR EXPERT
THIS AREA. L. J. REPORTS UTILITY HAS CANCELLED SCHEDULED
TRIP ITALY ORDER BE AVAILABLE. WE HAVE IN NO WAY SUGGESTED
OR ENCOURAGED THIS DECISION HIS PART.
IN 1937 KROUTINE

FRAN BONN SITE (DIR 95231)

RE FRAN 4490

NOW LIKELY BE BONN 25-26 JAN AND WOULD LOOK FORWARD
MEETING WITH UTILITY PER REF IF THIS CAN BE WORKED INTO SCHEDULE.
PRESUMABLY THIS COULD BE DONE VIA EITHER SEPARATE MEETING OR
UTILITY JOINING CHANCELLOR BRIEFING PER DIR 95050. NR.

SECRET

TOR 18/0755Z
1. If my memory serves me right, this was the first Christmas in the past four years that the Chief, KGBAK failed to send Christmas greetings to UTILTY. Usually a cable containing such greetings was received on Christmas Eve.

2. Since no message came from Washington, the following was drafted and approved by the Chief, WASHINGTON by hand on 30 December:

26 December 1963

"The following message was received from [ ] for you:

I extend to you and the members of your service the heartiest season's greetings with all best wishes for the New Year. I am looking forward to seeing you in Washington during this coming year."

Distribution: 2. Chief, EX
2. COG/6

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3028 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED DATE DISPATCHED
17 Jan. 64 20 Jan. 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

327-3-28-1
1. At — party on 10 January Brock approached me and almost before he had said hello began to spout off about the poor morale at CANTAB and the inadequacies of UTILITY. He hardly bothered to lower his voice, and since a number of other CANTABs including (DEAN) were only a few yards away, I hustled him up and made an appointment to meet him a few days later.

2. By meeting with Brock was held at the Bruecke on 14 January. Brock was in a rare mood and seemed to have an absolute compulsion to talk. He dished up the dirt on CANTAB for over two hours. He said he wanted to pass on this information because he was very concerned at morale in CANTAB and the future of KNEER/CANTAB relations. He admitted that some of the information he gave me was hearsay and rumor, but said he knew for a fact that most of it was correct. The conversation rambled around a good deal and for the sake of clarity I have considerably reorganized it.

3. UTILITY was the first topic discussed and — comments about him were not very flattering. The following were his main points:

a. UTILITY's sole interest these days is staying in office until he reaches retirement age in 1969. His pride will not let him resign earlier. In order to shore up his position, he spends practically all his time hobnobbing with Bundestag Delegaten and senior officials in Bonn.

b. Since Erhard took over the chancellorship, he has not put UTILITY a single time, and UTILITY has felt himself humiliated by this. However, UTILITY does not expect that Erhard will replace him prior to the elections in the fall of 1965; and then he will be almost at retirement age. UTILITY desires to play the role of elder statesman in the German intelligence field after retirement.

c. Despite UTILITY's long absences and preoccupation with his own position, he will not let anyone else make major decisions at CANTAB. The result is that CANTAB simply drifts without decisions being made. For instance, some months ago TREGER submitted to UTILITY a proposed CALT program for the Winter Olympics in Hanover. UTILITY never made any decision and possibly never even read TREGER's paper. Now nothing is being done.

d. UTILITY's personal policies, especially his notorious preference for relatives and old cronies, has had a very disturbing effect on morale at CANTAB. UTILITY makes personnel assignments on the basis of merit or suitability. But more frequently he acts on the basis of personal favoritism, repayment of obligations, or a desire to get rid of officers who have displeased him.
I talk with UIA at CO.

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9. Brock next switched to CAEBAX and his situation in the U.S. He said that contrary to Reine's statements to KUBARK he was unhappy in the U.S. The reason for this is that he has far too little to do. To meet \[\text{not legible}\] for lunch once every other week and between times has nothing to do but attend a few briefings put on by low level KUBARK types. This does not come close to making up a workload for a Major General. A point of personal irritation to Reine is his belief that the British and French representatives in Washington operate on a higher level than he does. He believes that the British and French representatives see C frequently and are consulted on important policy matters. He himself, he says, is handled by the German desk of the Beachhead.

10. Brock's next target was Dessau. He said that Dessau is a pitiful case and in an impossible situation at KUBARK. His two chief subordinates, RICE and OTTEN, consider him a complete incompetent and have all but refused to work for him. KUBARK pays no attention to Dessau and considers him a disposal problem. After the suicide of Dessau's son, KUBARK toyed with the idea of getting rid of him by making his his representative in Australia. Then he sent Dessau on a long tour of the Far East. More recently, he scheduled Dessau for a long trip to Latin America, again only to get him out of sight. KUBARK's latest wrinkle is to send Dessau to the U.S. in place of BESCH, who will be laid up for at least six months and may never again regain full activity.

11. It became obvious at this point that Brock's main reason for talking to us was his desire to keep Dessau from going to Washington. He declared that such an appointment would be a disaster for both KUBARK and C.AEB. He said that Dessau had absolutely no influence on KUBARK and that no one in C.AEB would pay any attention to what he reported from Washington. In his present state, Dessau would also give the KUBARK officers he dealt with a very poor impression of C.AEB. Thus, instead of having a man in Washington who could improve relations between KUBARK and C.AEB during the next critical years, Dessau's appointment would lead to KUBARK and C.AEB drifting further apart. With some bitterness, Brock remarked that KUBARK knew that Dessau was not a suitable man for the Washington job, but Dessau was a disposal problem and in his present mood KUBARK did not mind pushing him off on KUBARK.

12. C.AEBAX, Brock said, was the proper run for the Washington job. He had KUBARK's confidence and KUBARK would listen to what he reported from Washington. His energy and intelligence would also favorably impress the KUBARKers he met. Brock said that he had had several meetings with Hartwig and had urged him to try to get KUBARK to vote Dessau's appointment and volunteer for the job himself. However, Hartwig had been non-commital.

13. Returning to C.AEB, Brock said that C.AEB was trying to get moved to Paris as rapidly as he could. He realized that if he was still at C.AEB Headquarters when KUBARK departed, his ticket to Paris would probably be replaced with one back to the Bundesrepublik. However, if he could get to Paris he hoped to hang on there for another at least. Brock said that the French
had been no more eager to accept than we were, but that out of deference to ULTIM they had smiled and taken him.

14. Brock said that the present CATIDS representative in Paris, was returning to CATIDS Headquarters about 15 February to take over as Chief of Foreign Liaison from Morten. Specia French, being and a great admirer of the French. However, he is not equally fond of KENAI and Brock predicted that things would not go so smoothly for us after he takes charge.

15. Brock himself, if present plans are fixed up, will leave during the summer to take over a CE Bisontin in Hamburg. Brock is happy and looking forward to the assignment. The only thing that can hold him is the problem of placing the present holder of the job. This gentleman, whom Brock did not mention, has a very high grade but not the ability to match it. He has to be placed somewhere, but there are very few vacancies at his grade level.

16. Brock said his replacement has not yet been selected. One of the candidates is GAY also known as CAMEL. Brock said he did not remember Gay's true name but his brother was a bishop of either Regensburg or Passau. Brock said that Gay had worked with KENAI before and was friendly to us. Brock therefore hoped that he would get the job.

17. Almost the last point Brock touched on was the problem of ULTIM's successor. He said that due to the present state of morale at CATIDS and ULTIM's "lame duck" administration, rumors about the succession are flying thick and fast. The most widely spread story is that ULTIM will be succeeded by a political nominee of the Brent caliber. His deputy would then be a retired military officer, the most likely candidate being Haas or General Vossel. Brock said he thought Haas would continue to play a leading role in CATIDS no matter who took over. Judging by the way the British have been coming up to Haas lately, Brock said he believes this too. Brock said very people think that Vossel is the KENAI candidate for ULTIM's job. Possibly this is due to Vossel's present assignment in the U.S.

18. By the time we had gotten this far we had talked over two hours. Several times Brock repeated that he was telling me these things only because of his concern at the state of KENAI/CATIDS relations and his fear that relations were getting worse instead of better. I promised to hold his remarks in strict confidence and asked if he would be willing to continue our conversation at a later date. He accepted readily. He also said he wanted to introduce me to some of his non-CATIDS friends in Munich before he leaves and to get together again socially very soon.

Typed: 16 January 1968
ROUTINE: 18 JAN 64 IN 1950 K
SEC C RIE T 181648Z
BONN MUNI CITE FRAN 4527
REF DIR 95251
PLES ARRANGE 3-UTILITY MEETING KEEPING ME INFORMED.
SECRET
TCR 19/1925Z

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (CIA)
SOURCE: METHODS EXEMPTION 3026 G. WAR CRIME DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GROUP I- EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION
G/MOB C/OPS OCA RLS INT GO SO EG HT 6/530 SEC FIM LOG SEC
C/I:K DC/SL L/OPS L/GE L/PANS L/RE L/COMO L/HE L/PUL
The following information given to us by Brock will be of interest to you:

A. Erhard will not see UTILITY and latter is also having difficulty seeing Westrick.

B. UTILITY remains acutely suspicious of KURASK and is convinced that KURASK is out to get him. One of his main references in his belief that some of our people in Bonn, especially C, are passing derogatory information to the newspapers about him. Brock said that UTILITY is especially suspicious of C. Contact with Jakob Stehle and Carl Flick-Steger said he suspected that Wolken (Tempergor) was responsible for whispering stories about C in UTILITY's ear.

C. Senior NATO personnel are jockeying for positions and looking out for their futures when UTILITY leaves.

D. Certain foreign services have involved themselves in the question of UTILITY's eventual successor. The French particularly are trying to get a man in as successor-who will be well-disposed towards them. Brock would not identify any specific candidate the French are sponsoring. The British are also active but Brock specified only their efforts at cultivating Mala (Wendt). This is done by C to everybody be visits Bonn.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE agency

Sources: Network interrogation 3026
2 - CO/Germany
2 - OIB/Germany
2 - Chief, XX

FILE: MEMO OF CONVERSATION

30 Jan. 65

EXISTING ZOKI AND REGISTER

Central Intelligence Agency

Originating Office

Coordinating Office

Office Symbol

Date

Office Symbol

Date

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, XX

Ref.: KUM-57738 (NOT TO BE)

YOU HAVE APPOINTMENT WITH CHANCELLOR 25 JAN AT 1100. HE PROPOSES THAT YOU BEGIN WITH JUST THE TWO OF YOU AND THAT SCHROEDER, VON HASSEL, VESTRICK AND POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO OTHERS BE CALLED IN ABOUT 1130 FOR THE MORE FORMAL BRIEFING. THIS LATTER NOT YET CONFIRMED WITH OTHER PRINCIPALS, BUT ONLY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO MOVE BRIEFING TO SCHROEDER'S OFFICE, WHICH ONLY FIVE MINUTES AWAY. THIS LEAVES AFTERNOON FREE FOR UTILITY AND CONFERENCES WITH KUBARK AND EMBASSY OFFICERS AS YOU MAY DESIRE.

SECRET
TOP: 6A/1142

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET METHODS OF EXPLI CATING NAZI WAR CRIMES/DISCON SURE AC
6/30/2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GROUP 1: EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DEDERALISING AND DECLASSIFICATION
C/OPS/oca rls int go so eg rt c/58 spe fin loc rop
C/LOD/oca c/ops l/ce l/plans l/RC l/com l/int l/fdo
SECRET 22/11572

INFO FRAN MUNI DIR CITE BONN 5757

REF BONN 5741

ERHARD NOW SET FOR 1130. SCHROEDER AND VON HASSELLWILL JOIN AT 1200.

SECRET

TOR 22/11572
G/MLB
22 January 1964

C/MLB

PRIORITY BGM C INFO FRAN C

O/MLB

TELENOTE

REP MINT 8629.

1. DEHNENHARDT WILL BE IN BORN AND PLANS PARTICIPATE MEETING. HE

AVAILABLE ANYTIME FRIDAY EXCEPT BETWEEN 1500 AND 1600 WHEN TIED UP WITH

TOURS AND HE IS ALSO AVAILABLE ALL DAY SATURDAY. OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

STAND BY TO TRAVEL BORN ON SHORT NOTICE BUT GETTING VERY EAGER TO KNOW

AT LEAST WHAT DAY THEIR MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE. THEY COULD OF COURSE BE

AVAILABLE FRIDAY AFTERNOON EVEN THOUGH DEHNENHARDT WOULD NOT BE.

2. I ASSUME FROM YOUR CABLE THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR

UTILITY TO JOIN CHANCELLOR (PHILIP) AS BURGETTED DIR 95231. UTILITY NOW IN

BORN AND MAY BE GETTING IN TOUCH WITH YOU ON CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENTS (575%)

YOU COULD THEN EXPLAIN WHERE MATTERS STAND ON C) MEETING WHICH I ASSUME

WILL BE SATURDAY AFTERNOON.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION EXEMPT FROM 1974
SECRET WEAPONS DISCLOSURE ACT.
CIA 2005
1. After the top-level briefings given by the Chief KUHAR, the Ambassador and Mrs. McAfee hosted a luncheon in honor of Mr. and Mrs. McCaw. Others attending were L.J. and wife, C.D. and wife, General Ferber and wife, Herr and Frau Krapf of the Fosco, UTILITY and L.J.

2. After lunch the men and women separated. Various topics were discussed which need not be recorded. Then as L.J. indicated it was about time for him to depart he came over and asked UTILITY to join him for a brief chat. I joined also as all the others left. General Ferber almost sat down again but then finally left too.

3. L.J. was glad that UTILITY had attended the briefing. UTILITY expressed his appreciation and was particularly grateful for the sessions which had taken place the previous day between KUHAR and Auswertung representatives. UTILITY had been briefed on the discussions which CATIDE considered most useful.

4. L.J. said that during the morning briefing there was talk of more discussions on the military situation. I mentioned that Degenhardt would be visiting Washington in April at the invitation of the Chief, KUHAR. L.J. stated that Von Hassel had indicated that he wanted the discussions held in Bonn. UTILITY recalled that something had been said as they were leaving but it was as if it were "between the doors". L.J. asked UTILITY to look into the matter and let him know.

5. UTILITY observed that there were no real problems between our services and that everything was going well. He went on to say that he has lots of internal problems. The first one cited was that of a CATIDE representative in Washington. UTILITY mentioned Ferber’s heart attack, and his intention that Degenhardt take over the Auswartung although under Degenhardt. He concluded that he just did not know how the Washington problem would be solved but he would inform L.J. later.

Distribution:
1. Chief, NE
2. DOM/SE
3. Chief, on file

Recipients:
1. Chief, NE
2. DOM/SE
3. Chief, on file

Date: 25 January 1964

Subject: Meeting
6. UNILITH noted that in 1962 heart attacks had taken a rather large
toll in CAVIN1 and as a result preventive measures were taken such as periodic
physical examinations. As a result, there were only two such attacks in 1963.

7. I suggested that UNILITH issue a notice about the release of personnel
during 1963 and he repeated the figure of approximately 90 noting as usual
that not all were released because of security reasons.

8. I also suggested that UNILITH comment on the problem of adopting an
LVMTT program which he has previously called a very hot issue. UNILITH
merely said that they are using the MOVEMENT on their top people. [ ] understood UNILITH'S problem and said that he is often asked "on the Hill"
whether it does not infringe upon civil liberties. [ ] said he agrees that it
does but that in his position he had to give up some of his civil liberties,
and therefore so should others if they want to work in UNILITH. [ ] told UNILITH that efforts were underway to get the MOVEMENT adopted community-wide and he referred to the unfortunate case of Sgt. Dunlop.

9. [ ] was pressed for time at this point. He told UNILITH how glad
he was to talk to him; he expressed regret that the visit was such that he
could not give UNILITH more time and he hoped the next time he could.
Because of the action we took as reported in EGM-63740 of 17 January, we are not forwarding to UTIL the greetings sent with EGMW-13518 of 15 January. I believe you will agree that a repetition of New Year’s greetings would appear strange.

Distribution
Chief, EE
Chief of Station, Germany

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3328
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
I am forwarding under separate cover (split transmission) Bransby's report on his visit to Munich and talks with UTILITY at the end of last year. I believe these should fill in any gaps in your information on the content of this visit.

Attachments: A and B (usc, split)
**DISPATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO:</th>
<th>CHIEF, EE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFO:</td>
<td>CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY - COB, BONN - CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM:</td>
<td>CHIEF, FRANKFURT OPERATIONS BASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>CART/EC J/FATTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBM NUMBER:</td>
<td>Z2179</td>
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**CLASSIFICATION** SECRET

**PROCESSING ACTION**

<table>
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<th>MARKED FOR INDEXING</th>
<th>REQUIRED INDEXING</th>
<th>INDEXING REQUIRED</th>
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**ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES**

DELETE FROM IBM LISTING

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1. PLEASE DELEETEE EGIS IBM NUMBER Z2179 WHICH READS -

- GEHLEN
- FNU
- NURAK GENERATION

01 - 1956

AS NEAR AS CAN BE DETERMINED THIS INFORMATION CAME FROM THE MATERIAL WHICH CONTAINED A REFERENCE TO A COPY OF "GEHLEN" MARKED "MAIN DEPT II", A BOOK OR REPORT CONTAINING 73 PAGES. EE GI CARD 5711.

2. THE LISTING APPEARS IN THE ALPHA INDEX AS WELL AS IN ALL NUMERICAL PRINTOUTS, AND MAY LEAD TO CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT.

---

**APPROVED**

**DISTRIBUTION**

- BY TAPE
  - EE
  - BONN
  - MLB
- BY POUCH
  - COS/G

---

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

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**DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3028 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

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**CROSS REFERENCE TO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EGIS: 5611</th>
<th>DATE: 12 FEBRUARY 1964</th>
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**SECRET**
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
13 February 1964

Hartwig and \( \)  
Bruecke dinner and movie with wives

1. Hartwig made no mention of travelling to London. He talked of visiting some of the Dienststelle in the Cologne area.

2. Hartwig, emphasizing that it was unofficial, said that Dessau is the choice for Washington. He has already discussed the matter with him. Hartwig noted that many years ago UTILITY had promised Dessau that he would get a Washington assignment. Hartwig observed that we all know Heinz is a difficult person, that he sticks his nose where it does not belong, tries to impress people, etc., and he hoped that Heinz would not get into politics in Washington. Hartwig said that the real problem about the assignment is how Heinz will conduct himself in the Embassy. This worries UTILITY. When I asked if I could discuss the Washington assignment with Dessau, Hartwig requested that I not. I expressed the thought that Dessau's wife might be a little unhappy about going to Washington just when Sybille is coming from Australia for two and a half years. Hartwig agreed but said that this was Dessau's last chance. I assumed that Gaby and Baerbel will not go along. Hartwig confirmed this but said that it was possible that the interpreter (Baerbel) might be assigned to Washington as a secretary next year. He did not want to indicate officially yet to Dessau but he intends to consider it.

3. I said that obviously Heinz would be accepted if nominated, that I knew of no security reasons why he should not, etc. I said absolutely nothing about Heinz being unacceptable or anything of the sort. I did note that obviously the ideal candidate would be an up and coming Auswertung officer of the (Bosch type who could spend a couple of years with our KICHAPE. Hartwig agreed wholeheartedly and said that there are no such people. For example, someone is always saying that they need someone "like Fleming" and Hartwig has to point out that there is only one Fleming.

4. Hartwig said that Kuehne must get back about 1 June and that this is imperative. He will be more than a Chief of Staff in the Auswertung. He will actually run it. Hartwig pointed out that Degenhardt has really two shops - the Auswertung and the psych warfare section under Goslar (I believe this is the section formerly headed by Wiersen, Fleming's father, prior to his death.) Anyway the plan is that Degenhardt will sit back as the chief of both outfits but all the real work will be done by Kuehne and Goslar.

EXTRACT: L/INT (For your info only)

5. Hartwig again made clear that he hopes to get to Washington to discuss personnel matters and he noted that he had not been there since 1958. He thought spring of 1965 would be a good time to go. I replied that I believed he would be welcome at any time that UTILITY chose to send him.
6. I mentioned to Hartwig the economy pressure that we are under and that for example I had to stop the [program for next year. Hartwig said that CATIDE had taken a substantial cut also. I think he said five million DM but am not sure.
TO: Chief, Munich Liaison Base
   Attention: C/MLB w/att USC TNP

FROM: Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Attached Sealed Envelope

DATE: 18 February '64

Please pass the attached envelope unopened to UTILITY. It is a brief message from Headquarters concerning the recent Soviet defector who appeared in Switzerland.

Attachment: USC TNP

Distribution:
2 - C/MLB w/att USC TNP

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES: METHODS EXEMPTION 382E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

RELEASED BY: __________________________
SECRET

8968

TO: BART, INFO FROM: CT.

FROM: 8968

CASTOR

REF: 8968

1. MILITARY IMPENDING CANCELLED LOSOS TRIP AND IS IN BOSTON THIS WEEK.

2. OFFICIALLY WE HAVE BEEN TOLD ONLY THAT DISCUSSIONS REGARDING JAN

BEING HELD. UNOFFICIAL WE HAVE OUR REASON TO BELIEVE CASTOR IS

TAKING PLACE WHICH WILL BE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE CASTOR ORGANIZATION.

IT POSSIBLE LATTER REPORT ALSO REFERS TO CASTOR ORGANIZATION.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CTR.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3821

WORLD WAR II CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2005

GROUP 1

EXCLUDED FROM OTHERS

desegregating and downgrading.

SECRET

LIAISON WITH 8968

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Only No.
TO:  DIR  INFO FRAN FROM HDID (FOR GEN WALTAKE) BELL BOKA  
FROM:  WYE  9017  
CONF:  C/ME;  DO/ACV  File:  CALLIKAK  
INFO:  

TO  DIR  INFO FRAN FROM HDID (FOR GEN WALTARX) BELL BOKA  

BYMAT CALLIKAK  

1. DURING DISCUSSION DRAFT LAW WITH L. J AND L. J. 2ND FEB 25, UTILTIY, WHO  
PARTICIPATED IN MEETINGS WITH STATE SECRETARIES IN BOKA LAST WEEK, CONFIRMED OUR  
IMPRESSION THAT BORCHEL'S IMMEDIATE AND DESPERATE PURPOSE HAS BEEN TO GET SOME  
KIND OF DRAFT OUT OF HIS HANDS AND INTO SOMEBODY ELSE'S. ACCORDING TO UTILITY AND  
NEWSPAPERS OF FEB 25, PRESENT DRAFT CONCERNS EXCLUSIVELY INDIVIDUAL SECURITY CASES,  
WITH EACH CASE REQUIRING APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT OF THIRD STRATEGIC IN BOKA.  
NO PROVISION IS MADE FOR ANY KIND OF GENERAL COVERAGE OR FOR ANY MONITORING FOR  
POSITIVE COLLECTION PURPOSES. IT WOULD NOT, SAID UTILITI, COVER HIS ORGANIZATION'S  
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. CONCEPTS ON DRAFT, SOLICITED FROM THE EID, EYV AND ASW,  
HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED, MINISTRY PREFERING TO LEAVE DISCUSSION SUCH MATTERS TO  
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES.  

2. WE USED UTILITI TO LET US HAVE BENEFIT HIS ORGANIZATION'S CONCEPTS AS SOON  
AS DRAFT IS PASSED TO US, PRESUMABLY FEB 26 WHEN IT WILL BE PRESENTED TO CABINET.  
OBVIOUSLY, UTILITI'S AND OTHER GERMAN SERVICES WILL BE LOOKING TO ALLIES, PRIMARILY  
OURSELVES, TO BACK THEM UP IN PRESSING FOR LESS RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION.  

GROUP I  
EXCLUDE FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
DOWGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION  

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DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3021  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005
INCIDENTLY, IT APPEARS THAT MINISTRY JUSTICE WILL BE COMING UP WITH SEPARATE NON-CRIMINAL LAW TO COVER STRAIGHT CRIMINAL CASES. TWO BILLS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE COORDINATED IN BUNDESTAG. SUCH IS GOVERNMENT'S HASTE TO PASS BILL TO PARLIAMENT.

END OF MESSAGE
On 25 February Major Clark, the USAREUR liaison officer, was at UTILITY's building in the compound at 1500 hours when General Trettner, the new Inspector General of the German army, came to visit UTILITY. Trettner had been in town for an official visit to the Bavarian Minister-President Goppel.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

25 February 1964

UTILITY's office - 40 minutes

1. I had asked for this meeting to pass UTILITY info on Nosenko. When I later learned that was in town, I notified UTILITY that he would accompany me. On arrival UTILITY immediately assumed that we were there to discuss "Article 10" - the KALLEDAK Law. replied that he really had no business and had just tagged along.

2. CALLEKAK: UTILITY said that he probably should tell us about developments in Bonn the previous week. (Some of the info is contained in MONT-9017 although some of that originated in newspapers and not with UTILITY.) UTILITY said that he finally had briefed the "Kleine Fraktion" on CATIDE use of some of the CATIDE and they were very impressed. He ridiculed Koecherl's plans to hold a press conference. He felt it very important that we all work together, (on the proposed law but he agreed that any appearance of collusion must be avoided. He was delighted with the American position that the law would not be sufficient and assumed we were behind it. confirmed that he was, that the Ambassador had not agreed but had won out; UTILITY agreed with that British and French as well as our State Department would favor a much more restrictive law than what the intelligence agencies. said that he would remain in close touch with Torgau when he got back to Washington. He also asked for a copy of the CATIDE Stellungnahme on the draft law so that we would know what position to support.

EXTRACT: CALLEKAK

3. Nosenko: UTILITY thought that perhaps congratulations were in order on the recent defection. I said that was the real subject of my visit since I had a sealed envelope for him on Nosenko and that I had not seen the contents. He opened it and read the memorandum; then said merely that he was to keep it to himself. (Based on COS ISN of 18 February.)

4. Soviet NIE: I told UTILITY that I had passed a memorandum and material to Holm and explained that the memorandum had been passed to State Secretary Hopf last Friday in the absence of von Hassel. Holm again asked if I had not said that the material was being given only to CATIDE. I confirmed this but repeated my previous statements that it could be given to MOD personnel by CATIDE. UTILITY interrupted to say he did not think that they would give these reports to MOD because he could not control their dissemination then.

I also raised the question of a recent visit to Bonn. UTILITY merely said it had gone well.
I then reminded UTILITY of the discussion with about follow-up discussions on Soviet military capabilities. assumed that we had known that things had gotten off the track when MOD people said they were ready for more discussions; Degenhardt heard about it and called (This was all news to me.) got things straightened out. (See ECMA on subject Degenhardt visit and General Ferber involvement.) In commenting on the desirability of Ferber accompanying Degenhardt, UTILITY spoke in terms of CATIDE inviting him. He asked Holm to look into the matter.

EXTRACT: L/INT C/MLB

5. I asked if he could lunch with . He regretted not because he goes off on two weeks leave starting next Sunday.

7. NSA: I mentioned that Kirby of NSA would be visiting about 18 March but that UTILITY need not see him and arrangements would be made via by .

EXTRACT: C

8. Bonn: UTILITY in discussing CALBerthak legislation expressed bewilderment about the Chancellor's position on all these matters. used this opening to mention the lack of Chancellory interest in intelligence matters and how he has not been able to talk to Westrick about them. UTILITY noted that Westrick is an old man and just not capable of handling so much.

9. was also discussed.

Typed: 27 February 1964
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

UTILITY, Heyl, C. and C. J
UTILITY's Office

3 March 1964

1. Meeting was scheduled for 1500 but as usual guards at Rate had not been informed that I was bringing guest. This plus delay in arrival, made us ten minutes late. Heyl greeted us at door after obvious alert by guards.

2. Wash Rep.: C. J thanked UTILITY for the letter on nomination of C. DesSau to Washington. He said would be fine appointment. UTILITY explained that assignment promised long ago, reward, etc. I later asked UTILITY if letter to C. J had been sent via Kuehne. It was.

3. Station Changes: C. J said C. J had been here, that it decided C. J would move to Bonn about 10-15 September, that he would be on leave this summer with C. J leaving PCS in fall after C. J return. C. J also said that C. J would transfer to Bonn to run operations there, primarily against the Soviet target although there are indications the Satellite representatives are getting closer to Bonn all the time.

4. G/ME: C. J then disclosed that C. J would replace C. J. He said he had drafted a letter for UTILITY but had tried to improve on the English and had not had time to have it retyped because he had come directly from the plane. He proceeded to read all the facts in the letter and said C. J would deliver a copy later. For contents see attached letter which given to C. J 5 March. C. J had said it could be given to one of UTILITY's aides. Two copies were passed in sealed envelope. UTILITY replied that C. J would be welcome. C. J cabled this in FRAN-557 dated 5 March. (Per C. J, C. J also told C. J about C. J at lunch same day.)

2. Cyprus: UTILITY asked about situation. C. J replied he knew nothing more than what had read in papers since not within his area although C. J involved.

3. CALLIKAK: UTILITY repeated many of his previously expressed statements on CALLIKAK situation. He said that the Ministry of the Interior had tried to put the blame for a poor law on the Parliament but this had not worked. He also said that the Fornoff had been told it would take the U.S. three months to reach a position (see cable). UTILITY also said that CATIDE had proposed that the Chief of the German CALLIKAK organization be a trained lawyer but that he not be a member of the courts. CATIDE feels that the main weakness of the draft law is that it mixes executive and judicial functions.
UTILITY recommended that a new draft should be submitted, but when asked who should submit, UTILITY was not sure. He said that he would talk to the Fraktion leaders and pass the results to another. Later suggested this be done with him in Bonn and I could get up there if necessary, but did not think it would take three months for the U.S. to react.

4. UTILITY regretted he could not attend Herrenabend because he was leaving for Bonn. He also told us that Family Minister Bruno Heck was being briefed by CATIE today. He considers him a good man.

Typed: 5 March 1964
The document is a classified message with the following details:

**TO:** DIR INFO FRAN
**FROM:** RUNX 9344
**CONF:** C/MLB; C/MA; C/BB; DC/MLB; COMM

**DATE:** 27 March 1964

**Routing: S-E-C-R-E-T**

**Message:**

Strongly recommend courtesy call utility 16 or 17 April if available. We certain CATIDE would also be willing provide briefings in any depth desired. Advise.

**End of Message**

**Declassified and released by Central Intelligence Agency sources.**
**Sources: Methods Exemption 3826.**
**Lazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.**
**Date: 2005.**

**Group I**
**Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.**

**Coordinating Officers:**
**Releasing Officer:**
**Authenticating Officer:**
**DISPATCH**

<table>
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**TO**

CHIEF, EE

**INFO.**

CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

**FROM**

CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE

**SUBJECT**

ADMINISTRATIVE

**ACTION REQUIRED**

ADMINISTRATIVE

**TEXT**

UTILITY'S BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY WILL BE ON 3 APRIL. UNLESS WE HEAR OTHERWISE FROM YOU, WE SHALL PLAN TO FORWARD GREETINGS FROM [ ], [ ], [ ], [ ], [ ], [ ] AND [ ] SIMILAR TO LAST YEAR'S IN DIR 28925.

**DISTRIBUTION**

BY TAPE

2 - CHIEF, EE
2 - COS/G

**DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPT FROM INTELLIGENCE ACT HAZ/WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

**GROUP 1**

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

**CROSS REFERENCE TO**

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

EGMT 10356

**DATE**

27 MARCH 1964

**CLASSIFICATION**

CONFIDENTIAL

**HOSTILE NUMBER**

C
SECRET 3017512
MUNI INFO FRAN CITE
REF MUNI 9344

WHEELON GLAD SEE UTILITY AND REQUESTS ATTEMPT SET UP MEETING EARLIEST POSSIBLE AFTERNOON 16 APRIL ORDER CONCLUDE BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR BERCHTESGADEN LATER.

SECRET
TOR 31/07252
CONCUR.

END OF MESSAGE
CONTACT REPORT

UTILITY, " and "
UTILITY's office, 1130-1150 hours
31 March 1964

1. The meeting was arranged to introduce " to UTILITY prior to his trip to Washington and to schedule meetings for a number of visitors to CATIDE. UTILITY was pleasant but somewhat preoccupied and hurried.

2. I opened the meeting by introducing " and commenting briefly on his trip to the U.S. with the Auswertung representatives. " then remarked on his high regard for the Auswertung and thanked UTILITY for the many finished studies and assistance they have provided. UTILITY smiled in gratification. I added that " would be very happy to carry greetings to UTILITY's old friends in EMBARK Headquarters and UTILITY said thanks and rattled off a number of names including " and "

3. " remarked that it was too bad Wortmann had broken his leg skiing and would not be able to go to Washington. UTILITY was very surprised— he had not previously heard of the accident. His first comment was that Wortmann had done a stupid thing by going skiing on the eve of his trip. Then he jumped up and telephoned Brock and said he wanted to know who was going to the U.S. in Wortmann's place. He added that he wanted to make sure the replacement was fully grounded in the necessary substantive fields. Brock's answer could not be heard and UTILITY didn't mention who the replacement would be.

4. Then I said that " had given me a birthday present for UTILITY but that I had forgotten it and would send it over by special courier later in the day. UTILITY said that was okay and that his birthday didn't come until later in the week. " and I added our congratulations to those of "

5. I mentioned that " will be in town a few days later in the week on vacation. UTILITY smiled and said we should be sure to pass his greetings to "

6. I said that " planned to come to Munich during the week beginning 5 April and would like to pay a call on UTILITY. UTILITY said fine and 6 April would be the most convenient day. He added that his schedule for the remainder of the week was somewhat indefinite, but that if necessary he thought he could also arrange a meeting either in Bonn or Munich on 9 or 10 April. I promised to inform " and let UTILITY know the date of his preference. I went on to say that during " visit we thought he would wish to spend most of his time at the Station in Frankfurt and at MLA, and reserve his briefings from CATIDE until he came here PCS in the fall. UTILITY said okay, the briefings could be arranged then. I concluded by saying that " wished to have a dinner party for " at his home, and UTILITY said he would certainly try to attend but that his schedule was quite indefinite.

7. Next I stated that Colonel Wright J. Sherwood, J-2 Headquarters EUCOM, had accepted CATIDE's invitation and planned to arrive for a visit in early May.
Be would be accompanied by a staff of about six officers, not including Lt. Col. 
Director of directory. I said we would inform CASSIE of a definite date of Sherrard's 
arrival as soon as this was known. UTILITY said okay, he would be happy to see 
Sherrard.

8. Next I stated that Dr. Albert P. Wheelon, KUBARK Deputy Director of 
Science and Technology, was planning to pass through Munich on 16 April and 
would like to pay a short visit to UTILITY. UTILITY was obviously in the dark 
as to who Wheelon was and with whom he was associated. I explained his position. 
UTILITY then said he would certainly like to meet Wheelon, but that it was dif- 
ficult for him to tell us in advance whether this would be possible. He 
said that he might not be in Munich but would let us know as soon as he could 
if a meeting could be arranged. I said that Wheelon's plane arrived at 1200 
and if possible he would like to have the meeting in the early afternoon.

9. I said we had heard from our Headquarters that I had written a 
letter to UTILITY accepting Deese as Wheelon's successor and we wished to 
state that we were very happy about the appointment. UTILITY said thanks.

10. Next I passed UTILITY our Blue No. 10273 concerning an agreement for 
exchange between the Luftwaffe and U.S. Air Force. I said that minor 
changes in the agreement might still be negotiated. UTILITY read the memo with 
some interest and said he would pass it to his experts for further 
analysis.

11. This completed the conversation and Fulivos and I took leave and 
departed. It was a very businesslike session. UTILITY didn't seem to have 
either the time or inclination for small talk.

Typed: 6 April 1964
ROUTIE 03 APR 1964 IN 4252 A
SECRET 031550Z
CITE BONN 6858

PLEASE EXTEND OUR CONGRATULATIONS TO UTILITY.
SECRET
TORI 03/1614Z
C/MIB 54
15 April 1964

TRAN 0

META 0

1964 APR 15 15:11

C/MIB: L/OSSO

TELEPHONE

11/05/63

ROUTINE

1. VIELOM CONCURS KEP RECOMMENDATION THAT

AIRCRAFT DELIVER PLAN.

2. REM fury: UTILITY WILL NOT BE IN BOHS OR SUNDA. THIS FIRM

WITH VIELOM NOT POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPT
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2985

CONFIDENTIAL
5. Frankfurt Visit: I told Hartwig about the invitation to utility to visit Frankfurt on 26 June. I noted that utility had said that he would take Moeller along but that I was not sure who also would go. I thought Geichlin should make the trip in any event. Hartwig agreed and thought that Dührer and perhaps Petersen should go along too. I also suggested Holm and Hartwig again agreed. I reminded Hartwig that he (Hartwig) had made the trip in 1961 but that we would be delighted to see him there again. Hartwig was appreciative but said that he did not want to cause any hard feelings with Moeller and that he would stay out of it. (COMMENT:)

SECRET

It appears that Moeller would resent Hartwig's involvement with Americans.) Hartwig said that he would take up this subject with utility on Sunday evening also. I assumed that I would have to deal with Geichlin on this Frankfurt visit. Hartwig said that he would tell Geichlin the outcome of the discussion with utility.

6. Utility Trip: On Sunday Hartwig said that he had to see utility down at the station where his train was departing at 2200. At one point Hartwig got the impression that I thought utility was going to Paris and his comment was "not this time." I told him only that utility had said he should go to Paris to discuss. I never did learn where utility was going.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Plans

27 MAY 1964

Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Letters to the DCI from General GEHLEN

1. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Attached are two letters for the DCI from General GEHLEN, President of the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). One of the letters expresses General GEHLEN's appreciation for the excellent treatment and briefings given by CIA to J, the Chief of Evaluation of the BND, during his visit to CIA Headquarters in April 1964. The other letter expresses thanks for the greetings the Director sent to General GEHLEN on the occasion of his sixty-second birthday in April 1964.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Chief
Eastern Europe Division

Attachment
Tab A - Two letters

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
Dear Mr. Mc Cone,

I wish to thank you very much for your birthday greetings which have been forwarded to me via teletype. It was very kind of you to remember this day.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

May 5th, 1964
Sehr verehrter Mr. McCone!

Herr Dethleffsen hat mir soeben Ihre freundlichen Grüße übermittelt und von seiner 3-wöchigen Reise in die USA berichtete, zu der Sie ihn liebenswürdigerweise eingeladen hatten. Er ist stark beeindruckt durch die überaus freundliche Aufnahme von seiten aller Herren Ihres Dienstes, durch die vorzügliche Organisation der Reise und durch die interessanten Briefings und Diskussionen im politischen, militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Bereich.

Erlauben Sie mir, daß ich Ihnen meinen aufrichtigen Dank dafür sage, daß Sie Herrn Dethleffsen diese Reise ermöglicht und auch den Herren seiner Begleitung die Teilnahme an den Briefings wie an den anschließendem Flug nach Cape Kennedy, Omaha und Wright-Patterson gestattet haben.

Wie mir Herr Dethleffsen sagte, hat sich in den Briefings und Diskussionen zu meiner Freude eine weitgehende Übereinstimmung ergeben. In den Fällen, in denen das nicht so gewesen sei, habe man in aller Offenheit die beiderseitigen Standpunkte herausgestellt und gerade diese Offenheit habe wesentlich zum gegenseitigen Verständnis beigetragen.

Mir erscheint daher die aus dem Teilnehmerkreis dieser Diskussionen sowohl von seiten des CIA wie des BND vorgebrachte Anregung, diese unmittelbaren Gespräche zwischen den führenden Herren des DDI wie der Auswertung des BND fortzusetzen und in Zukunft in kürzeren Zeitabständen fortzuführen, sehr zweckmässig.

Ich würde mich sehr freuen, wenn wir in einem halben bis einem Jahr Mr. Cline mit einem entsprechend zusammengesetzten Team bei uns in München begrüßen könnten.

Mit den besten Grüßen bin ich

Ihr ergebener
SUBJECT: Assessment of UTILITY 27 May 1964

1. Over the years UTILITY has been thoroughly described. My sessions with him during the past five years have been documented in detail in memoranda of conversation which are filed in 230.2 (Liaison with 363).

2. In his official dealings with me UTILITY has always been very correct and proper, friendly and gracious. His moods, as with all men, varied but there was little or no change in the afore-mentioned characteristics. Only UTILITY's display of warmth or coolness varied. And these variations seemed less determined by moods than by prevailing attitudes towards KUBARK or Americans in general. Almost always they were reactions to causative factors on our side or misinterpretation of factors.

3. In general, UTILITY and I were almost always on friendly terms. There were few issues I pushed which annoyed him except for the sourcing problem. I was unable to make a breakthrough on this subject and neither has anyone else.

4. I have been impressed by UTILITY as a far-sighted individual who is usually planning years ahead. At the same time he has frequently displayed his naivete on current problems.

5. It is difficult to judge UTILITY as an executive. The fact that he rules with an iron hand seems clear and his attitude towards his employees even in the presence of Americans is often slightly dictatorial. We have heard much about his poor management. To an outsider it is difficult to comment. We can be certain of one aspect however and that is UTILITY's pre-occupation with trivial matters in which one would not expect the head of an intelligence service to involve himself. During the past five years these have been fairly well-documented and usually concerned KUBARK social matters.

6. UTILITY loves and lives the intelligence business. Except for his summer vacations, he seldom seems to take any time off. During social events he prefers to spend the evening talking shop although he can be equally at ease with a variety of other subjects such as politics, art, children, etc. Only sports, except for sailing, appear uninteresting to him. However, his passion for sailing has been well described.

7. UTILITY's immediate goal seems to be to finish out his career through three more years when he retires at age 65. I believe he is fighting hard to realize it. During this time it is essential that UTILITY be given his due amount of attention and courtesies. More frequent meetings in Bonn between the Chief of Station and UTILITY should help immensely.
1. Please pass the following message to Utility's Office at your earliest convenience:

   It is a pleasure to be in a position to inform you that your visit to Frankfurt will coincide with a visit of a group of very senior officials who are studying the capability of the United States Intelligence Community to provide the earliest possible warning of hostilities. This group will be composed of the following:

   (1) Mr. Benjamin R. Shute whom you met years ago when he was Mr. McCloy's

   [DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE]. He is a partner of the Cravath Law Firm in New York and was the executive director of a committee which established the National Security Agency in 1952.

   (2) Major General John M. Reynolds, USAF. General Reynolds' last assignment was vice-director of the joint staff. He was recently assigned to the staff of Mr. McCone in response to a requirement that a highly qualified senior military officer be provided to the director of central intelligence to work on the evaluation and coordination of the U.S. intelligence effort.

   (3) Mr. Gerry E. Pettibone, a senior examiner of the bureau of the budget.

   (4) Mr. J. J. Hitchcock who for many years was the chairman of the National Indications Center.

   (5) Mr. Benson Buffham of National Security Agency.

   (6) Colonel Howard V. Pullen, USAF.

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BEFORE THE SECRETARY

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(5) Mr. Benson Buffham of National Security Agency.

(6) Colonel Howard V. Pullen, USAF.
CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

SECRET

EGOT-23434

/7/ CAPTAIN ROSS R. HIRSCHFELD (WELL KNOWN TO YOU FROM HIS SERVICE IN GERMANY), U.S. NAVY.

B. WITH YOUR AGREEMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU AND YOUR CHIEF OF COMMUNICATIONS TO MEET WITH THIS GROUP FOR 45 MINUTES OR AN HOUR BEFORE LUNCH AND THEN TO HAVE LUNCH WITH THEM AT THE CASINO. WE PLAN TO HAVE THE OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF JOIN THE GROUP FOR LUNCH.

C. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY OR EVEN APPROPRIATE TO ASK THAT YOU PROVIDE THE GROUP WITH A BRIEFING. THEY ARE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE LONG TRADITION OF COOPERATION BETWEEN YOUR SERVICE AND THE AMERICAN SERVICES AND THEY WILL HAVE BEEN BRIEVED BY MR. MADISON MITCHELL CONCERNING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ATG/CGG CHANNEL EARLIER IN THE MORNING. THEIR BASIC INTEREST IS IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - COLLECTION, PROCESSING, ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION - AS CONTRIBUTIONS TO STRATEGIC WARNING. I BELIEVE THAT THE MOST VALUABLE THING WE CAN DO IS TO HAVE A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION.

END OF TT/2-044/WASH/920/MUNI / DISPATCH EGOT-23434
SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

15 June 1964

Participants: With wives--UTILITY, Wagner, Hartwig, and alone.

1. On 15 June I gave my farewell dinner for UTILITY. It was a pleasant evening and I discussed practically no business. I said that he had discussed a few matters with UTILITY. At dinner I toasted UTILITY and he responded with kind words and a toast also. Mrs. UTILITY was her usual bubbly self and seemed to enjoy the evening very much.

2. As a farewell gift I gave UTILITY a speedometer for his boat. Mrs. UTILITY was given a set of Irish linen tablecloth and napkins. UTILITY gave Mrs. three Nymphenburg demitasse cups and saucers to go with three previously given. At the farewell party at OATIDE on 8 June UTILITY had given me a large Nymphenburg line as a farewell gift.

3. UTILITY's driver handed me a bottle of 1949 Hiersteiner wine as a farewell gift from @lancing.

4. I gave UTILITY, Wagner and Hartwig memento Kennedy half-dollars.

Typed: 18 June 1964

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METROSEXUAL-EXCEPTION 382 KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 2005

SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

UTILITY, [ ] and [ ]
UTILITY's office, 1005-1110 hours

1. Shyrl escorted us to UTILITY's office but did not participate in the discussions. [ ] expressed his pleasure at being able to meet with UTILITY again and conveyed greetings from the Chief, KUBAK, as well as the Chief, KUDETZ. He mentioned that he had just made a trip to Greece and Cyprus and a brief discussion of the latter issue ensued.

2. U.S. Visit: [ ] repeated his invitation to UTILITY to visit the States and recalled that he had previously made the invitation last November during his visit to Munich. UTILITY said he had been thinking about such a trip and thought that perhaps he would do it sometime in the fall. [ ] said that he would recommend the visit be made after the elections in November. UTILITY said he would check his schedule, that this might be quite possible and expressed the intent to travel by ship. He then recalled briefly the difficulties that arose when he made his last trip to the States by ship.

3. CALLIKAKS: UTILITY raised this subject by referring to the Cabinet session on which Holm had briefed us. UTILITY repeated Holm's recommendation that the Allies should insist on full coverage. He told us also that the Ministry of Justice recognizes that the law is no good and the Ministry of Interior, which drafted the original law, now also feels the same way. Mr. Erler of the SPD maintains that the Chief of CATHE should be in charge of administering the law. [ ] raised the question of timing as far as passage of the legislation is concerned and UTILITY's view was that passage of the law this winter could be a real possibility. I inquired about the visit of the Fraktion leaders on 6 July to Munich and UTILITY said the purpose will be to brief them on how monitoring should be handled in the future.

4. TV: UTILITY said that the television program on the organization would be appearing on 25 June and he burned Winterstein on the telephone for additional details. Winterstein said that the main title would be Organisation Gehlen with the sub-title called "From Freiep Herrn Ost to END". UTILITY did not think the main title was too good and Winterstein agreed but indicated there was little they could do. It will be shown from 2015 to 2100.

5. KUBAK: I gave UTILITY Blue memo No. 30672 containing biographic data on the Chief, KUBAK. [ ] observed that the memo did not really explain how we got to the Chief, KUBAK, and that it was really a question of motivation since obviously he could be drawing down a much larger salary in private business.

6. Frankfurt Visit: Winterstein was given Yellow memo No. 30675 containing the agenda for the Frankfurt visit. I repeated [ ]'s invitation for UTILITY to stay with him. UTILITY was grateful but said that he had other business to conduct and he would stay in a CATHE residence.

a. I also passed Blue memo No. 30674 explaining the make-up of the Shute Group which UTILITY would be meeting in Frankfurt.
SECRET

7. Book: I gave UTILITY yellow memo No. 30676 concerning the Invisible Government, and I passed a copy of the book itself. I discussed briefly the faults of the book and how it played right into KGB hands. UTILITY's reaction was that perhaps CATIDE should give the book to ERIE with comments. I called UTILITY's attention to the fact that the comments which were attached to my memo should not be attributed to KIRK.

8. Africa:

a. Congo: I raised this subject in context with his former job as Chief of the African Division noting that the matter of most concern in the Congo. He said that we have not given up on Adoula and that we won't attempt to overthrow him. I then went on to cite the general Headquarters attitude as contained in DIR-3573o. He recommended that it would be a good idea to coordinate between CATIDE and KIRK on general objectives on the Congo. He also informed UTILITY that if CATIDE puts a new man in Leopoldville, we would be glad to have contact and see him occasionally. Both I and UTILITY agreed that Mwita makes a good impression and UTILITY said that Tahambe was waiting in Spain to take over part of the Congo. I commented on Nenda's importance pointing out that he could however go to the wrong side. I felt that we must stay close to Nenda.

b. Tanganyika: Answering UTILITY's inquiry concerning Kyere, I said that he was an idealist and not tough enough although his instincts are good. There is not enough iron in his soul but he is modest, intelligent and likeable.

c. I and UTILITY discussed the effects of the Chinese/Soviet rift on activities in Africa and I mentioned the Chinese defector who has taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Burundi. He said that the local nationals are maintaining that the defector should be turned back to the Chinese; however, the effect of such an action by the U.S. is also clear. He assured UTILITY that various methods for evacuating the defector were being considered.

9. KIRK/Bonn: UTILITY commented on the plans to move the German station to Bonn and expressed complete agreement. He then went on to say that he felt our contacts with the Germans will be harder over the next two years because Westrick is not interested in intelligence, and Nercker is a strong man. UTILITY said he had told I that he should have contact with Krone.

10. Commenting on the Visit in June by the Rechmungshof: UTILITY said that CATIDE would not be getting additional monies and that things were tightening up.

11. After the above session we moved down to one of the conference rooms where I discussed the NEUR/BERD/treaty in considerable detail and then went on to comment on critical Western actions. After 30 minutes Dessaau interrupted to say that time seemed to be running out and if he was going to cover his area, he would have to talk now. He explained that Reichlin was taking over today from Dessaau and then, utilizing charts, he described his organization which was listed on the chart as "Operativen Schriftzettel Kollegium". Dessaau also referred to the Reinh problem and
said that he had heard about U.S. intentions to reduce. He continued by saying
that ATIK would regret a U.S. reduction but would try to place personnel who are re-
leased. He felt that the matter could not be discussed yet because the people don't
know about it since the reduction goes into effect on 22 June. On operational
matters, Desan stated that the DDR was more of a denied area than the Satellites
and that it takes 100 approaches and about one and a half years to find one source

12. At the conclusion of Dessau's talk we were joined by Wagner and we moved
to the foyer for a glass of sherry followed by the luncheon which Wagner hosted.
This concluded the first day's session.
Chief, Ws

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, Nebraska Liaison Base

Subject: Conversations with CATINE

1. Attached are three memorandums of conversation dealing with CATINE's meetings with UTILITE, Tola, and Winterstein. Your attention is invited particularly to UTILITE's tentative acceptance of CATINE's invitation to visit Washington next November.

2. Note that Holt's statement that CATINE is about 50,000 strong coincides with Fleming's estimate as reported last January in ROMA-46031.

3. For the deletions in para 1 of meeting with UTILITE, read true meanings of "UTILITE" and "CATINE".

Attachments:
Three memorandums of conversation h/v

Distribution:
2 - Chief, Ws w/ att, h/v
2 - COB w/ att, h/v

Best available: D-1

DATE TYPED: 18 June 64
DATE DISPATCHED: 18 June 64
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

OFFICE SYMBOL: ROMA-46032

COORDINATING OFFICE SYMBOL: QQM-2-28/1

OFFICE SYMBOL: QCM-2-28/1

SECRET

RECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CIA, REASON: EXEMPTED FROM EXEMPTION 3, JUNE 1975

TOP SECRET"
OMELIER explained that it was increasingly difficult for anybody to see UTILITY, who was always busy and often away. He said that he felt this particularly strongly himself. For example, he had himself been pressing UTILITY to allow his arrival West from Paris on 2 Mar 61 to have UTILITY introduce him personally to L. But the opportunity had never presented itself until the stag farewell party on the night of 8 June, 1961.
CONTACT REPORT

General Johnson's Visit to CATZDE

On 22 June I escorted General Johnson to CATZDE Headquarters to call on
UTILITY, Giol, Wagner, Guerrier, Kirou, Synchronous Two Interpreters
General Johnson, Major Ray Clark and
1000 - 1400 hours
22 June 1964

1. On 22 June I escorted General Johnson to CATZDE Headquarters to call on
UTILITY and receive a briefing on CATZDE. Johnson's visit was in response to an
invitation from UTILITY. Major Ray Clark, the Army Liaison Officer at MB, was
also present.

2. Before going to CATZDE I briefed Johnson for about fifty minutes in my
office. The main points covered were CATZDE organization and responsibilities
in the military intelligence field, then briefed Johnson for about five
minutes on the CATZDE Staybehind Program, spoke for another five minutes
on the CATZDE military intelligence product. Johnson was very interested in
everything we told him and asked a number of pertinent questions.

3. Upon arriving at CATZDE Headquarters we were greeted by Dr. Gey and
escorted into UTILITY's office. UTILITY was in excellent spirits and briefed
Johnson for about forty-five minutes on CATZDE's position in the West German
Government, responsibilities, and internal organization. In passing he mentioned
that CATZDE has worked up a dummy table of organization for briefing Bundestag members
and Federal officials who do not have the proper clearances or need-to-know. UTILITY
also commented on the many cover firms CATZDE maintains for covering their oper-
ational personnel and the difficulties these firms involve them in with the German
tax and legal authorities. Still another point he mentioned was the fact that he
is planning some changes in the organization of CATZDE's S & T components. These
changes will facilitate closer cooperation between the S & T Collection and Evaluation
Units.

4. The conversation then moved to CALLYMAK and UTILITY made the comments
forwarded in EMA-3676. Then UTILITY discussed CATZDE activity in the CE field,
making a special point of saying that the present division of CE responsibility
between CATZDE and BAKA is working out well and to the full satisfaction of both
parties. He stated that in BAKA cases which have an offensive CE potential CATZDE
sometimes steps in over direction of the case but lets the BAKA officer continue to
handle the agent. UTILITY also stressed that CATZDE must grant clearance for all
document or build-up material passed in CE cases handled by BAKA and the ARV.

5. General Johnson then asked about the CATZDE Staybehind Program and the
extent to which these Staybehind assets could be plugged into NATO communica-
tions channels; UTILITY buzzed Hola, who appeared immediately and provided answers to
Johnson's questions. In essence, Hola said that in case of war CATZDE liaison
groups would be attached to CENTAG and NORTRAC, and that these groups would have
direct radio communication with CATZDE's tactical Staybehind agents. CATZDE's

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005
strategic Staybehind assets, as well as their E & E networks, would come up on the
day later and communicate with CATIDE Headquarters. Johnson seemed very impressed
with the CATIDE Staybehind Program and said he planned to study in greater detail
the Army's plans for exploiting it.

6. Johnson, Major Clark and I then left UTILITY's office and went to the
CATIDE Conference Room. There a briefing was presented by Grau and Kynast of
the Military Evaluation. Wagner was present for part of this briefing but only
in the role of listener.

7. The first part of the briefing was spent on the organization of the
Military Evaluation. The only new topic included was the Indications Center which
is to be attached to the Chief of Military Evaluation. Then the discussion moved
to the functions and responsibilities of the Military Evaluation. Special emphasis
was laid on the fact that the German military services do not have any collection
responsibilities except for a limited one in the electronics field, and that CATIDE
is almost solely responsible for both collection and evaluation.

8. Grau and Kynast then got into substantive topics and a lively exchange of
views took place between them and Johnson. The specific points covered were the
following:

a. Combat strength of the GSFU. CATIDE believes the GSFU is at 100
percent combat strength and completely prepared for field operations. Johnson's
analysts believe the GSFU is at only 85 percent strength and would need reinforce-
ments from the Soviet Union before undertaking combat operations. Both sides agreed
that qualitatively the GSFU is superior to any other body of Soviet troops.

b. FROG rockets assigned to the NVA. Both CATIDE and USAREUR have some
evidence of this but nothing conclusive.

c. Organization of the Czech Army. CATIDE believes that a fourth field
army, probably a tank army, is being formed. They believe the fourteen divisions
in the Czech Army are about one-third under strength but could be brought to full
strength in a very short time. They consider the Czech mobilization system an
excellent one.

d. Changes in the training cycle of the GSFU. The first period of the
GSFU training cycle - winter exercises - took place several weeks earlier in 1964
than during previous years. However, the second training period began later than
usual and the third period has not even begun. Neither CATIDE nor Johnson had
any explanation of these changes.

e. Headquarters of the 18th Guards Army. Johnson and USAREUR suspect
this Headquarters is to be disbanded and the three subordinate divisions attached
to other Soviet Armies. CATIDE has no evidence that changes are in the offing.
The Headquarters of the 18th Guards Army is located in the middle of a restricted
area in East Germany and this makes collection operations very difficult.

f. Hungary. No evidence that Soviet troops are being withdrawn.

SECRET
g. Romania. There was no evidence of unusual movements of Soviet forces on the Romania borders during the recent Soviet/Rumanian tension.

h. NVA. Combat strength is up sharply and the NVA is now the best equipped of the Satellite armies. A large number of multiple rocket batteries were recently obtained from the Soviet Union. NVA units are becoming steadily more reliable politically.

i. Poland. All units of the Polish Army are at full strength and more men are available than equipment. The Polish Army has the poorest equipment of the Satellites.

9. Following this briefing we repaired to the CATIDE dining room for a glass of sherry and a very good lunch. UTILITY was an excellent host and spent quite a bit of time talking to Johnson about his experiences during and after the war. He also questioned Johnson in some detail about Johnson's experiences in World War II and Korea. UTILITY and Johnson seemed to hit it off well together and I believe they have a great deal of respect for each other. Johnson made quite a point of telling UTILITY how much he needed and appreciated CATIDE's military product. He also stressed that USARUR's operational capabilities were declining and that in the future he would have to depend on CATIDE even more.

10. This completed the meeting and Johnson, Clark and I departed. UTILITY and al. the other CATIDE came out to the courtyard to see us off. On the way back to my office Johnson made a number of favorable comments about UTILITY and the briefing he had been given. He appears to be well disposed toward CATIDE.

11. This was my third encounter with Johnson and I must say he impresses me as a very decent and cooperative person. He had only kind things to say about KUBANK and seems to want to work closely with us. He commented a number of times on the station briefing he was given in Frankfurt and I believe this made a very favorable impression on him.

Typed: 16 July 1964
Forwarded under separate cover for your disposition are:

a. Memorandum from UTILITY (signed in alias) to (in true name) dated January 1951.

b. Memorandum from UTILITY (in true name) to (in true name) dated December 1951.

c. Letter from @Wagner (in true name) to (in true name) dated November 1963.

d. Letter from @Degenhardt (in true name) to (in true name) dated November 1963.

e. Card from @Fleming (in true name) to (in true name).

Attachment: USC
End 1. Abstracted as E6MA-64764/.

As stated above
End 2. " " " " /3 - C

Distribution:
1 - Chief, EE w/att. USC
2 - COS/O v/o att.
Upon receipt copy ref was provided Chief, KUBASS with request to brief ALIAS KUEHNE as suggested or designate member his staff to do so. After continuous prodding we have just been informed that Chief, KUBASS feels that such briefing should be given by him personally but that unfortunately his current commitments do not allow doing this prior to ALIAS KUEHNE departure. Possibility exists that CHIEF, KUBASS may visit Western Europe during FALL 64 and briefing utility per ref would be included in his schedule. Alternatively, since apparently utility plans visit HQS toward end this year we would include such briefing during his visit.

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Distribution by Tape
COS, Germany
C, MMB

File: 230.2 LIAISON WITH 365
CONTACT REPORT

UTILITY, Holm, Hartwig, and
UTILITY's office - 1030-1915 hours
2 July 1964

1. The meeting was arranged at [redacted]'s request. We were a little late because [redacted]'s plane was delayed. [redacted], Holm and Hartwig were waiting and the meeting proceeded in a business-like atmosphere.

2. [redacted] opened the meeting by briefing [redacted] on the Congo situation described in FRAN-7616 and previous traffic. [redacted] was relaxed about the matter and perfectly satisfied with [redacted]'s reply. I have sent a teletype to [redacted] suggesting that I report this matter to Headquarters since I also got some information on the affair from [redacted] the next day.

3. The next brief was [redacted] on a [redacted] matter. I have prepared a Memorandum for the Record on this. [redacted] did not pass [redacted] the Aide Memoire we had prepared.

4. The last and by far the most important topic was the Prisoner Exchange reportedly agreed upon between the FEDREP and East Germany. [redacted]'s comments were recorded in UNI-2175. I will stay in contact with Holm and try to obtain additional information on this.

5. This completed the meeting and we left with the usual cordial handshake. [redacted] thanked [redacted] profusely for the briefing and entertainment he had been given in Frankfurt.

Typed: 7 July 1964

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 2020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2005

SECRET

FILE: 230.2 SIMON
WITH 363
Dear,

I feel extremely guilty and apologize not to have answered your kind letter of June 1 yet. I had to deal with some difficult problems during the past months which kept me awfully busy.

Since the political problems touched in Mr. Meany's extremely interesting editorial have still some actuality I should not postpone my answer any longer.

To put it very bluntly: I consider Mr. Meany's editorial as a most lucid analysis and at the same time as a most convincing and constructive contribution among so many speculations affected at least in part by wishful thinking. Confronting with reality the theses of Mr. Fulbright with which a new "realism" was to be demonstrated and the necessity of greater flexibility was to be set forth, your criticism exposes the senator's statements as mere assumptions without proper foundation in fact, and then in the last analysis unmasks them for what they are: marks of a rather dangerous approach to match Khrushchev's "coexistence" strategy.

There is certainly no need to go deeply into the matter as far as your editorial is concerned since I could only state my full agreement to its detailed outlinings and assessments. Of course, the course of action Moscow takes before the background of the difficult intra-bloc-developments is not in all respect clear cut. So we here in Germany too understand that there is to be given some consideration to the problem, whether Khrushchev could possibly be drawn into some disadvantages by the process
of careful negotiations. But the very precondition to that would be to my mind and experience the absence of any illusions which are just to meet Moscow's aims. Mr. Meany's statements are guarding this in an utterly needed distinction in opposition to an "appeasement-happy realism":

Not only from a German point of view but also in the best interest of the West as a whole I want to assure you of my great appreciation and comfort this editorial gives to me by countering Mr. Fulbright's speech and laying bare once more that solid ground on which the unity and the strength of the West are to be based. It is in this respect that we feel a profound solidarity with America: we are convinced with our American friends that we are motivated not "perversely by an inclination, for cold war" but correctly by an awareness of Moscow's hostile intentions even if covered by false persuasion, and of our responsibilities and duties to protect mankind against Moscow's still alive expansionism. Nobody should be blinded for that c.e. by Khruschev's desire to "stabilize" the status quo in Central Europe. It is not difficult to see that this desire aims in fact a disruption of the Federal Republic from its allies.

If there is feared sometimes America might get tired of standing up for its ideals, it is most consoling to see that this American will is still alive and not ready to give way to a "realism" which confuses true detente on substantive ground with Khruschev offering "coexistence". Again, I feel glad that Mr. Meany’s editorial sees clearly through the surface appearances and speaks up so firmly.

Hoping very strongly there will be a soon opportunity to exchange views more thoroughly on those matters at stake I send my best regards to you.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Routine

Spec: R.E.T. 2721112

Muni: On NY Info Bonn Cite (Dir 45367)

Rydat

Ryd Dir 45367

This para three ref not intended to exclude utility presence during briefing or appropriate brief social contact. Request your recommendations.

27. On NY info: please relay substance ref to muni.

S. C. R.E.T.

Top 27/07327

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Best Available copy

Group 1 - excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C/MOB C/OPC OCA RLS INT GO SO EG NT C/SB SEC FIN LOG REG

C/LB DCULB L/OPS L/CE L/PLANS L/RE L/COMM L/INT L/POL
ROUTINE: 28 AUG 64

S.F.C.R.E.T 28/1452
DIR MUNI INFO BONN CITE(GHNY 6733) (ACTING)
RYBAT.
REF:
A: DIR 45008
B: DIR 45367

1. I SHOULD OFFER TO SEE UTILITY, AND EMBASSY IN SETTING UP
   BRIEFINGS WITH ERHARD, SCHROEDER, ETC, AND EMBASSY SHOULD BE
   ADVISED TO SUGGEST THAT UTILITY BE INCLUDED.

2. FOR MUNI: REF: CONCERN PROPOSED VISIT TO CONTINENTAL
   CAPITALS, PROBABLY BETWEEN SEPT 20 AND OCT 1 TO BRIEF HEADS OF
   GOVS ON ADVANCED INTEL COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND EQUIVALENT SOVIET
   TECHNIQUES.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED FOR
SPECIAL USE.
SOURCES: NET 333, EXEMPTION 3B26
TO RE: 28/14542

NazI War Crimes Disclosure Act
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
REFS.: A. DIR 34061, PARA 2 NOT SENT BONN/
B. MUNI 0603

1. REF A MENTIONED ---1 HQS CONSULTATION AFTER LABOR DAY
FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS. FOR PLANNING HERE, WHAT ARE HQS AND COS VIEWS
AND SUGGESTED SCHEDULE? FOLLOWING ASPECTS MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN
THINKING.

2. IN SOME ROLE--OR AT LEAST AS ONE OF THOSE PRESENT--FEEL I
SHOULD BE IN BONN WHEN UTILITY COMES UP TO PARTICIPATE IN WHATEVER
WAY HE DOES IN 1 BONN BRIEFINGS. ASSUME ALSO THAT I WOULD HAVE
SOME ROLE IN UTILITY TRIP TO HQS LATER IN YEAR. IN PRESENT STATE OF
NEEDEDNESS AT BASE, FEAR I CANNOT MAKE MUCH CONTRIBUTION, BUT PRESENCE
WOULD PRIMARY BE TO ENFORCE IDEA I AM THE MAN WHEN IT COMES TO
KUBARK-UTILITY AFFAIRS.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
END OF MESSAGE
1. DURING PREPARATIONS FOR JANUARY, 1964, VISIT, INTERBASE TELENOTE USED PHRASE "LIAISON DISASTER" IF UTILITY EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATION IN VISIT. SAME APPLIES TODAY. ALSO UOS WILL RECALL THAT IN REF B MENTION HAS MADE OF J's HOPE TO HAVE MORE TIME AT LATER PERIOD TO TALK WITH UTILITY, WHO MAY VERY WELL RECALL THESE SENTIMENTS. WHETHER OR NOT THERE ACTUALLY IS MORE TIME DURING PLANNED NEW VISIT NOT IMPORTANT, BUT WHETHER UTILITY INCLUDED IN SCHEDULE IS.

2. RECOMMEND THAT IN EMBASSY HANDLING OF MATTER EMBASSY BE URGED TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THOSE GERMANS CONTROLLING LIST OF GERMAN PARTICIPANTS THAT L NATURALLY WILL EXPECT HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE TO BE INCLUDED. RECOMMEND ALSO THAT KUBANK SHOULD BE IN POSITION INFORMALLY TO NOTIFY UTILITY THAT VISIT IN OFFING AND THAT L NATURALLY ANTICIPATES UTILITY WILL BE AMONG THOSE PARTICIPATING.

COordinating officers

RELEASED OFFICE
SECRET AUTHENTICATION OFFICE

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
OCCASION FOR THIS MIGHT BE AT 1'S 6 SEPT AVE ATQUE VALE
DINNER FOR AND AT WHICH UTILITY MAY BE PRESENT.

3. QUESTION OF MY PRESENCE AT AFFAIR INCLUDED IN FOLLOWING
CABLE MUNICIPAL DEALING WITH HQS CONSULTATION ETC.

END OF MESSAGE
ROUTINE
04 SEP 64

SECRET  0422282
MUNI INFO GNY. FRAN CITE (DIR. 47681)

CAT1DE

1. CHIEF KUBASS PLANS ARRIVE MUNI 1205 HOURS 25 SEPT
VIA BE-582 AND AVAILABLE THAT AFTERNOON AND EVENING FOR
DISCUSSIONS. WISHES KEEP 26 SEPT FREE AND PLANS DEPART MUNI
27 SEPT.

2. PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER 25 SEPT CONVENIENT FOR
DISCUSSIONS WITH UTILITY. IN DETERMINING THIS PLEASE KEEP
IN MIND THAT TENTATIVE DATES FOR [ ] VISIT BONN (NOT YET
FIRM) ARE FROM LATE 27 - 29 SEPT.

SECRET

FOR CO/GNY

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
S.E.C.R.E.T 1609302
PRIORITY MUNI INFO, PRIORITY DIR ROUTINE BONN CITE G'MNY 6828
I INVITED UTILITIES ATTEND A BRIEFING ON 28 SEPTEMBER.
SAID THAT DETAILS, TIME ETC YET TO BE WORKED OUT.
S.E.C.R.E.T.
FOR 16/09/472

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES/METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 2005
REF: DIR 47661

SAYING HE REGRETTED THEIR SCHEDULES CLASHED LAST TIME, UTILITY
SAID HE DELIGHTED SEE CHIEF KUBASS AFTERNOON OF 25 SEPTEMBER. WILL WORK
OUT EXACT HOUR LATER.

END OF MESSAGE

Chief, KUBASS available—afternoon of 25 September. Convenient for UTILITY.
MESSAGE BEING SENT SHORTLY FROM SECSTATE TO YOUR AMBASSADORS VIA ROGER CHANNEL GIVING FOLLOWING PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR JS'S TRIP:

A. PARIS: 18-20 SEPTEMBER.

B. LONDON: 20-22 SEPTEMBER. BRIEFING FOR PRIME MINISTER, POSS. BUTLER, THORNEycROFT. MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE MOUNTBATTEN, STRONG, WHITE.

C. THE HAGUE: 22-23 SEPTEMBER. BRIEFING FOR MARJNEN AND LUNS. POSSIBLY SEPARATE VISIT WITH BERNHARD.

D. BRUSSELS: 24 SEPTEMBER. BRIEFING OF SPAAK.

E. ROME: 24-26 SEPTEMBER. BRIEFING FOR MORO, SARAGAT, ANDREOTTI. POSSIBLY CERTAIN SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS.

F. BONN: 26-28 September. BRIEFING FOR ERHARD, SCHROEDER, VON HASSEL, OTHERS. OTHER SENIOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS.

G. OSLO: 28-29 September. BRIEFING ERHARDSEN, LANGER, HANDEL.

AMBASSADORS BEING ASKED SEEK APPROPRIATE APPOINTMENTS IN COORDINATION WITH CAS TO ENSURE PARALLEL NOTIFICATION TO LIAISON.
1. This was our first meeting alone and the second time we have seen each other. UTILITY appeared to be in very good fettle. My introductory remarks about the long association of our services led me back to newspaper articles I had seen recently. They referred to the outbreak of World War II 25 years ago. I told UTILITY on that day in September I was in Hotel Haus Oberschlesien in Gleiwitz watching the hotel become a corps headquarters. This touched him off and we got into a 15-minute discussion of his background in Upper Silesia, his military service and where he was the day the march took place into Poland, etc., etc. I had a hard time shutting him up.

2. Then I said there were only two things I wanted to take up with him on the occasion of this more or less ceremonial visit. One of these was to arrange for a meeting between him and Chief, KUBASS. This we quickly did.

3. The other thing was his view of outstanding problems which might come up during the course of my administration here.

4. He took this pretty much to mean world problems rather than inter-service problems. I did not re-define my concern. He then went on to say that basically there were no problems between us (and I think here he meant inter-service). He said we were all in the same boat and this, he added, meant all of the western powers. Referring for a moment back to our service connections, he said they had been so long and close that we could easily disagree with one another without feelings being hurt.

5. To this I agreed, saying that the main thing was to get our differences on the table between us.

6. He then went on into a dissertation about the world dangers: being the dangers from expanding Communist power. He added his country, being a small country, had to concentrate on the main danger spots. He added, however, wherever there were German interests (and I think he said "also in the western hemisphere"), CATIDE would report as well as they could on the dangers of expanding Communism. He gave as an example our mutual interest in the Congo. I also understood him to say they worked closely with the British in this matter as well as with us. He showed me a product of the CATIDE-owned (through a cut-out) printing works in the Congo. It was a smashing first-class five-color job.

7. He then proceeded to give me a little briefing on how CATIDE worked, getting for this purpose a black briefing book with diagrams in it. He spoke of his desire to keep CATIDE out of politics and how
he had to, as it were, play a little politics to do this. He spoke of being in touch with government party chiefs and the leaders of the opposition as well. At this point, and at several other points, he made reference (in English) to "security clearances". I got the impression he felt that I would be particularly concerned with this aspect of his relationships with the political people, with the Foreign Office people, and the military people. At one point he said that one of the difficulties was the understanding of the difficult split-nation situation.

8. I had expected to elicit from him the name of his people I should see in Washington, hoping that the name General Wessel would pop up. I forgot to do this but UTILITY mentioned Wessel's name. He said he was one of the men who had had the Ministry of Defense J-2 spot. He said this job always went to a man who had served in CATIDE. I think I may be able to use this reference by UTILITY to Wessel to see if I cannot see him in Washington.

P.S. During the course of the explanation of CATIDE's relations to the Foreign Ministry, UTILITY said that he had often been called upon by Adenauer to render an opinion. UTILITY said in such an instance, he might have slightly variant views of those held by the Foreign Minister. Usually the divergencies between the two men would be small. UTILITY then went on to say that of course nowadays (under the present Chancellor), he was not asked very often for his views. "Things are not so busy for me in this respect these days," he said, "but in place of those worries, I naturally have other worries". In short, he isn't called upon so often these days to perform for the Chancellor.

Typed: 9 September 1964
CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Chief, EE

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

Chief of Station, Germany

CATIDE/Operations

Program During Headquarters Consultation

Headquarters consideration of problem and discussion on J's arrival

Ref.: EGMA-65205

1. One of the tasks I foresee in connection with my term of administration at this Base has to do with the successor to UTILITY. Therefore, we should consider all means of unobtrusively getting me into contact with his possible successors. J has apparently fingered one of them in the referenced dispatch.

2. The same man was mentioned to me by UTILITY during my initial meeting with UTILITY. I think, therefore, that during my Headquarters consultation we should consider some means of having me meet the gentleman. Of course, there is the regular liaison officer, whom I believe I should meet, and I understand there is a third senior officer, not necessarily tipped as UTILITY's successor, but who served in UTILITY's organization, whom I might profitably meet.

3. I hope that Headquarters officers can be thinking of some reasonable way to get me in touch with these officers during my consultation.

Distribution:

2 - Chief, EE
1 - COS/G (Bonn)
1 - COS/G (Fran)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES: METHODS SECRECY
RAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
E 2005

15 September 1964
TELENOTE

REF DIR. 45367

Not received

1. DIR. 49219 DESCRIBES EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF BRIEFING TO BE GIVEN. SAYS THAT BRIEFING WILL BE RESTRICTED TO A VERY FEW PEOPLE WHO WILL BE INVITED BY NAME ONLY.

2. BRIEFING IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY MORNING 28 SEPT. WHEN HOUR IS SET AND FINAL ARRANGEMENTS MADE WE WILL SEE WHETHER IT POSSIBLE TO HOLD SEPARATE UTILTY MEETING.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE OF REREXEPION 3926 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

250.2 LIASON WITH 363
16 September 1964

C/MLB

SECRET

SN

C/MLB

TELENOTE

REF: DIR-48094, para 2

WOULD YOU BE GOOD ENOUGH TO KEEP ME POSTED IN DUE COURSE OF UTILITY ASPECTS OF C VISIT, ESPECIALLY HIS NOTIFICATION. I WOULD HATE TO LEARN FROM CATTLE SIDE THAT HE GOT HIS INVITATION WITHOUT US KNOWING ABOUT IT AHEAD OF TIME. THANKS.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBJECT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 DISCLOSURE ACT

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET 230-2 LIAISON WITH 363

B. Brandon
16 September 1964

SECRET

C/MLB

GMNY □ □
MUNI □ □

C/MLB

TELENOTE

RYBAT

REFS: A. UR 09/15 SEPT
B. MUNI 0603

1. I SUPPOSE ALL ALONG 's SCHEDULED PATH THOSE WITH
LIAISON CONNECTIONS ARE PLAGUED WITH PROBLEMS OF AVAILABILITY
OF a TO MEET CHIEF OF LIAISON SERVICE.

2. MY SENTIMENTS REMAIN THE SAME AS EXPRESSED IN PARA 1
OF MY REF-B, BUT I WILL NOT SQUAWK ANY MORE ABOUT MATTER KNOWING
THAT b -AND b- BECAUSE OF YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN UTILITY, THE
BEST EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO GET HIM TOGETHER WITH a EVEN
IF IT IS ONLY A SOCIAL-CEREMONIAL-PROTOCOL SESSION.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHOD EXEMPTION 3549
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2095

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FILE: 230.2 LIAISON WITH 365
1. There were four pieces of business to transact with UTILITY at this meeting.

2. My main job was to hand him the assessment of CATIDE's take in this field. This had recently been cabled to us and I suggested that I make the money by presenting the assessment to him. Oddly enough, he didn't quite remember what it was he had requested from us. The minute he saw the text of it, however, he recalled at once and expressed his gratitude. In a quick glance he obviously saw that it was going to be useful to him.

3. Then I broached to him the question of lists of prisoners from the East Zone. I had some difficulty in the phraseology of my own aide mémoire to him on this matter. I wanted to be as loose in phraseology as I could in order to evoke from CATIDE the most encompassing list possible. UTILITY caught the looseness of the phraseology immediately and said, "do you want the list of persons returned or the persons whom we seek to have returned?" I then said that we sought the most complete list possible, a Bundesliste as it were, of all persons whom the government hopes to have returned.

4. In the course of this discussion UTILITY filled me in on some of the background of the prisoner situation. None of the points he raised is not reflected in our Base files and cable traffic. However, he said he was talking a bit out of school when he described to me the uncoordinated way that the prisoner affair was being handled. He emphasized that because of the shortage of trained civil servants, as a result of the war, civil government did not proceed as smoothly as it ought. He said that many political people "in their interpretation of the democratic processes" thought they could act individually in this important but very emotional matter. UTILITY then spoke for a few minutes on the necessity of carrying on your politics with your head rather than your heart.

5. The above were the only two subjects on which I passed papers to UTILITY.

6. I then asked him, as suggested in a cable from L, for his presentation of the Schwirkmann case to the Chancellor. He had copies made after removing his signature and the Top Secret classification (no longer necessary since the government's intention to keep the matter quiet had gone adrift). UTILITY then gave me the data which appeared in EGO-82 and the accompanying operational cable.
7. The last matter which I brought up was in response to Headquarters query about Mr. Meyer, a young man shot while attempting to cross the Berlin Wall. His response was covered in MUNI-0768.

8. The meeting was to have lasted a short five minutes but UTILITY seemed in a talkative mood. Although most of our time was spent directly on business, we did discuss my children, their ages, their school and previous international school experience, and my desire after that experience to have them once more for a period in a completely American school atmosphere. UTILITY agreed with this point of view. However, I said after they had been here sometime and depending upon how they were progressing, I might investigate the German school situation. I told him the children had already made friends with all the German children around them and I expressed my astonishment at how loud conversations in two languages could go on with all the children apparently understanding every word. He said that it was because children had no inhibitions. He then said that the children of J's predecessor spoke very good German.

9. He did not volunteer nor did I raise the \( J \) visit.

Typed: 18 September 1964
1. ALIAS EICHENDORF, UTILITY'S ADJUTANT, CALLED AND SAID UTILITY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE GENERAL IDEA AREAS CATIDE'S BRIEFCOVER WILL COVER. UTILITY WISHES BRING HIMSELF UP TO DATE CATIDE PROGRESS THESE AREAS PRIOR BRIEFCOVER.

2. PLS ADVISE REPLY IF ONE POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE
**SECRET 212062**

**DIR GMNY INFO FRAN CITE MUNI 2601 (ACTING)**

**CATIDE**

1. Through his personal aide Utility has informed us that his private 1957 Mercedes, driven 200,000 kilometers, is for sale at 500 dollars.

2. Do HQS or COS think it might be useful operational gambit to take up this offer, hold car a little while then dispose of or transfer elsewhere?

3. Fully aware of vehicle cut-back drive, and would not entertain even as operational idea at moment were not Utility personally behind it.

**SECRET**

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

*DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SERVICES METHODS EXEMPTION 3021 IN ZIMMER CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2385*
No interest. In replying to Utility's aide be sure you do not imply in any way that you have taken this matter up with anyone outside of base. Just say that all the boys have wheels and therefore no market for such a good buy at this time.

**Utility's private 1957 Mercedes is for sale at $500.**
TO MUNICH GERMANY FRANKFURT
FROM DIRECTOR
CONF. EEE INFO OLY, VR

TO MUNI INFO GMYN FRAN CRT DIR 51507.

CATIDEB
REF MUNI 0801 (IN. 77952)

BECAUSE SEE NO POTENTIAL USE FOR VEHICLE IN RETURN FOR EXPENSE OF HANDLING PURCHASE AND RESALE, REQUEST NOT TAKE UP OFFER.

END OF MESSAGE

* RE UTILITY'S 1957 MERCEDES FOR SALE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005
06/22 SEP 64

TO: MUNI (EYES ONLY) FM: GMNY (E)

TELENOTE

RYBAT CATIDE

REUR 01/21 SEPT

AS I UNDERSTAND IT BRIEFING WILL COVER ADVANCED COLLECTION
SYSTEMS BOTH OF U.S. AND USSR. FOREGOING MOST CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Advised @ Eichendorf of above. We speculated about
what this meant and concluded scientific develop-
ments probably involved. Eichendorf said Heftl
had believed though he said it on the
agenda.

FILE: 230.2. LAISON WITH 363
BRIEFING SCHEDULED AT 1100 HOURS, 28 SEPT.
IN CHANCELLERY, LUNCH AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FOLLOWING
BRIEFING. AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE ASKS THAT WE INVITE UTILITY
TO BOTH AND REQUESTS REPLY THIS AFTERNOON. PLEASE TELEPHONE
REPLY TO MY OFFICE. YOU'LL ALSO INVITED TO LUNCH AT AMBASSADOR'S
RESIDENCE.

Utilit accepted BRI, invite UTILITY
Gordon informed by telephone.
SECRET 2221682
PRIORITY MUNI C/NO INFO FROM CITE DIR 51647

TO

1. MUST RELUCTANTLY INFORM YOU I HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO CANCEL PLANNED EUROPEAN TRIP. THEREFORE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP APPOINTMENT AT MUNI ON 25 SEPTEMBER.

2. AM AWARE OF YOUR INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION IN 25 SEPTEMBER MEETING AND ASSURE YOU THE DECISION TO CANCEL AT THIS TIME WAS A MOST DIFFICULT ONE. BELIEVE IT BEST TO DEPEND ON YOUR JUDGMENT AS TO HOW TO HANDLE THIS WITH UTILITY. FOR YOUR INFORMATION DECISION PREDICATED ON NO SINGLE ISSUE BUT TOTALITY OF CURRENT PRESSING MATTERS DEMANDING PERSONAL ATTENTION.

SECRET

TORI 23/08517

FILE: 2802 LIAISON WITH 363

GROUP H EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

C/MOB C/OPS OCA RLS INT GO SG EG NT C/SB SEC FIN LOG REC
C/LB C/LB L/OPS L/CE L/PLANS L/AF L/CORD L/HUIN L/POL
TELENOTE

1. [CABLE (DIR 51647)] SAYING HE NOT ABLE TO SEE UTILITY ON 25 SEPT ADDRESSED TO YOU, BUT FEEL WE MUST IMMEDIATELY TELL UTILITY. HE HAS PEOPLE COMING IN ONE INSTANCE FROM AS FAR AWAY AS BREISACH. THIS WILL CLEAR UP HIS SCHEDULE AND ALLOW US TO CANCEL COCKTAILS AT BRUECKE, AS WELL, WHICH CRANKED UP SOLELY FOR [C]'S VISIT. DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL YOU ARRIVE.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM BY PRIORITY TELENOTE THAT YOU HAVE NO OTHER PLANS IN THE MATTER.

3. WILL PICK YOU UP TONIGHT AT AIRPORT.

END OF MESSAGE
Reference: EGMT-11297, 25 September 1964

Headquarters would appreciate receiving on a regular basis the contact reports written on meetings with UTILITY.

Distribution:
Orig & a - MLB
1 - COS, Germany
1 - CSB, Frankfurt

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES/RECEIPT/EXEMPTION 3328 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2305
**Meeting with UTILITY 29 September 1964.**

1. UTILITY called on me 29 September principally for the purpose of discussing Krone's position. My report on this subject and several others is attached (USC TNP).

2. A few points not included in the report follow:
   UTILITY was at pains to point out to me that while foreign policy is certainly out of his field he is much closer to Krone than he is to Schroeder on the question of how to deal with France (if I am really very pleased that the question of the French alliance came up at lunch with UTILITY present since as you know I have attempted to get UTILITY to report confidentially on Franco/German relations and on what he learns in Paris. The rumors referred to in the attached report are of course CATIDE reports. UTILITY himself relegated then to the rumor category.)

3. I told UTILITY that there is no doubt but that the U.S. does want to keep France lined up within the framework of the Atlantic alliance and that any influence that the Germans could bring to this end would be welcome.

4. UTILITY believes that there may be a desire on the part of the USSR to defer the Erhard/Khrushchev meeting until after the Queen's visit to Germany. Since I took this to be gloomy speculation in the wake of the Schwirrmann affair, I have not reported it. Would appreciate having WLB check with @Degenhardt and Company. Do not quote UTILITY.

5. UTILITY believes that a lecture that Gerstenmaier is planning to give in Paris -- apparently the same one he recently gave in Tokyo -- has found favor in high places in the French Government.

Attachment: USC TNP
Memo dated 30 Sept 64
6. UTILITY again remarked that his relations with the British are very close. He said that he had pushed for a better understanding with London at the time of the Franco/German rapprochement. He felt this was one way of keeping things in balance. He considers that he now enjoys a relationship based on full mutual confidence.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador George C. McGhee  

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Gehlen 29 September '64

1. General Gehlen, President of the BND, had the following comments to make 29 September. He felt that the briefing given by the Director of Central Intelligence on 28 September had been a thorough going success. After the briefing, Chancellor Erhard asked him whether German intelligence could produce good photography. He replied that in his opinion the cost of such a program would be well out of the range of anything the Germans could undertake. He added that in his opinion the Germans should concentrate on doing the very best job of collection that they can and that they should give full support to American intelligence and should cultivate very strong ties with the U.S.

2. Further to this point, Gehlen told me that he has recently written to Minister Westrick asking that the budgetary ceiling imposed on his organization two years ago be re-examined. He explained that in the late 50's and early 60's, with Adenauer's full agreement, he had embarked on a program of increasing Germany's collection capabilities in the signal intelligence field. He has now reached the point where he cannot round out his collection effort without more funds.

3. Gehlen did not indicate whether he thought he has a chance of getting more money but he did say that the present administration is now much better informed about intelligence than it was at the outset.

4. Gehlen felt that Minister Krone had not completely succeeded in answering the question: Can the German Government, using its close alliance with France, bring France somewhat more into step within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance? Gehlen said that Krone's replies had seemed to him to be somewhat hesitant and evasive, although clearly indicating that Krone feels deeply about the matter. As background, Gehlen explained that Krone has been one to urge Chancellor Erhard to keep the door open to France. His interest in keeping Franco-German relations on a good footing is in part inspired by fear that France, feeling rebuffed, may embark on an entirely independent course isolating herself from Germany and the U.S. and in a sense placing Germany in the awkward position of standing between unfriendly forces. Gehlen said that there had been rumors in Paris that such a course of action may be contemplated and that he and Krone, while not believing that such a decision has been made, are concerned that it might be.

Gordon M. Stewart

CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH
SECRET

CONTACT REPORT
UTILITY, Brigadier General Higgins, Major Clark and C
UTILITY's office
2 November 1964

1. Not a great deal of substance took place at this meeting as the Doctor mainly concerned himself with giving Brigadier General Higgins a resume of the history of his organization.

2. In addition to the history, he mentioned the CATIDE use of cover commercial firms. He said that for legal reasons the cover firms would exist less than a year and then would go into the equivalent of bankruptcy proceedings which could last for another four years. UTILITY also commented he had talent spotters in universities. Sometimes he found a talented person and urged him to stay in a university fingering other prospective CATIDE candidates. I think in this comment he was referring mainly to scientific and technical personnel. He said his organization also had a Colonel in the personnel section of the armed forces doing spotting work for him. He commented to General Higgins that the CATIDE use of cover-license tags had been demonstrably effective in hindering inquiries about CATIDE.

3. He also mentioned that he believed that his successor would be a General adding, I believe, that this was part of the law surrounding the organization of CATIDE.

Typed: 12 November 1964
CONTACT REPORT

UTILITY's Office
4 November 1964

1. The ostensible reason for this meeting was to allow Utility to tell Utility about contacts he had been making in Bonn. In this connection, Utility advised C in one instance not to bother with one proposed contact because he was too junior a man.

2. Utility made comments on the matter of German technical men in Egypt. He asked C if possible, to get the point across to interested parties that if West German technicians were withdrawn from Egypt, the technical positions there might be filled by Soviets or East Germans.

3. Utility made an interesting comment (in my opinion, at any rate) about the fall of Khrushchev. He said he thought it was a good thing. The reason for this was people were becoming lulled by Khrushchev's relatively low-pressure world politics. Therefore, they forgot the real nature and the real menace of the Soviet Union.

4. In the CATIDE estimate as reflected by Utility, the Soviet Podgornyi figured high on the totem pole of behind-the-scenes powers: as a strong man.

5. In a discussion of SIGINT, which was of a detailed nature, Utility seemed quite at ease, reflecting in no way the low-level pressures we are getting to come across immediately with finished COMINT material. Part of this may stem from the anticipated resignation or retirement of a gentleman in Bonn connected with the matter. (I fear my ignorance of the names and numbers of the players is reflected in my inability to recall the man's name.)

6. Utility also seemed to be quite relaxed about the matter of the construction of the air force towers, mentioning that the head of the air force was a man from CATIDE of former years, and that CATIDE entry into the towers was a matter that had already been arranged.

7. C and Utility had what appeared to be a worthwhile exchange of political news notes on the Bonn scene. I fear the intricacies and nuances were a bit beyond my presently primitive understanding of the situation in the German capital. However, Utility made an interesting estimate regarding Chancellor Adenauer's pre-De Gaulle newspaper interview. Utility said this was an effort to remove himself somewhat from the official German and German Foreign Office position before having his talks with De Gaulle.

Typed: 12 November 1964
They gave UTILITY a very favorable description and Brock asked if UTILITY planned to accept KUBARK's invitation to go to the States himself. UTILITY replied that time would not permit his making the trip before the spring of 1965 and he was not sure he wanted to go even then. He added that KUBARK had invited him only because they had a guilty conscience about the Deckmann case and he was not sure he wanted to accept their hospitality.

5. Brock said that UTILITY's comment emphasizes what he has always told me: that UTILITY will not forgive KUBARK for the Deckmann case as long as he lives. UTILITY's interpretation of the case is that it was an intrigue aimed at forcing him out of CAYDE. He believes that the allegations against Deckmann were deliberately twisted by an anti-UTILITY cabal in KUBARK probably headed by [JS] which was determined to get rid of him. He sees Deckmann only as a pawn in this game. Brock said that it is probably because of the Deckmann case that UTILITY has made such an effort to strengthen his relationships with the British and French Services. Feeling that he has lost KUBARK's support, he hopes to retain theirs.
3 December 1964

Dear General Gehlen,

Almost six months have passed since we bade you farewell and it is difficult to realize that the time has passed so quickly.

Ruth and I did enjoy so much that last afternoon with you and your wife. Shortly thereafter we departed Munich. The trip back was pleasant and our home leave was enjoyable except that it was marred by the death of Ruth's father. However, she spent his last three weeks with him and was grateful that we got home in time. Her father was 82 and had had a full life.

We moved into our former home in Falls Church, Virginia in early September; the children entered school nearby, and I returned to work about mid-September. I believe I told you before my departure that I was destined for the position I held in 1959 which concerns planning activities. I am back at it and reorienting myself.

I was delighted to see that during October the visit of Herrn Moeller and Erock materialized. I trust they enjoyed the entire trip. Although I had the privilege of escorting them about Washington and saw them at various social functions, I did not get to see them at the completion of their travels in the United States. I am particularly happy that you chose Herr Moeller to make the trip. The discussions and briefings here in Washington plus a first-hand look at the country should be of assistance to him in his new position in your Service.

Particularly enjoyable in October was the grand reunion party which Heinz held at his home. Not only was it a genuine pleasure to see some of the old Pullach hands who were stationed there with Jim, but it was a real surprise to meet John Boker again after all these years. It was a very nice party.

With Christmas approaching, the thought of parties will make us yearn for Munich. First of all, we shall miss the traditional Christmas dinner at which you were our honored guest for the past five years and at which we always saw Eberhard and Putschens. We did enjoy those evenings so much. Then, too, there was always the large Christmas cocktail party -- the one really large gathering of the year when we were able to mingle with so many members of your Service. I must say that the house at Forstweg 8 provided an ideal setting for such events. It is unfortunate that I could not have inherited it.
The mention of the Hartwigs reminds me that I have heard that you have posted him to London. You know, of course, the high esteem in which I hold Eberhard and I consider the British most fortunate in having him as your representative. I trust that someday his assignment will permit him to visit the United States again because we would be delighted to see both him and his wife again.

And speaking of visits, we are looking forward to the day when you choose to visit here again. Perhaps by that time we shall be in our new home. We purchased one in November which is under construction and we expect to occupy it in late March. It is located in Virginia also but now our address will be Vienna, Virginia. Sorry we don't have a Munich around here.

Doctor, I think this will probably reach you by Christmas, but the personal remembrance that I am sending will probably arrive late. The 'press' of events here has us jumping this Christmas.

Ruth and I both wish you and your family a most joyous Christmas and holiday season. And may the New Year bring continued good health and success.
SECRET 64161HZ

DIR GMNY INFO FRAN CITE MUNI 1398

HOPE THAT DIRECTOR PLANS TO SEND CHRISTMAS CARD TO UTILITY
AS USUAL. WE WOULD FIND THIS USEFUL AT LIAISON BASE. SUGGEST
2 3 I WOULD BE ABLE TO RECOMMEND THE DISPATCH OF SUCH OTHER
CHRISTMAS CARDS FROM SENIOR OFFICERS AS HAVE USUALLY BEEN SENT.
IF DIRECTOR MAKES PRACTICE OF PUTTING ANYTHING PERSONAL ON CARD;
SUGGEST REFERENCE BE MADE TO LAST 2 3 UTILITY MEETING AT BONN
BRIEFING AND AMBASSADOR MCGHEE LUNCHEON. UNLESS HEADQUARTERS OR
3 1 FEELS WE'VE MENTIONED IT ENOUGH, POSSIBLY REFERENCE TO HOPE
OF SEEING UTILITY IN WASHINGTON DURING NEW YEAR MIGHT BE
IN ORDER.

SECRET

Answered by 12/16/57

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FOR “SECRET/DECLASSIFIED TO PUBLIC”
UNLESS CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005
Attached under separate cover is a Christmas letter to UTILITY and a carbon copy for the information of Chief, MLB.

Attachment a/s, use Letter

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - MLB, w/att
1 - COS, Germany, w/o att
1 - CSB, Frankfurt, w/o att

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES AND METHODS EXEMPTION 302A NAZI WARS CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT PRI 2005
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<th><strong>PROCESSING ACTION</strong></th>
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<td><strong>SECRET</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TO</strong></td>
<td>Chief, Munich Liaison Base</td>
<td>XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED</td>
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<td><strong>INFO.</strong></td>
<td>Chief of Station, Germany</td>
<td>ONLY QUALIFIED RESE CAN JUDGE INDEXING</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FROM</strong></td>
<td>Chief, EE</td>
<td>MICROFILM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUBJECT</strong></td>
<td>CATIDE Letter to UTILITY</td>
<td>MARKED FOR INDEXING</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES</strong></td>
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Attached under separate cover for transmittal to UTILITY is a letter from L to UTILITY thanking him for the CATIDE medal and a silver dish which recently were presented to L by Alias DESSAU, acting in UTILITY's behalf. A carbon copy of the letter is attached for Chief, MLB.

Attachment a/s, use Letter

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - MLB, w/att
2 - COS, Germany, w/o att

Date: 4 December 1964
CONCERNING WOODEN CHIEF'S THRONE L J SO KINDLY SEND HE IN OPERATIONAL ACCRA FOR CHRISTMAS PRESENTATION TO UTILITY: WOULD LIKE TO INCLUDE WITH GIFT SOME BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION. RECOLLECTION 13 THAT THE CHAIRS WITH THE LION ARM RESTS CAME FROM AREA OF FORMER NATIVE CAPITAL NORTH OF COTONOU, DOROBEY. CAN YOU SUPPLY THE NATIVE NAME OF THIS TYPE OF CHAIR? WHAT IS SIGNIFICANCE OF EAGLE-SNAKE CARVING ON BACK? WHAT DO TWO LION ARM RESTS MEAN? LOCAL RESOURCES HERE AREcommend THIS/ APPRECIATE EARLY ANSWER IN TIME FOR 18TH DECEMBER PRESENTATION DINNER.

END OF MESSAGE
To: CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE

Chief of Station, Germany - Chief, CSB, Frankfurt - Chief, Bonn Operations Base

From: Chief, FS

Subject: Christmas Greetings to Catide

Action Required: Reference Muni 1398

1. Since I am not sending any cards, plan to draw up a message to convey to utility greetings of C and E together. Will teletape or cable it for MLB to pass on.

2. Our plans for other greetings include cards to utility from C, J, C, and myself being posted from here, and cards to Dessauf from them and myself to be delivered locally.

3. Bonn - pls inform IC and J:ard para two being sent in his name from here.

DISTRIBUTION

By tape

MLB

CSB, Germany

CSB, FRAN

Bonn Operations Base

Classified and released by Central Intelligence Agency
Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency

Declassified and released by Central Intelligence Agency

Effective Date: 30 December 1964

Distribution by tape

MLB

CSB, Germany

CSB, FRAN

Bonn Operations Base

EGMS - 5456

DATE: 15 December 1964

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

Hold for release

230:2 Liaison with 363
TO: MUNICH GERMANY FRANKFURT

FROM: EE-G

TO: MUNICH

DATE: 15, DEC 64

MESSAGE FORM

<table>
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<tr>
<th>OUN</th>
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<tr>
<td>EXT</td>
<td>X 5751</td>
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1. **SECRET**
2. No INDEX
3. File in CS file no.
4. No return to branch
5. File RIO

**ROUTING**

1 5 16 0 13 8 0 7 2

**Copy No.**

**71320**

**CATTDE**

**RE**: EGMS 5456

**PLS CONVEY TO UTILITY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM**

**AC/G**

**TO**: C/EE

**COOP.** D/CI, D/DCI, DOP, ADDP, EN/DC, CS/RF, PI, CI, CI/OPS, VR File, INT2

**INFO**

**SIGNATURE**

**AUTHORIZED**

**ROUTINE**

**RE: CMS 5456**

**PLES CONVEY TO UTILITY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM**

**C**

**AND**

**AND**

**WE WISH YOU AND ALL**

**OF THE MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF**

**HEARTIEST SEASONS GREETINGS AND**

**BEST WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL AND SUCCESSFUL NEW YEAR.**

**WE ALSO**

**LOOK FORWARD TO A CONTINUATION OF THE FRIENDLY SPIRIT OF**

**COORDINATION WHICH HAS EXISTED BETWEEN OUR SERVICES FOR SO**

**MANY YEARS.**

**END OF MESSAGE**

**DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

**ARCHIVE METHODS EXCEPT FOR JUST WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT**

**DATE 2005**

**AC/G**

**DDP**

**COORDINATING OFFICER**

**C/EE**

**REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.**

**Copy No.**
"Well, this is the last for a few years; (refers to Christmas in Germany) next time in London. I have never thought of that! Expected some recognition or climax in later years in Washington. But things developed very sudden and the British were very outspoken to their personal suggestion! So our boss made the decision towards me whilst he is still in office and call me back before he leaves. This means, that I hope to stay over there for some three years at least.

Yesterday we had a very nice Bruch dinner and dance. Putshen and I were the king about our feasts and the easy and cozy, modest way you took care of us all. Tomorrow is the traditional private dinner but without Putshen and me. Only Dr. Sugger, Vends. The Dr. represents it very much but I honestly do not, since this has been our very personal "hohepunkt" with you both and before with Tom and one should not and cannot transplant the personal feeling. Besides, we are bound to leave........"

Extract from Brook Christas card to C...

"........I went also to thank you again for the wonderful and impressive trip. I would do because I know that was your work........'We are very happy here mainly for two reasons, if I set of all to remember every... (?) that there is between my beloved chief and myself a distance of more than 700 kilometers and second to live in the neighborhood of a beach....."
Headquarters assumption of this task

1. A few days ago I had a discussion with \( \text{C} \) who was, as usual, loosed with good lines. We had a quick five minutes on the question of UTILITY's successor, which hangs over all our relations with CAYADE.

2. Both \( \text{C} \) and \( \text{I} \) wondered whether anybody at KURARK was going out of their way to keep our social hand in with IDENTITY. He has been cited several times (but, of course, there are no guarantees) as a possible UTILITY successor. As \( \text{C} \) put it, you can bet your bottom dollar that the \( \text{I} \) and \( \text{C} \) people are busyly working away cultivating people whom they suspect or hope will follow UTILITY. Since we have one whom we can consider at least a prime candidate, maybe he would be worth a little representation work from our side-- a dinner, a show, a party once in a while.

3. Although we know that \( \text{I} \) has a lot of fish to fry, from our personal point of view if he could fry some of them down at the National Theater or at Constitutional Hall, it might be worth all our while.

Distribution:
1. Chief, NE
2. UNPA-AVAILABLE
Attachment: USC
IDEN - Sam Shone, Counsel

SECRET

21 December 1964

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
1. L and I arrived at CATIDE headquarters at 0930 and first made a courtesy call on UTILITY. When I introduced the two gentlemen L remarked that he and UTILITY had met previously in 1945-46 when L was still in the United States Army and had been partly responsible for shepherding UTILITY and his officers through the United States. UTILITY said that he indeed remembered L, but he clearly did not wish to reminisce and I got the impression that the memory of those days was a little distasteful to him. L then went on to mention his experiences since the war and the topic of his lectures. While doing so he indicated that he had been the case officer for both the L and L operations. UTILITY's eyes popped a little at this and he allowed that he might find time to sit in on part of the lectures himself.
ROUTINE

03 JAN 65

SECRET 0321412

MUNI INFO GMMY FRAN CITE AIR 82215

CATIDE

REF: MUNI: 1855

FDS: POUCH-LETTER HGS UNOPENED. WILL AdvISE STATION OF CONTENT AS PROVIDED BY ASCHAM.

SECRET

DORR: 04/07/92

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES: METROSEXEMPIAL: 2231 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
SECRET

Chief, Munich Liaison Base

Chief of Station, Germany

Chief, CS

Identity of Reference

FDMA 6563, dated 21 December 1964

1. The thinking reflected in Reference is certainly valid, and we
would not agree more that we do that any individual action [21st
November] in support of UTILITY is well worth an appropriate
evaluation ahead by UNAMS.

2. In point of fact, Subject is not someone who has been overly
praised during his time in the Headquarters in the USA. In reality,
subject is not really an entity to which one can turn on a occasion
for the purposes of help. He is not capable of responding to this
friendly environment with any kind of call. A couple of days later,
Abbeau seems to have been able to settle his personal affairs
with some comfort, and if that is the case, we would certainly not
imagine him as the kind of man who is capable of providing the
kind of help which Subject now needs. This is not surprising, as
we have seen that the exception of the services of Subject would
not have been worth the effort of many others; and they have
missed the opportunity to have such back

[signature]

17 Jan 65
300.0 2-68/1
3. On the whole, consider Subject to be an intelligently pro-PEOPLE official, whose basically friendly feelings are, of course, by no means undiscriminating or of such nature as to override his proper fundamental loyalty to his own country or - were he to become Chief of CAUCUS - to that organization. In any event, we will make the effort to keep in touch with him at an appropriate level, so that his tie to KUBA remains intact and effective. The undersigned might note that despite his personal relationship, for such as at the National Theater or Congress Hall, he had, however, already managed to re-establish such a high position as the Under Secretary of State. Accordingly, it would be possible for him to maintain his former official contacts and he would understand it fully. The way has been opened for an eventual recall of KUBA from contact with Mira Fishman.

According to [ ], there is no great love lost between Subject and Allan Fishman, and it might be that this fact would prove useful to an even greater disadvantage to Subject's cause than he would otherwise have.
1. Hartwig's wife told me that their assignment to London would preclude a subsequent assignment to Washington because UTILITY plans to have Hartwig return to Headquarters sometime before he himself retires from the organization.

2. Roger told me that it is his impression that Holm runs a very good chance of being UTILITY's successor. He said that he knows many people put their money on General Wessel but that Holm's impressive knowledge of the interests and operations of CATIDE will weigh very heavily in the final decision. Roger said that he has been a good friend of Holm's for a good number of years and that he now works directly under him. He feels that Holm has shown the qualities of leadership and judgment which would fully justify his appointment as Chief.

3. These observations of Roger bring to mind a statement UTILITY made to me some time ago, namely, that he hoped that his successor would be selected from among the general officers currently serving with the organization.

Distribution:
1/2 - Chief, EE
2 - Chief, MLB

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT ON 3976 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005
1. At the CATIDE reception on 10 January UTILITY remarked that he expected an SPD victory in the 1965 elections.

2. We think the information in Reference para 1 tends to confirm that UTILITY is thinking along these lines. Although the Fedrep government has approved the operation, UTILITY does not desire to go ahead until he has briefed the Socialist leaders.

Distribution:
1 - COS/G/B
2 - COS/G/F
2 - Bonn Ops

GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
1. This is just a short news note to the gentlemen mentioned in the line above. As [person] and his party were leaving UTILITY's office, UTILITY asked me to stay behind for a moment because he wanted to show me something. What he wanted to show me was a picture, 12" x 12" in glorious technicolor, of the three gentlemen mentioned above, plus mine humble self, sitting on a couch in the playroom of @Dessau's Washington home. The picture was taken during the @Brock-@Moeller visit. It was a present to UTILITY from @Dessau. The picture hangs immediately behind UTILITY's right shoulder, on his wall back of his desk. For some reason he seems to be pleased as punch with this photo.

2. Certain cynics in [person]'s party suggested that the picture is taken down and exchanged for the [person] or [person] liaison pictures, depending upon who was calling.

3. An ignoble thought!

Distribution:
[person] - Chief, EE
[person] - COS/G (Bonn)
[person] - COS/G (Fran)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3026
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE (GROUP I)
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Date: 4 February 1965

SECRET
4. Ritter started with the comment that UTILITY had in the past performed invaluable services to Germany and CATIDE and he did not want us to get the impression that he was disloyal to UTILITY. However, the fact was that UTILITY had not given CATIDE any real leadership for the last two to three years and could not be expected to change during the remainder of his stay as President. Ritter said that UTILITY spends most of his time cruising around with the politicians in Bonn, he no longer knows what is going on in CATIDE, he won't make decisions himself and won't delegate to his subordinates the right to do so, he is scared stiff of a flap, and he demands that risks of any kind be absolutely avoided. The result of this is that CATIDE is drifting and morale is anything but good. Ritter said that officers of his grade and age (he is a 47-year-old Colonel) were especially frustrated. They felt CATIDE had great operational possibilities but that timid and ineffective leadership did not permit them to be exploited. Ritter said that CATIDE was now operating at only about 50 percent of capacity, and that the general atmosphere is all too frequently one of lethargy, cynicism and passing the buck.

5. While Ritter was talking I was struck by the close similarity between his views and those expressed to us almost a year ago by Sturm. Both Ritter and Sturm were mature and sober men and the fact that they independently expressed almost identical views is a sign that what they say is true. I evaluate the reliability of their comments far higher than the anti-UTILITY tirades Groock treated us to last winter.

6. He spoke of the trouble that arose when UTILITY found out that the Foreign Relations Staff had made arrangements for a Fasching party for at the Regina Palace Hotel. Contrary to my previous understanding, what miffed UTILITY was the aspect of supplying seven KUBARK gentlemen with female escorts from the Translation Section of CATIDE. Apparently, UTILITY thought that the seven visitors from Washington would have but one thought in mind, to assault his young ladies. This line of thought, as expressed by UTILITY to Moeller, came to an end when Moeller announced to UTILITY that one of the young ladies had beer his daughter-in-law.

7. Moeller said there were a number of interesting aspects to UTILITY:

a. He has no sense of time. He will talk on and on.

b. He is fascinated with mechanical gadgets.

c. He really doesn’t enjoy socializing. He would prefer to be out in his boat thinking about CATIDE in the year 2000.

8. Moeller said UTILITY would give an insight into another facet of his character—he is quite happy if he called for Moeller, and has told that it was such a fine day that Moeller was out skiing. He would be alright, that would be Moeller’s decision. But, at the same time, if Moeller were sitting at home with five children on Christmas morning, UTILITY would be quite up to telling him to leave immediately for Bern, Switzerland, because his Christmas card to the Chief of the Swiss service had not been correctly signed.

9. Moeller did not give this as an actual example but the Bern story had so much detail in it that it sounded as if it really happened.

10. I spoke to Moeller about the debacle that was my attempt to bring their gentlemen out into contact with other than KUBARK people. Moeller said that he was sorry that this thing had gone a drift and his enthusiastic approval of it before the fact was, in fact, too enthusiastic. I asked him whether on a smaller scale, and say, for instance with house guests, we could have a small number of his people in without dusting up the landscape. He said certainly, especially the kind you could be told, “now just don’t ask these people too many questions I gather then that once in a while we can have non-KUBARK guests into affairs and have a CATIDE present (on, rather, the other way around)."
CONFIDENTIAL 1118577
MUNI INFO GMNY FRAN CITE DIR 91710

CATIDE

REF: DIR 62235

LETTER NOT RECEIVED IN EE. PLS ADVISE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TORI: 12/07/62
LETTER FOUCED HQS WITH TRUE NAME MANIFEST NW 1900 22 JANUARY 1965.

END OF MESSAGE
Possible Invitation to UTILITY

Lt. Col. Abels, who is very good about keeping us posted on his activities, said that he had recently visited Wiesbaden. There he talked to Colonel Gibbons. He reminded Gibbons of an earlier Abels suggestion that General Disoway might wish to invite UTILITY up to Wiesbaden for a courtesy visit and briefing. Gibbons said he was still very much aware of Abels’ suggestion and in favor of it. The crush of other business had prevented him from asking General Disoway from issuing an invitation.

As background Abels said that the previous Air Force commander had invited UTILITY up for a briefing. This was said to have been well received. He accompanied UTILITY on this visit. General Disoway has not yet had an opportunity to offer such a briefing to UTILITY. This note is merely to alert you to the possibility of one being issued.
The meeting was a routine one to straighten out a number of minor matters and only one topic of importance came up. This was a comment Koller made on UTILITY's personal interest in all matters involving

Koller mentioned the matter to explain his inability to give us an answer regarding the CATIDE officers who are to have dinner with in Bonn on 1 April. Koller said that the answer was prepared but could not be sent to us until UTILITY released it. Koller went on to say that UTILITY personally clears every topic to be raised with, every CATIDE officer who meets, every gift sent to, and every CATIDE communication which goes to or mentions his name. Koller said UTILITY is not overly sticky about other KUBARKers' contact with CATIDErs, but that he will simply not permit anyone else to make a decision regarding. The quickest way for a CATIDER to get into trouble, Koller said, would be for him to take some action involving without clearing it with UTILITY.
MUNI INFO DIR DOST CITE NYDO 0532

CONGRATULATIONS AND KINDER REGARDS TO UTILITY ON HIS BIRTHDAY FROM L.

SECRET

CFN

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
PLS EXTEND BIRTHDAY GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHE 0 UTILITY 
ON HIS BIRTHDAY, ON BEHALF OF 
AND 

END OF MESSAGE 

CLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
SOURCE/METHOD EXPEDITED 3076 
WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 
DATE 2005 

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
During a talk with Utility and H.O.M. 30 March, raised the matter of prior notice and clearance of visitors of Catide people visiting Coyote. Said that we needed time to consider whether we could be of help to Catide to prepare for the necessary meetings and assure the presence of key personnel. Suggested that visits be distributed throughout the year evenly so as not to overburden the relatively small staff handling these matters.

Their reaction entirely positive. Utility said he had had feeling that too many people were slipping through the net and sitting to the U.S., although he, himself, had turned down a good number of proposed trips. With a smile, he said that, of course, everyone in Catide wants to go to the U.S. But that, of course, such visits must serve our mutual purposes and must be allowed to become a burden. H.O.M. added that it is just a matter of a burden to us, but also to Catide from the personnel and budgetary point of view. Both officers gave every indication that they intend to look into this matter and get it under control.
I am referring to Sprach 015. I would be thankful for forwarding my appreciation for the birthday greetings and good wishes which I got on behalf of Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. Critchfield, and Mr. Critchfield.

Appreciation

On behalf of Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. Critchfield, and Mr. Critchfield.

An 801 routine 105565

050465

Von: 801 Pers.

Routine: 1891

025052

1620
SECRET 071406Z
DIR GMNY INFO FRAN CITE MUNI 2429
REF: MUNI 2379 (N35544) *
FOR C & AND C

AS SUGGESTED BY C ON 31 MARCH, FOLLOWED UP REF SUBJECT
WITH ALIAS HOLL ON 7 APRIL. HE SAID UTILITY HAD ALREADY ISSUED
SOME WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS ON THE MATTER AND HE, HIMSELF, HAD
DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH ALIAS MOELLER, HEAD OF THE FOREIGN
LIAISON STAFF.
SECRET
CFN: ARE CALLING PEOPLE VISITING OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: NSC/DESCRIP 0828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
C 7 OCT 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
SECRET 8813252
MUNI CITE GARY 8461
CATIDE

Teletype to Dr. Schneider

Please inform utility we expect to be in Bonn sometime 12 April. Arrival and departure times not set, nor is visit absolutely certain. If utility you happen to be in Bonn know that would be greatly pleased have chance to visit and talk with you.

S.C. REIN
TOR/03/13362

Classified and released by Central Intelligence Agency
Sources Methods Exemption 3924
Razen Air Crimes Disclosure Act Date 2005

Best available copy
The referenced birthday greetings were sent at once by Telex to UTILITY upon receipt of the Headquarters cable. I have received, in return, a teletype from UTILITY saying that he would be thankful for forwarding his appreciation for the birthday greetings and good wishes which he got from C and C.

Distribution:
- Chief, EE
- COS/G (Bonn)
- COS/G (Fran)
1. I seized the opportunity of a prospective visit by C — to seek a meeting with UTILITY. I passed him our Yellow No. 32057. This dealt with his previous remarks to me about Greece.

2. After reading the Yellow, he said that his information from Greece was "reliable". He said the forecast, which I mentioned, was his own. He did not mean to imply that the situation was going to fall apart in Greece. He noted Headquarters admonition about false information being sold and commented that he thought he knew who might be selling it. Although it was not all that precise, I inferred from his remarks that this specific report of Soviet "views" (as he put it this time) on the situation in Greece had not come from a source in Greece, but elsewhere. He volunteered to give us an appraisal of the Greek situation if we sought it. I said I thought there was no need for this. I merely wished to get any single reports he might have available if that was what he meant. He referred again to the Soviet build-up in Cyprus and said he might differ from some of our people in the threat around the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

3. I then passed him a written reminder of the possible visit of C. He thought he might be able to change his plans to meet two visitors in Munich on that day. However, Holm interrupted to comment, "no, no, better not, those are very important meetings". I then brought up the matter of the Berlin crisis reporting. (While waiting for UTILITY, I had been called into Holm's office to sit awhile. I had mentioned the reporting situation to Holm as well.)

4. UTILITY gave me a perfect opening in that as the conversation evolved, he commented that his organization had just received a compliment from the government on their Berlin reporting. This gave me the handy opening to say that I wish that in the future they would make some of their views on this critical area available to us. This somewhat surprised UTILITY; his eyes bugged out and he headed for the inter-com to call Kuehne. I stopped him with a gesture saying I was not objecting, I was just reflecting my own general views on the subject. Holm chimed in with yes, yes, we have just discussed this. I went on, however, to tell UTILITY that we naturally considered ourselves very engaged in the Berlin situation, and were naturally interested in their forecasts on the situation. I said that Kuehne had been very good about the situation. He had stopped, he told us, a number of low-level alarmist reports from being disseminated. I did, however, mention that a teletype information report to Bonn was casually sent to us via pouch. UTILITY reached for a paper on the Berlin situation and started reading from it. It
forecast the situation and then backed up the forecast with single reports bearing on the Berlin crisis. One of them was dated January; some others, February; still others, March. I said I thought we had not had any of these. UTILITY said sometimes reports come to him and without the formal participation of the Evaluations staff, are sent directly off to Bonn (implying that this might have accounted for us not getting them). Holm corrected UTILITY to the effect that in this crisis the Evaluations staff had worked hand in glove with the operations people from the beginning. I made the point that we (i.e., J had had a good discussion with Kuehne on the matter but only after the whole ruddy affair was half over.

5. I said I was in no sense coming over to gripe (which was exactly what I was doing) but merely took advantage of the meeting to mention our future wishes in the matter. Somewhat softening my general attitude, I commented that possibly we had objected to previous Berlin crisis reporting and the result was that, in this case, our faucet was turned off.

6. In any event, I think that the firm but gentle brace rendered to these gentlemen was worthwhile. I presume from comments made that UTILITY, at least, thought the stuff was coming through to our side. (He said quite casually at the beginning of the conversation, "but I'm sure our friends are getting all of this material").

7. As agreed with C by telephone, I confirmed to UTILITY and Holm that the inter-government conference was off. UTILITY said that was fine. He added that in writing up the government-to-government agreement, we had often been impatient with the Germans but there were reasons why delays were unavoidable on their side. In the final analysis, the agreement worked well. We should, at this time, also show patience because the reasons for not meeting were sound. I said we fully understood the nuances of the situation.

Typed: 12 April 1965
We would appreciate it if the attached letter from [name] forwarded under separate cover could be given to [utility name] at your earliest convenience. It contains a belated birthday message.

Attachment: u/s/c
Letter - true name pouch

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Chief, MLB
1 - CSB, Germany
1 - CSB, Frankfurt

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Pursuant to Exception 302E
FAR War Crimes Disclosure Act
EAFE 2005

MOST AVAILABLE COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO
EGMS-5737
DATE
21 April 1965
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
NO FILE NUMBER

Occ Distribution:
1 - RI
1 - EE/G/IS
9 - EE/G/CE

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C/EE/G/CE
DATE
22 Apr 65
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Pursuant to Exception 302E
FAR War Crimes Disclosure Act
EAFE 2005

MOST AVAILABLE COPY
23 March 1965

155/GEBLEIN, Reinhardt

BOBROCK commented on the case and UTILITY’s interpretation of the affair as a plot by a KUBARK clique to get rid of its chief (UTILITY). BOBROCK said he never did find out where UTILITY got his notion. Certainly not from KUBARK, since KUBARK was very upset about the matter and wanted to try and straighten it out in Washington. However, UTILITY sharply forbade him to do this and KUBARK was so depressed about it he almost went back to the Bundeswehr.

BOBROCK said he saw no sign that UTILITY was changing his attitude toward KUBARK and that it is unlikely UTILITY would change during the remainder of his tour with CATIDE. A good sign of this is the fact that UTILITY has still not accepted KUBARK’s invitation to visit the United States. BOBROCK said that although UTILITY does not openly display his pique toward KUBARK, the senior people in CATIDE see which way the wind is blowing and take their cue from the boss. If senior CATIDE men don’t have much time for the MIB staff it is at least partly due to their belief that it is not good politics for them to have time.

I asked if BOBROCK had heard any good rumors lately about how soon UTILITY would be replaced. He said unfortunately not, but that he was relatively certain it would not be before the fall election. UTILITY’s salvation is the fact that both of the coalition parties would like to name the next chief of CATIDE. An attempt to appoint a new chief would lead to friction between the coalition parties, and the parties would prefer to postpone coming to grips with the problem.

23 April 65

In context of a discussion of the IC FLUTTER at CATIDE, toward which BOBROCK described UTILITY as still in a “positive” frame of mind, BOBROCK indicated that he hopes to persuade the right people to grant him more power to separate CATIDE under a security cloud without fearing repercussions or bad publicity.

POBROCK added that there were some individuals who thought UTILITY would not be around after the next election but that he did not feel that way.
28 April 1965

Dear General Gehlen:

On the occasion of my retirement, I wanted to let you know how much I have enjoyed the all too few occasions we have met - and to wish you and the German Intelligence Service all success in the coming years. I have been very conscious of the links which have grown up over the years between your service and mine, and have had ample opportunity to realize how much it has contributed to the informed cooperation of our two governments. I have enjoyed particularly the visits to Bonn and the opportunity to discuss with you and the most senior officials of the German Government those matters of vital interest which affect us both.

I only hope that the remainder of your career in office is as fruitful and that our work together grows and continues to become more productive.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/

John A. McCone

General Reinhard Gehlen
President, Federal Intelligence Service
Friedrich-Ebert-Strasse 1
Bad.Godesberg, Germany

Submitted in draft by: DDP/C/EE
Typed in final by: O/DCI/ Washington, DC:MMW (23Apr65)

Orig - Addressee
Icc - O/DCI
2cc - DDP/C/EE
lcc - ER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3628
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005
None; for information only

Regarding the utility succession, this report is pretty negative. But I make it just to draw the addressees' attention to the matter. In a recent conversation with Fleming, he said that there were some unspecified persons who believe that UTILITY would not survive the next German elections. This is a pretty vague sort of report but it is made by a man who sits mighty close to UTILITY and is liable to know what rumors are available. On the other hand, Fleming himself, said he did not share this view. Kollner, the CIA/DE liaison officer to KUBARK, volunteered a few days ago, that he had been listening as hard as he could in Bonn the was up to Bonn on 1 April to attend a function at the Chancellery but he failed to get any definite word on who might be a candidate to succeed UTILITY. This is essentially negative but it shows that the matter is being thought about and talked about.

Distribution:

1. Chief, EE
2. COS/G (D)
3. COS/G (T)
4. Chief, CS/IA
5. Chief, Bonn Ops Base

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 502 KAHN WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2/2005

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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic reclassification and declassification

REFERENCE TO PARTIAL REPORTS AND MAPS 29 APR 1965
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 502 KAHN WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2/2005

SECRET

KEMA-66500 29 April 1965

R E M A - 66500
General Reinhard Gehlen is President of the West German Federal Intelligence Service. (END).

Born 3 April 1902 in Erfurt, Germany, he finished his formal schooling in 1920 and entered military service directly, receiving his commission in 1923. Attending the War Academy in Berlin in 1936, he became a major in 1939, a brigadier general in 1944.

In charge of Foreign Armies-East in 1943, he came to believe the German cause on the Eastern front was lost. Reprimanded by Hitler for his negative opinions, he was ultimately dismissed toward the War's end. After caching his files in Bavaria, he surrendered to the Americans.

Reforming his unit, General Gehlen operated under O-2 auspices from 1946 until 1949 when CIA assumed sponsorship. The Gehlen Organization was legalized as the West German Service in March 1956.

General Gehlen has expanded his activities to the point that his organization has been accepted as a world-wide service. Expected to retire within the next two or three years, he lives quietly with his wife in Berg on the Starnberg Lake near Munich. He speaks good English.

Prepared for Admiral Rayborn, May 1965
Es war die Nacht, in der die Kuba-Krise den entscheidenden Wendepunkt nahm. Im Weißen Haus formulierten Präsident Kennedy und seine Berater eine Botschaft an Nikita Chruschtschow.


Die Kuba-Krise war für Strauß Chance und Vorwand zugleich, eine Verschwörung auszuhöhlen, die in seiner Vorstellung bestand und sich aus einem krankhaften Verfolgungswahn erklären ließ.

Alle Teufel dieser Welt sah Franz-Josef Strauß gegen sich und seine Militäramtshalter, Kommunisten, denen er die Ausrottung hoffte. Amerikaner, denen er es verübelte, dass sie ihm keine Atomwaffen in die Hand geben, die die DDR behinderten, die ihm widersprochen und von denen er annahm, dass sie Informationen nach außen drücken ließen, sowie SPIEGEL-Redakteure, die ihn kritisierten.


Bei Bundesanwaltschaft und Bundeskanzler war die Seite einer abwechselnden Verschwörungs-Theorie aufgegangen, die aus dem Bundesverteidigungsministerium stammte.


Begründet wurden diese Behauptungen meist auf so simple Weise wie: „Die Stelle sitzt im westlichen Bündnis“. Oder: „Sie übernimmt dem Bunde einen wahren Vorsatz über die Bundesrepublik“. Oder: „Der Gegner kann sich Möglichkeiten begrenzter Aktionen ausreden.“

Daß die Bundeskanzler in diesen Gemessen überhaupt ernst nahmen, ist klar, und zwar genau wie Bundeskanzler Conrad Adenauer, die Komplott-Vorstellungen des Verteidigungsministers aberwitzig akzeptiert hatten. Anders sind auch die phantasie- und missverständlichen Hinweise von Strauß an Oster, mehrere Generale wurden verhaftet und allein Augustin halte sich in Kuba auf, aufgrund der Beweise, dass Strauß sein Verfahren nur durch einen Telephon-Abhörber erhielt haben.


Nachdem die Untersuchungsergebnisse noch erfahren hatten, daß ich dem BND über Becker und den Oberst Wicht 13 Fragen zum Poetsch-Artikel (Fragen...


Stammberger, heute SPD-Bundesgeordneter, damals FDP-Politiker Bundesjustizminister, war gerade im Ausland, wo er mit der Bundesregierung über die SPIEGEL-Aktion redetete. Als ihn ein Anruf aus dem Bundeskanzleramt erreichte, er solle mit der SPIEGEL-Aktion bis zum Bundeskanzleramt kommen, erwiderte er: „Herr Stammberger, Sie müssen Herrn Gehlen verhaften. Er ist in einem Nebenzimmer auf dort dreigebär.“


Und er wandte sich Adenauer nun zu: „Herr Bundesanwalt Kuhn: „Was sagen Sie dazu?“

Kuhn, ein enges, aber rechteffener Vertrauensmann, antwortete: „Herr Bundeskanzler, Herr Bundeskanzler ist Herr Justizminister hat gesagt, was ich nur gesagt werden kann.“

Adenauer resignierte: „Ich bin auch ein Staatsanwalt gewesen. Früher war ich Abgeordnete.“

„Vereinbarung: daß Bundesanwalt den General Gehlen im Nebenzimmer auf dort dreigebär.“

Im Zuge der Verhaftung der SPIEGEL-Aktion im Bundeskanzleramt des Verteidigungsministeriums von Struß befördert worden war, hatte Kuhn ihm zuvor schon einmal das Manuskript gezeigt, und General Gehlen konnte als freimachendes Bundeskanzleramt verlassen.


Die Annahme einer intimen Zusammenarbeit der SPIEGEL-Redaktion mit deutschen und ausländischen Geheimdiensten hatte inzwischen auch noch andere merkwürdige Folgen gehabt.

Obwohl der Verdacht auf die Bundesnachrichtendienst schließlich zu bestätigen, blieben Ermittler und Ankläger an der Meinung fest, es handele sich um eine Konspiration gegen Staat und Staat.


In Wirklichkeit war Frau Dönig lediglich einmal sechs Monate lang Sekretärin bei Randolph Churchill, dem Sohn Winston Churchills, gewesen.


Um so beglückter war die Bundesregierung, als sie nach einigen Wochen, dahinerteilt, daß der Hamburg-Innenminister Schmidt, heute Kandidat der SPD für das Amt des Bundesverteidigungsministers, der Entwurf des Foerstech-Artikels vor der Öffentlichkeit gesehen hatte.

Schmidt hatte ihm das Manuskript gezeigt, eine der mehreren, die damals noch einige rechtliche Probleme. In der Tat, als er ihm den Artikel zeigte, erwiderte er: „Herr Bundeskanzler, Herr Bundeskanzler hat gesagt, was ich nur gesagt werden kann.“

Adenauer resignierte: „Ich bin auch ein Staatsanwalt gewesen. Früher war ich Abgeordnete.“

„Vereinbarung: daß Bundesanwalt den General Gehlen im Nebenzimmer auf dort dreigebär.“

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†

Der allgemeine Schrei nach Verschmelzung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, dem Militärischen Abwehrdienst (MAD), der die Bundeswehr vor Spionage und Landesverrat schützen und Geheimnisverrat verhindern soll, und mit dem Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, das die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung des Staates schützen soll, ist zwar im ersten Moment einleuchtend, aber bei näherem Nachdenken wohl doch nicht rechtfertig. Zu versuchen sind die Aufgaben der drei Dienste, und zu groß wäre die Macht dessen, der die drei in seiner Hand vereinigte.

Und vor Machtkonzentrationen sollte man sich gerade in der Demokratie schützen.
Dear General Gehlen:

Heinz immediately passed to me the sense of your warm message of congratulations. You know that I deeply appreciated hearing from you so promptly. It literally seems to me that you and I have been fighting the common war together almost since I can remember, and there is no associate in this struggle whose intelligence, devotion, and integrity I admire more than yours. I am looking forward to the continuance of this excellent relationship as I take on my new duties.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Richard Helms
We are forwarding under separate cover letters from A and B for UTILITY. It would be appreciated if Chief, MLB would pass these letters to UTILITY at his convenience.

Attachment: a/s, usc, true name pouch
Letters (2)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - MLB
2 - COS
This brought up the question of what might happen to CATIDE as a whole if there were a change in Government. KOLLER was certain that no matter what happened UTILITY's days were numbered. He said that the position of mentor, CATIDE, was a political one and no Chancellor would fail to fill it with a man of his own political persuasion. In fact, he said that even if the CDU were to come out on top and Erhard should again be Chancellor he might decide to make a change although possibly not until a bit later (UTILITY will be 65, the normal time for retirement in April 1967). (Comment: This brings to mind some thoughts. While civil servants in Germany normally retire at 65, military personnel retire earlier. Generals at 60, Colonels 58, Lt. Col. 56, Majors at 54 and Captains at 52. Many CATIDERS who are officers on permanent assignment to CATIDE are very close to those retirement ages, some already above them, being kept on at the pleasure and insistence of UTILITY. If a new man came in he might have an opportunity to absolutely housethicle CATIDE by simply enforcing the rules as written. He could toss out a large number of senior officers and staff the organization out with his own Pretorian Guard.)
1. After a few introductory pleasantries I worked into the matter of the early warning question posed by the Chief of Station in connection with the arrival of the group in Germany (DIR 04698 of 26 April 1965). UTILITY's comments on this subject were covered in an Intra-Station Memorandum to the Chief of Station, dated 12 May.

2. UTILITY then brought up the matter of a visit by General SEIBERT to see his son-in-law in Mannheim. This was covered in a cable to FRAN numbered MUNI 2711 of 12 May 1965.

3. I brought up the fact that the Chief of Station would be in Munich on the 19th and 20th. UTILITY said he would be in Bonn on the 20th and 21st and hoped to get in touch with the Chief of Station at that time.

4. UTILITY mentioned that a contact between his brother who is CATIDE's Rome representative, as UTILITY explained it, and what appeared to be a contact to Headquarters, et al. This is being covered in a dispatch to Headquarters.

5. He thanked me for the memo on the affairs in the Caribbean which we sent to him the day before.

6. The tour d'horizon did not really turn out to be much. We touched the Caribbean and then Vietnam and then the matter of the Near East. What he had to say was essentially what we had covered a couple of weeks earlier. I found actually nothing new to report. I asked him about Turkey and his views there were also similar to what he had before. He commented that there was nothing new so far as he knew.

7. With respect to DeGaulle and France he commented that no matter what DeGaulle was--and he added that DeGaulle was not eternal--in any event he was always true to his allies. He said DeGaulle was true no matter what shenanigans he conjured up.

8. He also expressed the view that DeGaulle would obviously like to get out of a NATO arrangement but that he would never get out of an Atlantic arrangement. At any rate those were UTILITY's views on the subject.
9. As most of the time with him (nearly an hour) had been spent upon his early warning comments I thought it was about time to close off the meeting. He apparently did too. We closed on an exchange of comments about sailing. He said his boat was not down into the water yet and I again commented that I would be taking a sailing course very shortly if my luck held out.

10. The meeting in my view was characterized not so much by any substance but by an atmosphere of ease and friendliness on an informal basis rather than any formal exchange of comments. It was more friend to friend than it had seemed to be to me ever before.

P.S. In connection with his regrets that he could not attend the concert by Virginia Pleasants, UTILITY said that he was having a very important ambassador's reception at his house, namely, the German ambassador to Rome, that evening and he just could not avoid this visit. Please note above, of course, that his brother is their man in Rome.
SECRET

1. Utility said on 11 May that he had heard that General Seibert, the G-2 with whom he had dealt in the very early days of Catide, would be visiting his son-in-law in Mannheim about 20 May.

2. Through us Utility would like to invite the General, whom he regards as an old personal friend and sponsor, to visit Catide to see years later. How it all turned out, Utility said p.

3. As courtesy, Utility will inform Major Clark, Army Liaison Officer, that we will be handling General, and that we will be handling General, and arrange whatever schedule would accommodate the General, and that we will be handling General, and arrange whatever schedule would accommodate the General, and that we will be handling General, and arrange whatever schedule would accommodate the General.

Best available copy

Yours truly,

[Signature]
**DISPATCH**

**SECRET**

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**ACTION REQUESTED:** For information only.

1. @Koller told me on 10 May that UTILITY would not be available during June, July and August 1965. This meant not only a long summer leave but also "a foreign trip" Koller said.

2. It had seemed a possibility that UTILITY might bring this up with me during our meeting on 11 May but he did not do so and a situation in which I could quiz him on the subject did not arise. It feels that based on comments @Brock made, UTILITY might be making his foreign trip to London.

3. If we hear anything further on this we will notify interested parties.

**Distribution:**

- EE
- COS/G/B
- COS/G/F
- COS
- Bonn Ops
- CSB/F

GROUP I - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

**DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER**

| EGMA-66195 |
| 13 May, 1965 |
| SECRET |
| COS FILE NUMBER |

**CROSS REFERENCE TO**

| EGMA-66195 |
| 17 May, 1965 |
| SECRET |
| COS FILE NUMBER |
Air Force Invitation to UTILITY

1. Lt. Colonel Abels has kindly informed me of the proposed plan to have UTILITY invited to Wiesbaden for a briefing by General Dissosway and his staff. This will be arranged through General Gibbon. The Chief of Station will be informed, of course, on a more formal basis than this memorandum. This is simply advanced warning.

2. The dates are yet to be set but General Gibbon and his officers are thinking in terms of the first week in June, or in mid-July, or at some later date.

3. The invitation will be extended to UTILITY plus one officer, Lt. Colonel Abels and myself. Lt. Colonel Abels did not indicate in the first instance that they were planning to invite the Chief of Station but I am sure that there would be no problem if you thought it would be useful to be there.

4. The proposed briefing would cover:
   a. the U.S. Air Force in Europe and its capabilities
   b. the threat assessment—an intelligence briefing
   c. a CEIC briefing and
   d. a computer demonstration of some sort showing how the Air Force uses computers in intelligence work in Europe.

5. I will keep you informed as I get further information.

P.S. The invitation to UTILITY will be extended through me. The Air Force intends to send a plane down for the visiting group to take the participants to Wiesbaden.
ACTION: For Your Information

1. Fmr. DESSAU (alias) was in New York the evening of 29 May, prior to picking up his wife at Kennedy Airport next day. She was returning from London. DESSAU had called from Washington earlier in the week, and we had made a date for drinks at our apartment and dinner afterward.

2. He had, as usual, a good deal to say; and, as usual, little of it was notably interesting. But that little was interesting, indeed. Speaking of the difficulties caused the so-called German Gaullists by DE GAULLE’s own position on Germany, and particularly by GROMYKO’s statements following his most recent meeting with DE GAULLE, DESSAU said that this latter meeting had been too much, even for UTILITY, and that as a consequence UTILITY had backed off from the Gaullist views he had held heretofore. Later in the evening, Identity’s name came up, and DESSAU said the incident involving Identity had been the decisive factor in pushing UTILITY into the Gaullist camp. He added that Fmr. MOELLER (alias) had clashed with UTILITY on Gaullism in MOELLER’s being no Gaullist, as is true of most of the Frenchmen with whom he had formerly been doing business. Identity is Gaullist through and through. DESSAU said that he, too, had collided with UTILITY on this issue.

3. For the rest, DESSAU reported UTILITY firmly supporting American actions in the Dominican Republic, and asked what ERHARDT could do to help, both in the Dominican Republic and in South Vietnam. He conceded that the visit is strictly an election gambit, with the Chancellor somewhat at a loss about what to say to the President or

Attachment: Identity

Distribution
2 - C, EE w/a
2 - C, Munich Liaison w/a
2 - COS, Germany w/a
2 - C, DO w/a
DESSAU is sublimely happy in Washington, and hopes to stay there until compulsory retirement forces him out.

At least 50% of the people I speak to are looking forward to the day when the Chancellor is no longer Chancellor. They.

Although this vignette is that after the Chancellor leaves, the job will be more fun for the successor, which is right to the job. No one will succeed his predecessor right after the successor.
For Your Information

Transmitted under separate cover is the ODUNIT Liaison Officer's Report for the month of May 1965.

APPROVED:

Attachment: Under separate cover Extract from para 6:

Distribution: 6. (S/NFD) The MLO completed arrangements with General Gibbons for the visit of the President of the BND to the CINCUSAFe. Chief of the CIA Liaison Base in Munich and the MLO will accompany the President of the BND to Wiesbaden on 4 June 1965, to call on the CINCUSAFe. During the day several presentations and briefings will be given by USAFE personnel to the President, which should be of considerable interest to him.
SECRET 162120Z
RUPT INFO: ENGLISH CITE: DIR-19917
RYBAT/ YERABIDE

1. DUNIK INFORMS OF UTILITY VISIT TO SAFE-A2 4 JUNE 65 IN COMPANY C AND CHIEF, EEIC.

2. PLEASE ADVISE DETAILS.
SECRET
TOR: 17/11347

Answered by DAF

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3023
NATI MAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2009

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GROUP 1- EXCLUDED WITH AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
C/NOB/C/N/NOB/M RLS INT C/SG SEC FIN LOG C/REG
F/MB-DC/HLB L/OPS L/CE L/PLANS L/CONNO L/POL L/INT/RE

230 LIFISON WITH 363
1. On 26 May 1965 issue of "The Spiegel" this article gives Ahlers' version of the Spiegel Affair and alleges that at the height of the crisis Adenauer wanted to have Gehlen arrested. Fleming discredited the article qualitatively, although he qualified his remarks in a few cases by saying that they were based on his recollections or that he might not have all the background. Ahlers had previously denied a discussion of Gehlen's articles and said it was based on speculation.

2. Fleming said it was true that Adenauer had wanted to have Gehlen arrested and that he had summoned Bundesarminist Kuhn to Bonn for that purpose. However, no actual steps to arrest Gehlen were taken and Kuhn's discussion with Gehlen was far less an interrogation (Vernehmung) than a friendly conversation.

3. Fleming said that Adenauer had not authorized the printing of the incident article. He had not cleared the matter with Gehlen. Moreover, Adenauer and Strauss believed that Gehlen had authorized printing of this material, and that was the reason they wanted him arrested. Gehlen was not charged, as Ahlers' article has it, with illegally warning the Spiegel that action was being planned against them.

4. Fleming believes it is true that Strauss had telephone taps on the Spiegel offices. Fleming said that the only elements of the Defense Ministry which have any knowledge of wire taps are the KGB and a small anti-corruption group. He said neither of those units had the capability to pull off a clandestine wire tap job, or would have been trusted by Strauss to try one. Now, if Fleming believes Strauss would have risked trying such an operation through private detectives or political friends.

Distribution:
1. COS/OF
2. COS/GF
3. Scan Ops
4. CS/FR
5. Berlin Ops
6. Fleming said that Wolfgang DUERING, the former FDP deputy floor leader mentioned in Ahlors' article, was a paid informant of the Spiegel for many years. This was discovered after DUERING died. Fleming said that a good many other politicians in Bonn were also in the Spiegel's pay.

5. Fleming discussed the Spiegel affair with complete disgust. He does not have a high opinion of German political morality and commented two or three times that such going on would be possible only in Bonn.
Many of the military who have been held down by a lack of promotion vacancies are often outspoken in their criticism of utility and his tendency to fill choice slots for relatives and over-age in grade military. Included are such critics as:

- HERTEL
- STRICKER
- Koller - to a lesser extent
- SEBER
- GERSTEENBERG

Doubt if any of these have enough influence to be considered "Young Turks".
REFERENCE: UNDA-1164

Just a short comment: It was very interesting to us to hear what @Dassel had to say, especially about UTILITY, @Meier et al. If Dassel shows up again, we are always interested. He seems to be quite a chatterbox.
155/GEHLEN, Reinhardt.  28 Jun 45

In his personal opinion the belief that UTILITY is not well liked by Erhardt and that there is a strong possibility that Erhardt will select a new utility chief after the fall elections. Geilen believes that UTILITY's chances for retention would be greater if the SPD could win the elections but discounts their chances based on results of Saarland local elections.

DISTRIBUTION: E12 (2), 329, 817, 807

SECRET

Aug. 19, 45. Evening Opera and supper.

I asked alias Koller if he would check into the matter of invitations by the Navy to UTILITY and the others to visit the Sixth Fleet.
Sehr geehrter, lieber [Name]

Keiten erfolgreich fortgeführt worden, und ich dachte, daß das auch in den kommenden Jahren der Fall sein wird, bis ich mein Amt einem geeigneten Nachfolger übergeben kann.


Bis dahin mit allen guten Wünschen und Grüßen, auch an Jim Critchfield, Tom Lucid und alle sonstigen, in herzlicher, freundschaftlicher Verbundenheit

Ihr

[Unterschrift]
FOR YOUR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: EODM-3824, 10 June 1965

1. Munich files indicate that Carlos von CORDER is indeed the brother-in-law of the General's indicated in Reference. Carlos lived in the family until the General's family although there is no actual relationship between the families according to the General's wife. Carlos' family boarded the prisoners; therefore, the General does not believe the information in paragraph 1 of Reference is confirmed in Munich files.

2. Although we have no confirmation of the fact our files indicate that MIA has always presumed that Carlos is a special connection of CATION. We know that MIA visited her brother in 1962, where she was present at a reception for some BARBER. We also would appreciate any information which I can develop and recommend that the contact be brought on the presumption that the General is in contact with the General.

APPROVED:

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VIA WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT LATE 2005:

EODM-65987

SECRET

EGMA-66987
14. G. Viet to CAVIE Headquarters: I asked DESSAU whether he was going to be able to go to Germany soon on a TDY, but he said his headquarters had advised him that there could be no useful purpose served by a visit from him until after the elections in September. DESSAU hoped he will be able to get over there soon after the elections and was again quoted his conviction that UTVIITY will undoubtedly be ready to pay a visit to CIA Headquarters after the election dust has settled.
TO: GERMANY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CON: D/DCI/NIBE
TO: GMNY

REF MY LETTER 28 JULY (EGWS 1965) SCHEDULE NOW CHANGED
TO MAKE 24 SEPT BEST DATE FOR MUNICH WITH PRIOR AND FOLLOWING
DAYS SECOND CHOICE. WOULD APPRECIATE CABLE VIA

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHOLOGY EXPIRED 30 JUNE 1995
NAZI WAR CRIMES DECLASSIFIED AT
DATE 2006

CHIEF, EE
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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SECRET 021636Z

DIR CITE GMNY 9850

FOR ☐ FROM ☐

REF DIR 34856

WE CANNOT GET A DATE FROM UTILITY BECAUSE HE IS ON LEAVE BUT FEEL THAT A VISIT TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS AND A GOOD BRIEFING ON THEIR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION OPERATIONS WOULD BE USEFUL. THEY WILL BE VERY GLAD TO PROVIDE IT. UTILITY WILL OF COURSE WANT TO SEE YOU IF HE IS IN TOWN.

SECRET

OFN 9850 34856 CANNOT GET A UTILITY A A

BT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 302E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GMNY 9850
German bi-weekly agenda item(s) as they appear in final form

7 September 65

Status of General Gehlen: In a recent conversation with a usually knowledgeable HND officer, WHISENHEIM, Molenda expressed his personal opinion that General Gehlen is not well liked by Erhard and that Erhard would select a new HND chief after the fall elections. Molenda felt Gehlen's chance to remain in his present position would be greater if the EFD were to win the elections.
1. WINTERSTEIN STATED 3 SEPTEMBER THAT HE HAD JUST COMPLETED A SURVEY IN DEPTH FOR CATIDE TOP LEADERS ON PROB RESULTS UPCOMING ELECTION. HIS PROGNOSIS WAS THAT CDU/CSU WOULD WIN PLURALITY OF VOTES /ONE OR TWO PERCENT OVER SPD/ AND AGAIN FORM A COALITION GOVT WITH FDP. WINTERSTEIN SAID A GREAT COALITION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF CDU WON SINCE ERHARD WOULD NOT ACCEPT COALITION WITH SPD AND AS CHIEF VOTE COLLECTOR HIS PARTY HE COULD NOT BE FORCED OUT RIGHT AFTER ELECTION. HOWEVER, IF SPD PULLED UPSET AND WON PLURALITY VOTES WINTERSTEIN THOUGHT A GREAT COALITION LIKELY. IN THIS CASE SPD WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE FORM COALITION WITH FDP AND WOULD PROB BE ABLE WORK OUT ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE WITH CDU.

2. WINTERSTEIN SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT POSITION CATIDE IN GERMAN GOVT TO BE GREATLY CHANGED AFTER ELECTION. UNDER NEW ERHARD GOVT CATIDE POSITION WOULD PROB NOT GET BETTER BUT WOULD ALSO NOT GET WORSE. UNDER SPD DOMINATED COALITION CATIDE POSITION MIGHT SHOW SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT DUE PAST CATIDE CULTIVATION SPD LEADERS. WINTERSTEIN SAID SPD BUNDESTAGDELEGATES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN VERY UNDERSTANDING CATIDE'S PROBLEMS.

3. WINTERSTEIN SAID HE DID NOT EXPECT UTILITY TO BE DROPPED AFTER ELECTION NO MATTER WHO WON. HE SAID THERE IS NO STRONG DIS-SATISFACTION UTILITY IN EITHER CDU OR SPD AND LITTLE DESIRE REPLACE HIM. NOR IS THERE STRONG CANDIDATE FOR SUCCESSION. WINTERSTEIN SAID HE BELIEVED UTILITY WOULD CERTAINLY SERVE UNTIL HE REACHED LEGAL RETIREMENT AGE AND THAT IT WAS NOT UNLIKELY PARTIES WOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIS TERM EXTENDED.

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BY TAPE
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C/BONN OPS BASE
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C/CSB/FRANKFURT

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B21
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE
DATE 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
EGMA 67066
7 SEPTEMBER 1965
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ORIGINATING OFFICE
OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER
OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING OFFICER
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

FORM 53

DISPATCH
COMMENT: WINTERSTEIN HAS A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH UTILITY AND WOULD DOUBTLESSLY LIKE TO SEE HIS TERM EXTENDED. OTHER CATIDE OFFICER'S NOTABLY ALIAS BROOK, HAVE BEEN FAR LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UTILITY'S FUTURE.

APPROVED □ □

END OF XXXXX

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
I regret that I missed C's luncheon suggestion at the Bayerischer Hof after his evening with UTILTY. If C could give us a thumbnail memo of what transpired at this meeting, we should certainly appreciate it. Additionally, I am very curious to know what was behind Möller's luncheon suggestion. Anything on this which would be of use to us would be helpful as your time permits.

ACTION REQUIRED: Thumbnail Precis from C if time permits

Distribution:
- C/NE, C/EE
- 1-COS/Germany/Bonn
- 1-COS/Germany/Fran
- 1-COS/Germany/BE
- 1-COS/Germany/Fran

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/DESERED EXHENSION 3921
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

The text is difficult to read due to the quality of the image. The action required is to obtain a thumbnail precis from C if time permits.
DURING THE DISCUSSION FROM WHICH THE REFERENCE CAME, I ASKED UTILITY IF HE WERE HAPPY WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION. WITH AN EXPLOSIVE ABRUPTNESS WHICH TOOK ME SOMewhat ABACK, HE NEARLY SHOUTED HIS ANSWER - "NO!".

2. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN HOPING FOR A GRAND COALITION. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS, ONE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THOUGHT THAT SUCH THINGS AS THE EMERGENCY LAWS AND OTHER MEASURES WOULD HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH SUCH A GOVERNMENT.

3. MY OWN REACTION TO HIS RESPONSES WAS AN ALMOST AUTOMATIC CONCLUSION THAT UTILITY FAVORS A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, HE MAY JUST FEEL THAT THE ERHARDT GOVERNMENT HAS DEALT CATIDE A POOR HAND FOR A LONG TIME. THIS MAY IN FACT BE WHAT HE MEANT, AS HE ADDED THAT AS THINGS LOOK, "WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE TO FIGHT FOR MONEY FOR CATIDE, AS OPPOSED TO THE DAYS UNDER ADENAUER WHEN HE MADE THE CATIDE BUDGET A MATTER OF A POLITICAL DECISION" ON WHICH HE WOULD BROOK NO COMMENT FROM TREASURY AND BUDGET BUREAU PEOPLE.

4. UTILITY CONCLUDED THAT THE ELECTION WOULD NOT HAVE ANY DISCERNABLE EFFECT ON CATIDE, DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE: MET/175 EXEMPTION 3B20 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005 DISTRIBUTION - BY TAPE COS, G/EE C/BONN OPS BASE C/B, BRNL

CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER DATE 52W-2-40/ [EGMA-67143] 27 SEPTEMBER 65

SECRET 32W-2-39/5
DI S•PATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

FROM

C HIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE

TO

C HIEF, EE

INFOL

CHIEF, WE - COS/GERMANY - CHIEF, Bonn Ops Base - CSB/FRANKFURT

SUBJECT

UTILITY VISIT TO LONDON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. ALIAS BROCK STATED UNOFFICIALLY 5 OCTOBER THAT UTILITY TRAVELING LOND 29-30 OCTOBER TO INTRODUCE ALIAS HARTMIG TO BRITISH. HARTMIG TO BE CATIDE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN LOND. UTILITY WANTS GET HARTMIG ESTABLISHED LOND BEFORE DEPARTURE PRESENT FEDREP AMBASSADOR DR. HASSEK. VON EITZDORF WHO FRIENDLY CATIDE. NEW FEDREP AMBASSADOR WILL BE HANS HERMARTH VON BITTENFELD, WHO HAS ALREADY ONCE AMBASSADOR TO LOND AND NOW CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE. HE ARRIVING MARCH 1965 AND IS NOT OVERLY COOPERATIVE CATIDE.

2. BROCK SAID HARTMIG WILLING GO LOND BUT NOT ENTUSIASTIC ABOUT IT. HE SOMewhat CONCERNED OVER ABSENCE GERM SCHOOL LOND AND NEED PUT HIS WIFE'S PROPERTY INTO HANDS OF CARE-TAKER. BROCK VERY GLAD HARTMIG GOT LOND ASSIGNMENT SINCE WILL BE ABLE SEE HIM FREQUENTLY FROM HOLLAND. BROCK'S WIFE ALSO RELATED TO FAMILY OF HERMARTH VON BITTENFELD.

3. BROCK SAID UTILITY VERY CLOSE TO BRITISH AND SEES THEM REGULARLY EVERY SIX MONTHS. BRITISH VERY INTERESTED IN SELECTION UTILITY'S SUCCESSOR. MAY TRY INFLUENCE SELECTION THRU CONTACTS FEDREP POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCLES. WILL OPPOSE HAJ GEN GERHARD WESSEL WHOM THEY CONSIDER OVERLY PRO-AMERICAN AND KUBARK CANDIDATE.

4. REQUEST LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ABOVE TO PROTECT SOURCE. WILL SEND FULL BACKGROUND HARTMIG TO LOND LATER.

DISTRIBUTION - BY TAPE

2 - EE
1 - WE
2 - COS/G
2 - Bonn Ops
2 - CSB/Fran

BY POUCH -

1 - LOND

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SOURCES EXEMPTION 392E

Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act

DATE 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO

EOMA-65308

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DATE 6 OCTOBER 1965

SECRET

HOS FILE NUMBER

COMMUNICATIONS 5-21/03

EOMA-65308

SECRET

FMA-65308

SECRET

FMA-65308
Extract from Contact Report
Transmitted per EFMT-124LO. Dated: 13 Oct. 65

In addition to the information in this cable, SEIDEL dropped the tidbit that UTILITY's relations with Erhard are so good that he has been received by Erhard only once since Erhard became Chancellor.
21. BROCK had little to say about UTILITY. Contrary to his usual predictions that UTILITY is on the verge of being fired, he this time seemed to feel that UTILITY's position is fairly stable.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Information Received Informally from Mr. C

14 October 1965

1. Mr. C telephoned me to say he had attended a party at the home of Mr. Erich Straetling, Counselor of the German Embassy in Washington, in honor of the impending departure of First Secretary Hans-Georg Wöck. Mr. Wöck is returning to Bonn permanently, where he will work in the section of the German Foreign Office concerned with Berlin and East German matters. Wöck has worked on substantially these concerns here in Washington and it can be expected that he will be regarded by his colleagues in Bonn as an expert on American attitudes and policies in this connection. Wöck mentioned to Mr. C that he expects to be in regular touch with CATIDE representatives in his new position, but he made it quite clear that while he values good positive intelligence support in his job, he is very firm that foreign policy is made in the Foreign Office or above that level and not by CATIDE.

2. Assuming that Mr. C might be interested in establishing a loose, social contact with Wöck, Mr. C suggested to Wöck that he had one or two "friends" now stationed in Bonn with whom Wöck might find an occasional chat useful and enjoyable. Wöck responded very positively to this suggestion, and Mr. C is certain that any Bonn Base officer who might introduce himself as a friend of Mr. C's, perhaps indicating that he had recently heard from Mr. C by mail, would be able to gain access easily to Wöck. Important to note is, however, that Wöck is quite aware of Mr. C's Agency affiliation and that he would equally identify in his own mind any Bonn Base officer who so introduced himself as a CIA representative.

3. One amusing note during the evening was that Wöck asked Mr. C if he knew DESSAU and, if so, what he thinks of him. Sensing that this might indeed be a leading question, Mr. C indicated only that he had met DESSAU on a few occasions but does not know him well enough.
to have formed any clearly-defined opinions about him as yet. Mr.
Further noted that he had known DESSAU's predecessor who
was KUEHNE very well and held a distinctly favorable opinion of him.
Wöck's response was a wry comment to the effect that Mr. was
indeed very diplomatic and that he (Wöck) had gotten along with KUEHNE,
too. Mr. could not miss the implication that DESSAU is not
highly regarded by Wöck.

4. Among the other guests at the party was General Boie, formerly
with CATIDE. No conversation of significance took place with him.

5. At one point during the evening Straetling, who only recently returned
to Washington from a fairly extended stay in Bonn, told Mr. that
while in Bonn he had been asked by Minister Heinrich Krone the following
question: "What would you think of General Wessel as a replacement for
UTILITY?" Straetling apparently responded to Krone's question in an
entirely positive fashion. Mr. explained that Straetling is quite
close to Krone since the days that Straetling fulfilled the functions of
Foreign Office liaison with the Bundestag and that he continues to correspond
not infrequently with Krone by means of personal letters. The inference
Mr. draws is that Straetling furnishes to Krone his views as to what
goes on in Washington and probably also as to what goes on in the German
Embassy here. Mr. also noted that General Wessel was recently
promoted and thus now has his third star. The promotion was apparently
the subject of some rather snide comments made by some of the guests
at the party, including a number of members of the military attaches'
offices. These snide comments seem to center on the curiosity of General
Wessel having gotten so high a rank at so relatively young an age and without
a chestful of World War II German medals.

Chief, EE/Germany
9. SEIDEL started by saying that UTILITY is burned out and a burden rather than a help to CATIDE. He said that UTILITY does not establish programs, set goals, delegate authority, sell the CATIDE product, defend the organization politically, or any of the other things a good chief of CATIDE would do. On the contrary, he ignores these matters and lets the organization drift along without leadership or any sense of purpose. UTILITY does not face up to the major problems CATIDE faces, and spends his time with minor organizational and personnel matters. He will not let anyone else make a decision on a matter of importance, but frequently procrastinates over decisions so long himself that the matter becomes academic before the decision is made. He allows his division chiefs and senior officers to do as they please and work at cross purposes with each other. He is very fearful of flaps and afraid to assume risks. He will not tolerate dissenting opinions and surrounds himself with yes men. He cannot bring himself to dismiss his tired old friends and cronies. He is timid to the politicians in Bonn and creates an unfavorable impression of CATIDE.

10. SEIDEL said that he thought UTILITY's decline dated from the legalization of CATIDE in 1955-56. When CATIDE was legalized UTILITY had to take on a large number of organizational, financial, and personnel problems which he was ill prepared to handle. UTILITY was also confronted with a good deal of hostility in Bonn and got into the habit of being meek to the politicians. Since that time UTILITY has concentrated on the administrative and political aspects of his work and has been very much afraid to make waves.

11. SEIDEL was especially bitter about CATIDE's position in Bonn. He said that UTILITY generally gets no higher in the government hierarchy than Reinhold Harker. UTILITY also sees Gerstenmaier and Krone occasionally, but his access to even these men is not good. Adenauer came within an inch of firing UTILITY at the time of the Spiegel affair. Erhard received UTILITY once and has ignored him ever since. Westrick is very standoffish. Strauss will not speak to UTILITY. Schroeder is frosty to him and von Hassel is unavailable. SEIDEL said that the people who counted in Bonn were aware of the way UTILITY and CATIDE are floundering around, and if UTILITY was not removed it was only because of his services to Germany in the years after the war and in the creating of CATIDE. However, as soon as UTILITY reached the legal age for retirement (in April 1967), and could be gracefully eased out, he would be dropped with little ado.

12. Possibly, SEIDEL said, UTILITY might be eased out even sooner. WAGNER, who had long been treated in a humiliating manner by UTILITY, might soon be retired because
of ill health. His successor, whoever he was, would have to be approved by the cabinet, and this would open the whole question of CATIDE's leadership. The cabinet might then decide to replace UTILITY along with WAGNER. Certainly they would not appoint a vice president for CATIDE without giving some thought to the man who would be his boss for the next several years.

13. I commented at this point that I had heard rumors that HARTWIG would be appointed the next vice president of CATIDE. SEIDEL replied that he had heard the same rumors and could hardly think of anyone less qualified. He said HARTWIG was "charakterlos" and had gotten where he was only by sucking up to UTILITY. SEIDEL added that KUBARK would do well not to put too much confidence in HARTWIG since he had no principles and would always be quick to trim his sails to the direction of the wind.

14. I then asked who SEIDEL thought would replace UTILITY. SEIDEL said he believed it would be a young politician on the rise, probably the protege of some important political figure in Bonn. SEIDEL added that Adenauer had once considered giving the position to his aide, Bachmann, or to a protege named Bach (phon). SEIDEL said that there are a number of other clever and deserving young politicians in Bonn who would be interested in the CATIDE job, and the Bonn politicians would favor an appointment of this type after the UTILITY years. SEIDEL said that he himself thought that a political appointee, if it were the right man, would be an excellent solution for CATIDE. It would at least necessitate a fresh look at everything.

15. SEIDEL then turned to UTILITY's attitude toward America. He said UTILITY had never been really pro-American, and at the present time was quite anti-American. SEIDEL said that in the years between 1945-49, UTILITY had been so bitter at the Americans, especially at the US Army, that he came within an inch of breaking with the Americans completely, and doubtlessly would have done so if KUBARK had not assumed responsibility for his organization. SEIDEL said that ODESSAU had played an important role in persuading UTILITY to stay on good terms with the Americans during this period. SEIDEL added that he knew that ODESSAU had since changed and had become a joke in CATIDE; still, we should remember that ODESSAU was one of the most pro-American officers in CATIDE and that we had much to thank him for.

16. SEIDEL said that after the arrival UTILITY became more friendly to the US and remained so for several years. However, after UTILITY departed and CATIDE was legalized, UTILITY again began to grow cold toward the United States. He also began to imagine there was a clique in KUBARK which was out to get him. He attributed all sorts of misdeeds to this clique, among them sullying his reputation in Bonn. When Adenauer tried to fire him, UTILITY even concluded that the KUBARK clique had put Adenauer up to this. SEIDEL said that he didn't know this positively, but believed that UTILITY had once even protested to ASCH and BRENT about this KUBARK clique.

17. SEIDEL didn't go into details, but implied that UTILITY's anti-American attitude has a negative influence on CATIDE's present dealings with us. SEIDEL said specifically that if UTILITY did not give us his report on the Bundeswehr SIGINT deserter it would be only because he felt UTILITY's
anti-Americanism, since all the other responsible officers had cleared the report for passing to us.

20. While discussing UTILITY's attitude toward America, SEIDEL's reserve slipped a little and he said with a slight trace of emotion that KUBARK should know what is going on in CATIDE and that he considered it his duty to tell us. He also said that he was confident I would know how to handle his information securely. Then he became dispassionate again and a short time later stood up and took leave. We arranged to meet again in three or four weeks to discuss the Breisach project, and SEIDEL again volunteered to brief me on the Bundeswehr deserter if UTILITY has not released his report in the meantime.
GEHLEN, REINHARD /GEN/ 32W-C02-028/01
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GERMANY ?
CIT GERMANY
OCC CHIEF, BND
Δ W GERMANY, MUNICH ?
IS PRODUCT OF ARISTOCRATIC GERMAN SCHOOL
SYSTEM AND GENERAL STAFF, REMAINS FUNDAMENTALLY
A BELIEVER IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
AUTHORITARIANISM, IS A MAN OR RESOLVE AND
COURAGE, HAS REPORTEDLY SHIFTED MAIN
INTEREST FROM RESEARCH TO ACQUISITION /3
PAGES/

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODEXEMPTION 382E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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<tr>
<td>To:</td>
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<td>Subject</td>
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**Action Required: For Information**

1. Informed today by Commander Robert Bublitz, Naval Officer Accredited here for Catide Liaison, that Admiral Thach, Commander, USNAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE, probably will make a visit to Germany in January.

2. The first five days of the visit will be in North German areas - Flensburg, Hamburg, Bremen, etc. - will be accompanied by full publicity and be under the aegis of the Naval Attache in Bonn.

3. Thereafter, with no publicity, tour will be taken over by U.S. Naval Representative Germany, Captain Hatch, in Frankfurt. Of this part of visit, two days will be spent in Munich, the second being set aside for sightseeing.

4. We will be broaching idea of courtesy call by Admiral on Utility /preceded by MIB briefing/. Feel this would be useful protocol gesture. Bublitz envisages another visit by Admiral to CGG as well as one to Congen Creel. Will keep you informed as plans jell.

5. Fran - Understand that Capt Hatch been nominated as next Intelligence Officer to Admiral Thach. This is something on which you may wish to pass your congratulations although Hatch himself may not want to accept job having tried for German assignment for so long. Interested in any hints as to his successor.

CC: sent F1/D
Following is an excerpt from my Fortnightly Letter, dated 26 October 1965, which I feel would be of interest to you.

"Brigadier Sir Charles Spry who visited Bonn on the 22nd told me that he had spent two or three very pleasant days with UTILITY, whom he apparently admires very much. President Schruebbers whom I saw on the same occasion was full of his difficulties in Karlsruhe. Although nothing very new has come up during the Paetsch trial he is obviously shaken and very unhappy about it.

"A few weeks ago Poser told me that he had been asked by the Defense Department to go to Munich to "persuade" UTILITY to stay on as president of CATIDE. At about the same time I had lunch with Alias Torgau who said that UTILITY had been in his office that very morning and in better shape than Torgau had seen him in years: happy, gay and playful."
Forwarded herewith is a contact report on a recent meeting with [SEIDEL]. The report contains some interesting information on UTLITIY and the position of CATIDE in the German government.

ATTACHMENT:
Contact Report dated 25 October 1965

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2 - COS/Germany/Bonn w/l cy att h/w
2 - C/Bonn Ops Base w/l cy att h/w

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
CONTACT REPORT

Brüecke
25 October 1965, 1210 - 1500 hours

1. The meeting was scheduled by me by telephone on 22 October. The purpose was to obtain additional information on the Bundeswehr SIGINT deserter whom SEIDEL had previously mentioned to me. This topic was covered satisfactorily, and SEIDEL then went on to volunteer information on other highly interesting topics. The details are outlined below.

2. I am quite surprised at SEIDEL's desire to talk confidentially to me. We are not regular liaison partners, and have never seen a great deal of each other socially, although he has been at my home on three or four occasions. However, SEIDEL has practically gushed information the last two times I have seen him, and today he even debriefed himself on his brother-in-law UTILITY. Other than BROCK, no one in CATIDE has ever talked so unreservedly to me.

3. I have the impression that SEIDEL's relationship with UTILITY is not at all a good one. He spoke of UTILITY with considerable bitterness. I believe also that SEIDEL is quite disappointed in not having been appointed to succeed ENGKERN. One excuse for this we have heard is that UTILITY felt he could not appoint SEIDEL without opening himself to charges of nepotism. However, this excuse does not seem at all true in view of the notorious way UTILITY has taken care of his other relatives.

4. For the first hour of our meeting, SEIDEL and I talked only about personal topics. SEIDEL described his boyhood in Silesia, his family's conservatism, his original study of law and later transfer to the Army, and his service on the east front and in Rastenburg. SEIDEL seems to have been extraordinarily well connected in the German officer corps and tossed around names like Blomberg, Keitel, Busch, Heusinger, Speidel and many others as if they were the folks next door. Speidel's family doubtlessly accounts for many of these connections, but to a large extent I expect they are also due to merit on his part. He told one fascinating little story of seeing Keitel running like a dog to Hitler's bunker in Rastenburg after Hitler had rung for him.

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1 - SEIDEL
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5. Then SEIDEL talked at some length about the criminal excesses of the Nazi regime and the difficulty his generation has in explaining their actions or lack of them to the present young people of Germany. SEIDEL and most other conservative officers like him have a guilt complex about the Nazi regime, and are in a quandry to explain their service of the regime to their children. Almost every CATIDE I know well has sooner or later given me a monologue on this theme.

6. Finally I got SEIDEL down to business by querying him about the Bundeswehr deserter. His reply was forwarded in MUNI 4232. I was quite surprised at his offer to brief us unofficially on the case. He also made a remark about UTILITY being anti-American that surprised me.

7. Next SEIDEL brought up the Breisach Institute and CATIDE's dealings with Professor Rawer. He talked at some length on this topic and recapitulated all his past discussions with him about Breisach. At the conclusion of his presentation SEIDEL asked that I check into the matter and see if I could get KUBARK headquarters to be more helpful to CATIDE on the project, or, if that were impossible, to at least give CATIDE a definitive statement that cooperation with CATIDE was not desired. As soon as time permits, I will forward SEIDEL's points to Headquarters by dispatch.

8. By this time SEIDEL and I had been talking for close to two hours and I expected him to take leave and go back to his office. However, instead of doing so he suddenly switched his conversation to UTILITY and the sorry state of affairs in CATIDE. I neither urged him on nor tried to shut him off, and for the next half hour he really unburdened his soul about what was wrong with CATIDE. He spoke in a rather dispassionate manner, almost as if he were presenting a briefing on the topic. He mentioned a couple of times that his views were shared by a large number of other discontented and frustrated officers in CATIDE.

9. SEIDEL started by saying that UTILITY is burned out and a burden rather than a help to CATIDE. He said that UTILITY does not establish programs, set goals; delegate authority, sell the CATIDE product, defend the organization...
politically, or any of the other things a good chief of CATIDE would do. On the contrary, he ignores these matters and lets the organization drift along without leadership or any sense of purpose. UTILITY does not face up to the major problems CATIDE faces, and spends his time with minor organizational and personnel matters. He will not let anyone else make a decision on a matter of importance, but frequently procrastinates over decisions so long himself that the matter becomes academic before the decision is made. He allows his division chiefs and senior officers to do as they please and work at cross purposes with each other. He is very fearful of flaps and afraid to assume risks. He will not tolerate dissenting opinions and surrounds himself with yes men. He cannot bring himself to dismiss his tired old friends and cronies. He is timid to the politicians in Bonn and creates an unfavorable impression of CATIDE.

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12. Possibly, SEIDEL said, UTILITY might be eased out even sooner. WAGNER, who had long been treated in a humiliating manner by UTILITY, might soon be retired because
Page - 4

of ill health. His successor, who ever he was, would have to be approved by the cabinet, and this would open the whole question of CATIDE's leadership. The cabinet might then decide to replace UTILITY along with WAGNER. Certainly they would not appoint a vice president for CATIDE without giving some thought to the man who would be his boss for the next several years.

13. I commented at this point that I had heard rumors that HARTWIG would be appointed the next vice president of CATIDE. SEIDEL replied that he had heard the same rumors and could hardly think of anyone less qualified. He said HARTWIG was "charakterlos" and had gotten where he was only by sucking up to UTILITY. SEIDEL added that KUDARK would do well not to put too much confidence in HARTWIG since he had no principles and would always be quick to trim his sails to the direction of the wind.

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SEIDEL 25 October 1965

15. SEIDEL then went on to say that he doubted very much that the politicians would want an active duty General to have the job. SEIDEL also doubted that General Gerhard Wessel would take the job even if it were offered to him. SEIDEL said that he has known Wessel well for many years and during his last trip to Washington stopped to see Wessel with the intention of sounding him out on his views regarding CATIDE. Wessel was not at home, but his wife, whom SEIDEL also knows well, said that Wessel was not interested in coming back to Munich. She said proudly that her husband was getting his third star and had much better prospects in the Stromme than in the Chief of Staff. She added that her husband was especially interested in Graf von Kielmansegg's job in Paris.
16. SEIDEL said that HOML's name was also frequently mentioned as a possible successor to UTILITY, but that he didn't believe there was any chance at all that HOML would be selected. SEIDEL said that HOML was closely associated with the UTILITY reign and that this would count heavily against him.

17. SEIDEL then turned to UTILITY's attitude towards America. He said UTILITY had never been really pro-American, and at the present time was quite anti-American. SEIDEL said that in the years between 1945 - 49, UTILITY had been so bitter at the Americans, especially at the US Army, that he came within an inch of breaking with the Americans completely, and doubtlessly would have done so if KUBARK had not assumed responsibility for his organization. SEIDEL said that DESSAU had played an important role in persuading UTILITY to stay on good terms with the Americans during this period. SEIDEL added that he knew DESSAU had since changed and had become a joke in CATIDE, still, we should remember that DESSAU was one of the most pro-American officers in CATIDE and that we had much to thank him for.

18. SEIDEL said that after his arrival UTILITY became more friendly to the US, and remained so for several years. However, after B fell apart and CATIDE was legalized, UTILITY again began to grow cold toward the United States. He also began to imagine there was a clique in KUBARK which was out to get him. He attributed all sorts of misdeeds to this clique, among them sullying his reputation in Bonn. When Adenauer tried to fire him, UTILITY even concluded that the KUBARK clique had put Adenauer up to this. SEIDEL said that he didn't know this positively, but believed that UTILITY had once even protested to ASCHAM or about this KUBARK clique.

19. SEIDEL didn't go into details, but implied that UTILITY's anti-American attitude has a negative influence on CATIDE's present dealings with us. SEIDEL said specifically that if UTILITY did not give us his report on the Bundeswehr SIGINT deserter it would be only because of UTILITY's
anti-Americanism, since all the other responsible CATIDE officers had cleared the report for passing to us.

20. While discussing UTILITY's attitude toward America, SEIDEL's reserve slipped a little and he said with a slight trace of emotion that KUBARK should know what is going on in CATIDE and that he considered it his duty to tell us. He also said that he was confident I would know how to handle his information securely. Then he became dispassionate again and a short time later stood up and took leave. We arranged to meet again in three or four weeks to discuss the Breisach project, and SEIDEL again volunteered to brief me on the Bundeswehr deserter if UTILITY has not released his report in the meantime.

21. I was naturally surprised that SEIDEL passed me the above information. The last place I ever expected to hear anything like this was from a member of UTILITY's own family. I have the impression SEIDEL has been fretting about the situation in CATIDE for sometime and finally decided to do something about it. I was greatly impressed with his attitude while he was talking. He did not want to be cajoled into talking, thanked for his information, or assured we would handle his information securely. He seemed to be motivated entirely by his own principles.

22. I do not think SEIDEL could be turned into a regular source of incompatible information on CATIDE. However, he knows that I have a sympathetic ear and I will give him plenty of opportunity to tell me anything else he wants us to know. If things start taking a wrong turn in Germany, I have the feeling that Seidel might be a very useful contact for us to have. He certainly appears to be well motivated and to have the courage of his convictions.

23. I believe that the information SEIDEL furnished is all or in large part true. @BROCK has provided a virtually identical description of CATIDE's troubles, and @STURM and @RITTER have furnished partial descriptions along the same lines.
1. FURTHER MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD RE CATIDE BUDGET AT HIGH GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS AT WHICH DECISION MADE NOT TO CUT.

2. TORGAU HAD LONG TALK WITH UTILITY ABOUT CASE AND UTILITY'S STRONG REACTION TO IT. ASSURED ME TREND NOW VERY MUCH IN DIRECTION BRINGING THINGS BACK TO NORMAL. REGRETTED SEVERITY UTILITY REACTION BUT SMILINGLY COMMENTED "JUPITER FEELS HE HAS TO THROW A FEW BOLTS NOW AND THEN." STRONGLY ADVISED THAT WE REFUTE UTILITY NOTION THAT OUR AGENCY ACTED WITH "BOESER ABSICHT." SAID IT WOULD BE USELESS TO ARGUE THAT CASE IN SOME RESPECTS NOT A FLAP BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISTAKE ABOUT OUR PURPOSE.

3. INTEND DISPATCH LETTER TO UTILITY THROUGH TORGAU CHANNEL BASED ON DRAFTS EARLY NEXT WEEK. ASSUME CASE WILL THEN FINALLY BE PUT TO REST DURING MEETING WITH UTILITY 20 DECEMBER.
told an interesting tale about the "Doctor". He had been in London and bought himself a hat because he wanted something different from the usual German style hat. After some time his wife took it to the cleaner to be cleaned and blocked. The cleaner took the English label out, put his store label in and blocked it in a shape that was very German in appearance. The "Doctor" is a bit unhappy to say the least.
that UTILITY had really been burned up about our surfacing the matter to the French. WINTERSTEIN said that the French had been quite nasty to UTILITY about the matter, and when UTILITY came home he was raging angry at KUBARK. This led to his emotional behaviour, issuance of new security regulations, etc.

7. I have the distinct impression that we unwittingly played into the hands of the French on this matter. Instead of working honestly with [REDACTED] to clear up the case, the French seem to have used our material to provoke a breach between KUBARK and CARTER.

8. WINTERSTEIN stated that the Americans, when asked to change the anti-American stance before which the French were threatened to go wrong, this is a

9. WINTERSTEIN said that the French were interested in German Americans, and that their materials were returned to the Americans.

10. WINTERSTEIN said that the French were interested in the Americans' materials, and that they were returned to the Americans.

11. WINTERSTEIN said that the French were interested in the Americans' materials, and that they were returned to the Americans.

12. WINTERSTEIN said that the French were interested in the Americans' materials, and that they were returned to the Americans.

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14. WINTERSTEIN said that the French were interested in the Americans' materials, and that they were returned to the Americans.

15. WINTERSTEIN said that the French were interested in the Americans' materials, and that they were returned to the Americans.
MEETING WITH UTILITY, 20 DECEMBER 1965

1. UTILITY Began by acknowledging receipt letter about case, which he said he appreciated. He does not wish to discuss the matter further. He made it clear that he still feels that we attempted to exploit this case to his disadvantage. This is exactly the way we brought the son-in-law case to a close.

2. UTILITY then said that the changes that he proposed making in the way we conduct liaison are in no way intended to diminish the exchange of materials and views but have as their sole purpose the tidying up of a relationship which has grown somewhat beyond bounds. He also said that he would not presume to tell us how Staff MLB. He then turned to Holm who read from a typed memorandum:

A. They intend to list the people with whom we will normally do business. We may contact these individuals whenever we have reason to do so. Meetings will ordinarily take place in the compound. If it is necessary to have other individuals attend a given meeting because of their specialized knowledge they may be brought in on the understanding that no continuing contact with us has thereby been established.

B. After Catide has given us a list of their contact personnel, they expect that we will tell them who on our side will be conducting business in these various fields.

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TO MLM/BRN

BY POUCH
COB/BONN

CONTINUED/
C. Some kind of regulation concerning social contact I in the hill. Utility said that he will be ready to discuss it early in January. I said that I would be ready in February after my Washington visit and that return. This date accepted with alacrity.

3. I asked whether they considered that any of our officers were calling for meetings too frequently, mentioning specifically the three military liaison officers assigned to the base who may be somewhat under-employed and therefore over-anxious for contact. Holm stoutly denied that this was of any concern to them saying that business contacts in all categories of work in which we are engaged are most welcome.

4. At that conclusion of the session I said that I regarded as essential that intense official and social contact be maintained because Kubark must have access to CAtIdE in some depth in order to carry out its responsibilities within the large, competitive, and active American intelligence community. I emphasized that in order to play the leading role we must have answers to many questions and we must be able to state our opinions about the nature of CATIDE's work on the basis of sound knowledge. If liaison contact were cut back too far the loss to CATIDE within the American-German intelligence community would be a noticeable one. Utility understood this and agreed.

5. After lunch with Holm and Utility and while waiting to be picked up I asked Holm what his guess is about the future utilization of the Bruecke. He replied that whereas there is no doubt but that Utility wants to have exchanges take place in the compound this may not always prove to be convenient and therefore they may from time to time wish to meet at the Bruecke. He would like to see how this works out during the next month or six weeks and then on the basis of experience we can decide whether the Bruecke has a future.
EGWA 75

ALIAS WINTERSTEIN APPROACHED ME DURING CHRISTMAS PARTY ON 18 DECEMBER AND PASSED SOME INTERESTING INFO ABOUT CASE AND UTILIY'S REACTION TO IT.

1. WINTERSTEIN SAID WE HAD MADE MAJOR MISTAKE IN SURFACING CASE TO FRENCH. HE SAID CASE WAS QUOTE EIN GEFUNDENES FRESSEN UNQUOTE FOR FRENCH. WHEN UTILIY WENT PARIS CHIEF FRENCH SERVICE TOLD HIM KUBARK OBVIOUSLY TRYING USE CASE TO PROVOKE DIFFICULTIES AND DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN FRENCH AND GERMAN SERVICES. HOWEVER, GERMANS AND FRENCH SHOULD PRESENT COMMON FRONT TO OUTSIDERS AND NOT LET THEMSELVES BE SPLIT BY NON-EUROPEAN POWER.

2. UTILIY RETURNED FROM PARIS IN VERY ANTI-AMERICAN MOOD, NOW LIVING PARIS AND MAY WELL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS. UPON UTILIY'S ARRIVAL MUNICH NUMBER ANTI-AMERICAN OFFICERS IN CATIDE PUMPED HIM FULL DISTORTED STORIES ABOUT BRUECKE, LARGE NUMBER CATIDE WHO FREQUENT IT, AND SECURITY DANGER THIS PRESENTS. UTILIY ALWAYS SUSCEPTIBLE THIS TYPE OF INFLUENCE AND BELIEVES WHOEVER TALKS TO HIM LAST, RESULT WAS HIS EMOTIONAL OUTBURST, NEW SECURITY DEGREE, ETC.

3. I TRIED ELICIT NAMES ANTI-AMERICAN OFFICERS WHO INFLUENCED UTILIY BUT WINTERSTEIN DID NOT PROVIDE ANY. MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT THEY INCLUDED ALIAS BOHLEN AND ALIAS HOLTEN, LATTER IS WINTERSTEIN'S NOMINAL CHIEF AND BITTER COMPETITOR.

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5. To my knowledge this is closest any senior Catider has come to confirming there is an anti-American clique in CATIDE.

6. Winterstein again said he thought liaison situation would gradually drift back to normal. He advised that in any future negotiations about Bruecke we stress our willingness to let CATIDE Security Office select and limit number of Catiders who would be permitted use Bruecke.
I. DURING MY DINNER PARTY ON 17 DECEMBER UTILITY MADE A FEW INTERESTING COMMENTS TO MY WIFE ABOUT HIS FUTURE PLANS. HE SAID THAT HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, WHO ATTENDED IN LIEU OF HIS WIFE, WAS VERY DEAR TO HIM, AND THAT HE AND HIS WIFE PLANNED TO BUILD A HOME FOR HER AND THEIR SON IN THE STARNBERG AREA. THEN, UTILITY SAID, WHEN HE RETIRED QUOTE IN THREE OR FOUR YEARS UNQUOTE, THE FOUR OF THEM WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEND MORE TIME TOGETHER.

2. I RECALL THAT ALIAS BROCK ONCE PREDICTED THAT UTILITY WOULD NEVER LEAVE CATIDE VOLUNTARILY. BROCK SAID HE WAS SURE UTILITY WOULD STAY ON UNTIL HE WAS FORCED TO RETIRE, AND THEREAFTER WOULD TRY TO CONTINUE RUNNING CATIDE THROUGH HIS OLD FRIENDS STILL ON ACTIVE SERVICE.

3. UTILITY'S DAUGHTER-IN-LAW IS ALIAS GERSFELD. SHE IS DAUGHTER OF ALIAS BOHLEN, CHIEF OF CATIDE'S SECURITY DIVISION. BOHLEN IS REPORTED TO BE VERY ANTI-AMERICAN. I HAVE HAD NUMBER CONVERSATIONS WITH GERSFELD DURING LAST TWO-THREE YEARS AND SHE AT FIRST APPEARED VERY PREJUDICED AGAINST AMERICANS. SHE HAS RELAXED CONSIDERABLY DURING LAST COUPLE CONVERSATIONS, HOWEVER.

4. UTILITY'S SON/CHRISTOPH IS PHYSICIST AND ALSO EMPLOYED IN CATIDE. GERSELFD TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE FINISHED STUDIES HE GOT SUCH WONDERFUL OFFER FROM CATIDE THAT HE COULDN'T AFFORD TO TURN IT DOWN. GERSFELD ADDED THAT CHRISTOPH IS NON-COMPETITIVE PERSON AND THAT SHE GETS ALONG VERY WELL WITH HIM.

DISTRIBUTION - BY TAPE

2 - C/EE
2 - COS/GERMANY
2 - C/BONN OPS BASE
5. ALIAS HOLM WAS QUITE OBSEQUOUS TO UTILITY DURING PARTY. HE JUMPED UP TO LIGHT UTILITY'S CIGAR, FETCH HIS CHRISTMAS PRESENTS, ETC. I WAS QUITE SURPRISED SUCH BEHAVIOUR HOLM'S PART.
EGWA 75

Alias Winterstein approached me during Christmas party on 18 December and passed some interesting info about a case and Utility's reaction to it.

2. Winterstein said we had made major mistake in surfacing case to French. He said case was quote ein gefundenes fressen unquote for French. When Utility went Paris Chief French Service told him Kubark obviously trying use case to provoke difficulties and drive wedge between French and German Services. However, Germans and French should present common front to outsiders and not let themselves be split by non-European power.

3. Utility returned from Paris in very anti-American mood. Now living Paris and may well have contributed to this. Upon Utility's arrival Munich number anti-American officers in CATIDE pumped him full distorted stories about Bruecke, large number CATIDE who frequent it, and security danger this presents. Utility always susceptible this type of influence and believes whoever talks to him last, result was his emotional outburst, new security decree, etc.

4. I tried elicit names anti-American officers who influenced Utility, but Winterstein did not provide any. My guess would be that they included Alias Bohlen and Alias Holtien. Latter is Winterstein's nominal chief and bitter competitor.

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2 - C/Bonn Ops Base

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5. To my knowledge this is closest any senior Catider has come to confirming there is anti-American clique in CATIDE.

6. Winterstein again said he thought liaison situation would gradually drift back to normal. He advised that in any future negotiations about Bruecke we stress our willingness to let CATIDE Security Office select and limit number of Catiders who would be permitted use Bruecke.
Im Dezember 1965

Im Namen aller Mitarbeiter des Bundesnachrichtendienstes und in meinem Namen wünsche ich Ihnen anläßlich des Weihnachtsfestes aufrichtig Glück und Segen und zum Neuen Jahre Gesundheit, Erfolg und Frieden.

Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes
Generalleutnant d. Res.

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Christmas Greeting to 901 (1965)

Geheime
DISPATCH

TO
Chief, Munich Liaison Base

FROM
Chief, Bonn Operations Base

SUBJECT
(CATIDE; CAVATA)

UTILITY meeting with Chief, CAVATA

ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES

Ref: A. BORN 0824
B. BORN 0961

1. On 22 December, Chief CAVATA commented to the undersigned re his ref meeting with UTILITY. His remarks were as follows:

a. CAILLIKAK Turnover: CAVATA said that UTILITY revealed to him nothing about his plans for taking over. CAILLIKAK except to state his staff was making plans. CAVATA commented that he had already learned more about UTILITY's plan from EURAK than revealed by UTILITY himself. UTILITY was very evasive about establishing a joint policy with CAVATA toward the CAILLIKAK turnover and refused to comment himself. CAVATA has thereafter decided to take the initiative with the Interior Ministry to force UTILITY to agree to a joint policy rather than to deal with the Allies unilaterally. It was obvious from the above meager comments that CAVATA discussions with UTILITY re CAILLIKAK were most unsatisfactory and did not improve the situation.

b. CAVATA asked UTILITY directly, at the request of CAILLIKAK, for a copy of the original

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/Continued/

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DATE 2006

GROUP I - Excluded from automatic
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SECRET

4 January 1966

SECRET

EG-NA - 30808
copies for CAVATA. Be refused to discuss the subject any further and suggested that he and CAVATA discuss this question again in March 1966. CAVATA did not know why UTILITY wanted to postpone further discussion until March.

2. Comment: The above summarizes all that CAVATA apparently was willing to say about his meeting with UTILITY. It was apparent that other subjects were discussed. From comments of other CAVATA staff, particularly CAVATA CE Chief, the meeting was unsatisfactory and CAVATA failed to obtain any concessions on establishing a better working relationship with CATIDE. CAVATA Deputy Chief also remarked to the undersigned with respect to CAVATA/CATIDE relations that he doubted whether there would ever be really close relations between the two services as long as the two incumbent chiefs remained in office. He said that the two individuals are such divergent personalities that they will never really warm up to each other.

3. Any MIB comment or information re CATIDE reaction to the above meeting would be appreciated.
1. I am describing both meetings in the same report because they took place close together and covered about the same topics.

2. The first meeting was scheduled by UTILITY. I made the arrangements and attended also. The only topic discussed was the Spiegel interview with Vladimir Apolonovich KARPOV about L and Boguslav von BONIN. UTILITY discussed the case in some detail and seemed a little fearful that KUBARK would swallow the Soviet version of the BONIN case. He furnished a written report on the affair and read aloud the CATIDE rebuttal which is to be printed in the Spiegel. UTILITY's information was forwarded in MUNI-4821 and EGM-67744.

3. The second meeting was scheduled by me. I again made the arrangements through Castrop. As soon as UTILITY heard that I wanted to see him, he invited me to come over immediately. When I arrived, GHolm was in his office and stayed throughout the meeting.

4. The first topic I brought up was the case of in Algeria. I passed UTILITY my blue Memo No. 33585 and briefed him a little on the background of the case. UTILITY said that he was grateful for the information and would put somebody to work on the matter right away. From his comments I expect Castrop will get the job. I have sent out MUNI-4856 on this matter.

5. Then I mentioned our intention to invite ACKERMANN to the States for a briefing on Automatic Data Processing and our need for additional background information on his wife.
before we could issue the invitation. UTILITY said there
would be no difficulty about this and I should work out the
details with Castrop. He added that he was always interested
in the security of CATIDE personnel and receiving security
information about his organization. He said that even when
we surfaced the allegations about C to him he had been
grateful to us, although the matter was of course painful to
him in that C had been a member of his family. UTILITY
concluded by saying we could be assured that he understood
fully the need to investigate every scrap of derogatory in-
formation on any of his people.

6. I replied that nothing at all like this was involved.
We had no derogatory information on Ackermann and considered
him a highly competent officer. All that we needed was a
little additional background information so that we could get
Ackermann the necessary clearance.

7. Then I mentioned C's planned trip to Munich
and my hope that either UTILITY or Holm would be able to
meet him. UTILITY said that he would certainly like to meet
C and if he were in town would not fail to do so. He
added with a smile that he knew from experience that we always
sent our best people to Berlin. For instance, C was
one of the most competent intelligence officers he had ever
run across. I said that C was a worthy successor to
C and would certainly uphold the tradition. I then
described C's work in the Cuban crisis and work in
the White House. Both UTILITY and Holm were a little popeyed
and I'm sure will give C quite a reception.

8. Then I asked UTILITY if he could tell me anything
new about the Boguslav von Bonin case. UTILITY furnished the
information forwarded in "HUNT-858.

9. UTILITY seemed in quite good spirits during both
meetings and was friendlier to me than he has ever been before.
He complimented me on my Christmas party, asked about my wife
and son, and joked a little about the Wisconsin cheese I gave
him for a Christmas present. Holm seemed quite relaxed also.
Der Präsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes
und Frau Gehlen
gaben sich die Ehre

Ma. [Unterschrift]

am 21. Januar 1966 um 19.00 Uhr zum Cocktail-Rüft in das
Haus 37 (Einfahrt Sonnleit) zu bitten.

Dunkla Aurung

m. Anw. an Büro Muttke
Tel. Nr. 2576

21 JAN 66

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RAI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

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CONTACT REPORT

UTILITY's New Year's Party

CATIDE Compound

21 January 1966, 1900 - 2245 hours

1. The annual CATIDE New Year's party for the HMB liaison staff took place in House 37 of the CATIDE Compound on 21 January. It was quite a pleasant affair. The reception rooms were well set up, the dinner was catered by a very good restaurant, and the wines and champagne were first rate. CATIDE entertainment has tended to get a little flossier in recent years and I attribute this to the efforts of MOELLER.

2. Everybody of any consequence in CATIDE was present at the party; I assume UTILITY ordered a full turnout. On our side, the number of participants was much smaller, due to trips to the USA and the absence of a few other HLB staffs.

3. UTILITY made a warm little speech at the start of the evening and obviously tried to be a good host. He sought me out for a short conversation about the SDECE scandal in Paris, but there was so much noise in the reception room that I couldn't follow his words very well. Later UTILITY escorted my wife to dinner and talked to her about an hour, mostly about DeGaulle and President Johnson's proposals for changing the American Constitution. UTILITY seems to like to talk to my wife. Afterwards he circulated around and chatted with the other HLB attendees and their wives.

Distribution:
Orig 6 2 - 801
1 - 165/UTILITY
1 - 829 Contact Report Chrono
1 - For extracting
1 - 847
4. UTILITY's daughter, Maria Theresa, acted as hostess, and I chatted with her for an hour or so. She is an intelligent young woman. She said she works for CATIDE and her husband is studying for his doctorate at the University of Munich in the field of Germanistics. Since this is also my field, we had plenty to talk about. She said her husband would like to come to the USA for a year or so to work for an American University, and I told her I was well plugged in at the University of Wisconsin and would be more than willing to try to help with scholarships, assistantship, etc. if she were interested. She obviously was, but she just as obviously didn't want to ask for help without checking with her father. We will see if she brings up the topic again.

5. I regret that we can't get closer to UTILITY's family. He is very close to his children and if we had friendly relations with some of them I think they would serve as a pro-American influence in the family. As things stand now, I suspect that the family atmosphere is a fairly anti-American one, primarily as a result of the case. I noted that both UTILITY's daughter and daughter-in-law were quite standoffish when I first got to know them, but warmed up quickly after I talked to them a while. They are both international in their outlook and I believe would be quite friendly to Americans if they knew us better.

6. During dinner UTILITY's aide, GEICHENDORF, whispered a message in UTILITY's ear and UTILITY left the room for a short time. I expect that something of interest had just taken place, possibly in connection with the CAVATA publicity campaign against the five KGB officers in Bonn.

7. I left the party at 2245. When I took leave I noticed that UTILITY looked quite tired. Despite this, he stayed for another hour until the last American guest had gone.

8. All in all I thought the party was a good one. The CATIDEs were on their best behaviour and there was a warm and convivial atmosphere. I think UTILITY went out of his way to be gracious and show that he still wants to work closely with us.
1. My wife and I attended a dinner at the K U B R E ' s  in their home in Planegg. During the evening K U B R E N informed my wife that he had luncheoned on 1 February with the West German Ambassador to Israel (P A U L S ) at a restaurant in Munich. K U B R E N stated that he and P A U L S had become close friends during the period of K U B R E N ' s duty in Washington, when P A U L S and K U B R E N were both working in the German Embassy. K U B R E N stated that P A U L S at the time held the rank of Consul. K U B R E N stated that much of the talk between P A U L S and himself was devoted to reminiscences about the good old days in Washington. P A U L S conceded that, while his job as Ambassador to Israel offers a challenge, he has a minimum of social life and has little expectancy that many of the Israelis will exhibit any spontaneous warmth to him during his tour. K U B R E N spoke to K U B R E N about a conversation with DESSAU during the latter ' s recent visit to Munich over Christmas 1965. According to K U B R E N, DESSAU enjoys every minute of his job in Washington and stated that he has no desire ever to come back to C A T I D E Headquarters in a duty capacity, hoping that he can carry on in Washington until retirement. K U B R E N stated that he himself has had a tough time making the adjustment to his present job in C A T I D E after his Washington tour, adding that he has had a difficult time picking up the complicated threads of his present job in addition to reorganizing his personal life, new home, etc. He added that he misses not being in the capital and finds it a come-down to realize that he must say "Yes Sir" to somebody immediately above him. He stated, however, that he respects his superior (he did not mention DESSAU by name), and added that he has an excellent, hard-working staff which provides him with good support. K U B R E N then opened up the subject of DESSAU’s recent visit to Munich over Christmas 1965. According to K U B R E N, DESSAU enjoys every minute of his job in Washington and stated that he has no desire ever to come back to C A T I D E Headquarters in a duty capacity, hoping that he can carry on in Washington until retirement. K U B R E N stated that he himself has had a tough time making the adjustment to his present job in C A T I D E after his Washington tour, adding that he has had a difficult time picking up the complicated threads of his present job in addition to reorganizing his personal life, new home, etc. He added that he misses not being in the capital and finds it a come-down to realize that he must say "Yes Sir" to somebody immediately above him. He stated, however, that he respects his superior (he did not mention DESSAU by name), and added that he has an excellent, hard-working staff which provides him with good support. K U B R E N then opened up the subject of DESSAU’s recent visit to Munich over Christmas 1965. According to K U B R E N, DESSAU enjoys every minute of his job in Washington and stated that he has no desire ever to come back to C A T I D E Headquarters in a duty capacity, hoping that he can carry on in Washington until retirement. K U B R E N stated that he himself has had a tough time making the adjustment to his present job in C A T I D E after his Washington tour, adding that he has had a difficult time picking up the complicated threads of his present job in addition to reorganizing his personal life, new home, etc. He added that he misses not being in the capital and finds it a come-down to realize that he must say "Yes Sir" to somebody immediately above him. He stated, however, that he respects his superior (he did not mention DESSAU by name), and added that he has an excellent, hard-working staff which provides him with good support.
IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH CATIDE CONCERNING OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM, ENGERDED BY CASE/. FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST. INFORMATION COMES FROM MRS. CASE/. WIFE OF ALIAS KOLLER, WHO UNTIL RECENTLY WAS CATIDE OFFICER CHARGED WITH LIAISON WITH AMERICANS. HE IS NOW AT LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND WILL BE GOING TO MILITARY ATTACHE SCHOOL PREPARATORY TO PRESUMED APPOINTMENT AS MILITARY ATTACHE TO SAIGON.

INFO FROM MRS. CASE/ CAME FROM A NUMBER OF CONFIDENTIAL CHATS SHE HAD WITH WIVES OF MLB STAFFERS.

AFTER UTILITY HAD TAKEN HIS RATHER DRASTIC SO-CALLED INTERIM SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST MLB, CASE/ WROTE UP A PAPER ON THE MATTER. IT APPARENTLY DEALT WITH RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KUBARK AND CATIDE AND THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RELATIONSHIP AND OF DISTURBING THEM. CASE/ PRESENTED THIS PAPER TO UTILITY. THIS LED TO AN ARGUMENT AND POSSIBLY A SHOUTING MATCH. THE HIGH/LOW POINT OF IT WAS WHEN UTILITY THREW A HEATED QUESTION AT CASE/. WHAT ARE YOU, A GERMAN OFFICER OR AN AMERICAN OFFICER? QUESTION TO MY WAY OF THINKING IMPUGNED LOYALTY OF CASE/ WAS A DISTINCT INSULT AND WAS SO TAKEN BY CASE/ INTERESTING IN MRS. CASE/ S RECITAL HAS BEEN THE STATEMENT THAT CASE/ WAS BACKED UP IN HIS ARGUMENT BY ALIAS MOELLER, HEAD OF FOREIGN LIAISON STAFF.

AS RESULT OF ARGUMENT WITH UTILITY, CASE/ RETURNED TO HIS HOME DOWNHEARTED AND DEPRESSED. HE COMMENTED TO HIS WIFE THAT HE WAS GLAD HE WAS THROUGH WITH WHOLE CATIDE MESS AND OUT OF THE BUSINESS. WHETHER THIS ACTUALLY MEANS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE BUSINESS OR NOT IS ANOTHER QUESTION, BUT AT LEAST HE IS NOT UNDER IMMEDIATE SURVEILLANCE OF UTILITY AT MOMENT.

ABOVE SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AS WE FURTHER OBSERVE CATIDE AND DISTRIBUTION BY TAA 67/66.
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CLASSIFICATION INDEXING

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DISPATCH

TO
COS/GERMANY

FROM
C/MLB

INFO
C/EE - C/CSB/FRANKFURT

SUBJECT
CATIDE
VISIT OF U.S. ARMY GENERAL GAVIN OF SHAPE TO UTILITY

ACTION REQUESTED- COS/GERMANY ADVICE ON PARA 4

1. INFORMED BY CATIDE LIAISON OFFICERS ON 15 FEB THAT
UTILITY WAS EXPECTING COURTESY VISIT FROM A "GENERAL GAVIN OF
SHAPE" ON "FASCHING CARNIVAL TUESDAY", I.E. WASHINGTON'S
BIRTHDAY.

2. NOT CLEAR TO CATIDE LIAISON OFFICERS, WHO SOMEWHAT PUZZLED
ABOUT VISIT, WHETHER UTILITY AND GAVIN OLD PERSONAL FRIENDS, OR
WHAT. I SAID I HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT VISIT FROM MY SIDE. CATIDE
OFFICERS ADDED THAT INFORMATION HAD COME TO UTILITY FROM GERMAN
SHAPE OFFICER, FERDINAND-WOLF VON STUELPNAGEL, WHO LISTED WITH US AS SON
OR NEPHEW OF FORMER GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PARIS EXECUTED IN
ROUNDOUP OF ANTI-HITLER 20TH OF JULY OFFICERS. VON STUELPNAGEL
INDICATED THAT VISIT MIGHT BE IN CONJUNCTION WITH GENERAL GAVIN'S
ACCIDENTAL PRESENCE IN AREA TO PICK UP AUTOMOBILE.

3. IS VISIT AND PURPOSE KNOWN TO ANY ADDRESSEES? OUR OWN
USAREUR LIAISON NOT QUITE ABLE TO PLACE GAVIN WHO BELIEVED TO BE KIND
OF RETIRED GEN. GAVIN.

4. COS/GERMANY- WE STAND READY EITHER TO EXTEND ANY
COURTESIES OR STAND ASIDE AND CONSIDER AFFAIR PERSONAL BETWEEN GAVIN
AND UTILITY.

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C/EE
C/CSB/FRANKFURT

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DATE 2005

GROUP 4

EGMA-68060
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
32W-2-28/7

EGMA-68060
**DISPATCH**

**TO**  
CHIEF, MUNICH LIAISON BASE

**INFO.**  
CHIEF, CSB, FRANKFURT

**FROM**  
CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

**SUBJECT:**  
VISIT OF U.S. ARMY GENERAL GAVIN OF SHAPE TO UTILITY

**REFERENCE:**  
EGMA-68060, DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1966, PARA 4

PLAY IT BY EAR AFTER YOU HAVE RECEIVED □ INFORMATION.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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CROSS REFERENCE TO  
**DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER**  
EGWA-90  
**DATE**  
17 FEBRUARY 1966

**CLASSIFICATION**  
SECRET

**HQS FILE NUMBER**  
EGWA-90
Dear Admiral Raborn,

General Speidel informed me that he had a very nice meeting with you in the house of Senator Rivers. He told me about the interesting talks he had, and the pleasant days he could enjoy during his stay in the United States.

In view of the fact that the close cooperation between the United States Intelligence community and our organisation will reach its 20th anniversary in July, I may invite you to visit our organisation in the course of this year. I can imagine your probably very tight time schedule. So you may fix the date yourself in the frame of your possibilities.

Looking forward to meet you

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

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BEST AVAILABLE COPY
9. Over lunch WINTERSTEIN talked about various CATIDE personalities and problems at some length. He spoke very frankly, almost as if I were another member of CATIDE. He stated first that UTILITY is continuing his plans to continue as Chief of CATIDE after his 65th birthday in April 1967. The Redrep government will in all likelihood extend UTILITY in office. The government values UTILITY's world-wide reputation and long experience and the politicians do not desire an inter-party squabble over the naming of his successor. WINTERSTEIN said he thought extending UTILITY's term of office would be the best solution for CATIDE, since only UTILITY could keep strong personalities like @HOLTEN, @DEGENHARDT and others in line. WINTERSTEIN, of course, has a very good relationship with UTILITY and this doubtlessly contributes to his readiness to see UTILITY stay on. Few other CATIDERS would share his joy at this prospect.

10. WINTERSTEIN went on to say that UTILITY has been quite a different man since the UJDROWSY case broke. The case hurt him very deeply. UTILITY personally trusted UJDROWSY and did much to advance his career in CATIDE. When UJDROWSY turned out to be a KGB agent UTILITY's faith in human nature and the reliability of his associates was deeply shaken. WINTERSTEIN said that since the UJDROWSY case UTILITY is secretive and trusts very few people. WINTERSTEIN added that what I had seen of UTILITY during the last years had probably given me a wrong impression of the man. UTILITY was a much better and more vigorous leader a few years ago.
Composition of Bundestag Committee Meeting w/

END & RV

(BGH 2618, 1 Mar 66 - filed CATIDE/Rels, Other Agencies)

Rainer BARZEL of CDU
Franz-Josef STRAUSS of CSU
Fritz ERIER of SPD
Friedrich SCHAEFER of SPD
Knut von KUHLMANN-STUMP of BDP
General Reinhard Gehlen
President
German Intelligence Service

Dear General Gehlen:

I was very glad to get your letter and most grateful for your kind invitation to visit the German Intelligence Service sometime this year. There is nothing I would like to do more, but with the present state of world affairs I am finding it very difficult to travel anywhere. May I leave it that I will take advantage of your invitation at the first possible opportunity and will of course let you know as far in advance as I can. I have of course heard a great deal about your organization since taking over last year and realize that a milestone this twentieth anniversary of our work together will represent. For that reason alone, this year would be a particularly appropriate one to visit you and I hope it will be possible.

I did indeed thoroughly enjoy the evening I spent in the company of General Speidel and would hope very much to renew my acquaintance with him when I get that chance to visit Germany.

Thank you so much again for your thoughtful note.

Sincerely,

W. F. Haborn
Director

Distribution:
Orig: 1 - Address
2 - DCI
2 - DDP
1 - C/EE
1 - EE/G

Signature recommended:

Acting Deputy Director for PPS

4 - MAR 1966

Date
1. On the first of March 1966, I stopped off at the Munich Liaison Base on route to Headquarters. My purpose was to conduct further discussions with UTILITY and alias Holm, as mentioned in the reference.

2. UTILITY invited me to a private lunch in his headquarters building. (Alias Holm joined me for coffee and I came in shortly thereafter for the main business talk with alias Holm.) During their discussions, UTILITY gave a study of a certain crisis situation showing how CATIDE had predicted and reported the crisis. Although I did not see the paper, I gathered from what UTILITY said it was a 'how-did-we-get-to-this-time?' round up. UTILITY recommended this system to me. Additionally, UTILITY showed me the document contents a Steuerungshinweise. UTILITY looked at these and discussed them with interest but did not indicate to UTILITY that I had been getting them for some years through alias Dessex's office in Washington. I do not know whether UTILITY knows that we get them at the base here as well.

3. Thereafter, UTILITY withdrew and Holm; and I went to Holm's office. We were joined there by alias Winterstein. Alias Winterstein told of the contact with CATIDE made by a officer last year and gave us certain other information. This is reflected in the attached contact report.

Distribution:
- 2-C/EE watt h/w
- 2-C/NE watt h/w
- 2-COS/Germany watt h/w
- 2- watt h/w

Attachment: contact report
4. Then outlined three areas in which thought KUBARK and CATIDE might act in a mutually beneficial way.
   a. He said that CATIDE might help out in certain equipment problems.
   b. I also suggested that the East German representative in the operation were CATIDE interested.
   c. As his third point, I suggested consideration by CATIDE of the possibility of the exchange of information—not intelligence reports—in the field between CATIDE and KUBARK representatives. The target about which information would be exchanged in the first instance was the Soviet community.

5. A fourth point came out at the suggestion of CATIDE. This was the possibility of a closer and more rapid exchange of data during crisis periods in the

6. The attached contact report fleshes out the above. I have not seen the contact report written from my rather sketchy notes. He may wish to amend or supplement the contact report.

7. As you will see from the attached contact report, Ulrich's remarks indicate that we should revise our views in BOMA-68231, especially about there being no CATIDE representative in the operation. You should be more interested in your feelings. If you have any right now, to whom might be CATIDE's man. I suppose we are dealing with a non-official person rather than someone under diplomatic cover.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
Chief, Munich Liaison Office

Chief of U.S. Liaison Office, Germany

Chief, EU

DEPARTMENT

Transmittal of Letter to Utility

1. William YESSAP recently received along a letter from Utility to you which contained an invitation to visit Utility headquarters. Utility requested YESSAP's participation in its 50th anniversary in July. YESSAP replied that he would like to fix the most convenient time for the visit during the course of this year.

2. We are forwarding under separate cover a letter from Utility to Utility in which it expresses its appreciation for the invitation, but indicates that the current international situation is such as to prevent him from taking any travel plans at this time. It offers a desire to take advantage of the invitation at the earliest possible opportunity and hopes that it may be possible to do so this year. Please pass this letter to Utility at an early opportunity.

Attachment: o/a, w/o/c

Letter from J to Utility

Distribution:

O/A - O/S, Brussels, w/o/c
J - COS, Brussels, w/o/c
J - COS, Germany, w/o/c

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUSPENSION: EXECUTION SCHEDULE
FELD 2005

ZMP-14562
17 March 1974
B. M. S. W. 1974

Ekmw-14853
1. Alias DESSAU recently passed along a letter from UTILITY to C_ which contained an invitation to C_ to visit CATIDE headquarters. UTILITY mentions CATIDE's forthcoming 20th anniversary in July, but suggests that C_ fix the most convenient time for the visit during the course of this year.

2. We are forwarding under separate cover a letter from C_ to UTILITY in which C_ expresses his appreciation for the invitation, but indicates that the current international situation is such as to prevent him from making any travel plans at this time. C_ does express a desire to take advantage of the invitation at the first possible opportunity and the hope that it may be possible to do so this year. Please pass C_'s letter to UTILITY at an early opportunity.

Attachment: a/s u/s/c
Letter from C_ to UTILITY

Distribution:
- 2 - C/MLB w/att u/s/c
- 1 - CDB, Bonn w/o/att
- 1 - COS, Germany w/o/att

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE: METHODS EXEMPTION: 12-24-78 W/C: CRIMES DISCLOSURE:

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
SECRET 3119832
MUNI INFO GMNY DIR DOST CITE NYDO 1818

PLEASE EXTEND CONGRATULATIONS TO UTILITY ON HIS
BIRTHDAY, APRIL 15.
SECRET
CFW 1818 APRIL 15 UTILITY

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
TO: MUNICH
INFO: GERMANY

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: "EE G"
INFO: VR. FILE \ FILE COPY DOI. DOI. EN. DE. DEP

TO MUNICH
INFO: GERMANY

DATE: 31 MAR 66

INFO: GERMANY

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES: 4

MESSAGE

PLS EXTEND BIRTHDAY GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TO UTILITY
ON HIS BIRTHDAY, ON BEHALF OF [ ] AND [ ]

END OF MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
In another reference to personnel, UTILITY and Holm, in talking to the Deputy Director, referred (as they very often do) to the missing generation of officers: those lost in World War II. Then Holmsaid that the solution to this at CATIDE was simply to extend a number of senior officers on a contract basis after their normal retirement date arrives.

5. I suppose that this is an indication that instead of getting new youngsters surging to the top in CATIDE, we are going to have the old cadre, possibly not excluding UTILITY (he made passing reference to a recent social affair to "two or three more years"), staying on until the present young blood becomes tired old blood. So I don't think we need count on any fresh upsurge of youngsters to the top, so long as the oldsters can squeeze further contract jobs out of the organization.
8. I worked the conversation around to UTILITY and his term in office. He said that UTILITY had been asked (sic) by all parties in the parliament to stay on and he had agreed to stay on a couple more years. This was covered in a dispatch EGMA 68482.
For your information I repeat herewith an exchange of messages between [name of person] and me concerning Subject:

Message to [name of person] 13 April 66:

"The latest rumor in Bonn is that Lt. General Leo Epp, CG IIInd Corps, will be taking UTILITY's place in Spring 1967."

Response to above message, 20 April 1966:

"Concerning your rumor on Leo Epp, you may be on to something. He is [DOB 15 Aug 47], former chief of KIEPER comso. According to an early PRQ was head of Army Intel Service in 1945. Joined CATIDE in 46, made trip to States under UDDACO Program in 51, left CATIDE for German Army in 56.

"If your source comes up with anything else we naturally all ears. There one entry in his file in Dec 1965 noting that Comco folk at CATIDE hoped he would come back to take Comco job after Cappel but he too senior, would 'outrank UTILITY'"

Distribution:
- C/CE
- C/OE
- C/MLB
- C/CSB/Frankfurt

CIA Classification and Release
Central Intelligence Agency

DATE: 22 April 1966

LOCALITY: FRA

22 April 1966

EGWA-102

SECRET
1. One of the perennial sporting events in connection with MLB is trying to figure out when (if ever) UTILITY is going to retire. Not more than a week ago the COS sent an Intra-Station Memo in which he reported that the latest rumor on the Bonn circuit was that General Leo Hepp was to succeed UTILITY in April 1967. I replied that I thought he was on to something good and hoped he would keep us supplied with any details he could discover.

2. On the 20th of April I had a discussion with WINTERSTEIN. I managed to crank the conversation around to the "missing generation" at CATIDE and eventually to the UTILITY retirement date. WINTERSTEIN said that this had all been taken care of by a request to UTILITY on the part of all political parties in the parliament that he stay on the job. He had consented to do so for another two years. This jibes with what UTILITY said at a Christmas party here in 1965.

3. WINTERSTEIN continued to say that since WAGNER, the Vice President of CATIDE, was obviously not going to be back on the job due to his poor health, it seemed most likely that it would be SMITH who would be carrying on...

---continued---
after UTILITY left.

4. I said to WINTERSTEIN that I had heard some people raise the questions as to whether Bonn politicians would permit another military man to head CATIDE. He said that BÖHLM or any other military officer could very easily transfer to the civil service, as had he himself, for instance. He tended to discount the idea of a politician (for example some Secretary of State who was at loose ends) being assigned the CATIDE job.

5. In turning to a discussion of Bonn WINTERSTEIN said that Minister Heinrich Krone, the Chairman of the Defense Council, was taking a greater interest in CATIDE. This did not mean that CATIDE was not answering to the Chancellor's office. It had meant CATIDE had a further powerful customer in addition to their standard ones, the Chancellor's Office, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense. Contrary to other customers, Minister Krone has only one source of his own information: CATIDE. Therefore, this enhances CATIDE's position somewhat when Krone asks for and uses CATIDE estimates and information.

6. WINTERSTEIN said as Krone was fairly elderly he probably would not be holding his present position much more than a year. WINTERSTEIN then said Franz Josef Strauss would possibly take over the Defense council post. This would put him in the Defense business again, but without a Ministry. There would, of course, be a number of ramifications for CATIDE if Strauss did take the Council chairmanship.

P. S. Just sat in on a three-cornered CATIDE discussion among BREICHLIN, BERNHARDT and DR. FRANZ, the Chief of Personnel. They spoke in quite a 'matter-of-fact way of difficulties of getting UTILITY to change proven ways and means and of his retention at his present post for another three years.
Treiben Bundesbehörden strafbare Verfassungsverrat?

Strafanzeige der Humanistischen Union wegen Verdacht eines Verbrechens nach § 89 StGB

Beim Generalbundesanwalt in Karlsruhe erstattete der Vorstand der Humanistischen Union (HU) am 5.5.1966 Strafanzeige "gegen Unbekannt" wegen des Verdachts eines Verbrechens nach § 89 StGB ("Verfassungsverrat"). Nach dieser Bestimmung wird mit Zuchthaus bestraft, "wer es unternimmt, durch Mißbrauch oder Anmaßung von Hoheitsbefugnissen einen der in § 88 StGB bezeichneten Verfassungsgrundsätze zu beseitigen oder außer Geltung zu setzen."

Wie Bundesinnenminister Lücke am 3.5.1966 zugab, hat das Bundesinnenministerium geheime Ausnahmevorschriften vorbereitet, die im "Notstandsfall" entweder von den Alliierten in Kraft gesetzt oder aufgrund alliierter Vollmachten von deutschen Staatsorganen angewandt werden sollen. Diese geheimen "Schuhladengesetze" sollen nach bis jetzt unwidersprochenen Pressemeldungen viel weiter gehen als die Notstandssetzungen, die dem Bundestag vorgelegt worden sind. Minister Lücke äußerte zu Pressevertretern: "Diejenigen, die diese Gesetze gesehen haben, waren etwas blank."

Der HU liegen Informationen vor, die zu dem Verdacht Anlaß geben, es bestehe eine Übereinkunft zwischen Bundesbehörden und den Besatzungsmächten, der Bundesregierung in bestimmten Fällen grundgesetzwidrige Sondervollmachten zuzuweisen, die diese auf legalen Weg durch das

[Signature]

---

Humanistische Union e.V.
Genslingenstraße 110
7554 Karlsruhe 30
Tel.: (0711) 13 23 23

Humanistische Union
Parlament nicht erhalten könnte. Die HU führt in ihrer Strafanzeige einige von der Bundesregierung öffentlich angestrebte Notstandsvollmachten an, die - würden sie auf so außerparlamentarische Weise verwirklicht, den Tatbestand des Verfassungsverrats erfüllten. Da die geheimen "Schubladengesetze" sogar noch viel weiter gehen sollen, ist nach Ansicht der HU die Einleitung eines Ermittlungsverfahrens durch die Bundesanwaltschaft dringend geboten.

HUMANISTISCHE UNION
gez. Rainer Haun
(Geschäftsführer)
München, den 5. Mai 1966
Mitarbeiter der HUMANISTISCHE UNION e.V., 8 München 90, Geiselgasteigstr. 116

An die
Bundesanwaltschaft
7500 Karlsruhe

Betr.: Strafanzeige gegen Unbekannt wegen des Verdachts eines Verbrechens nach § 89 StGB ("Verfassungsverrat")

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalbundesanwalt,


Eine Kopie dieses Artikels fügen wir bei. Der Autor berichtet in dem Artikel, die Bundesregierung habe Gesetze für den Fall ausgearbeitet, "daß die Alliierten von ihren Rechten im Generalvertrag Gebrauch machen", diese Gesetze "lügen fertig in der Schublade" und gingen viel weiter als die Notstandsgesetze, die dem Bundestag vorgelegt werden müssen. Es wird in dem Beitrag ferner behauptet, die Bundesregierung warte nur darauf, daß die Alliierten mit der Bitte um Zustimmung gem. Art. 5 Abs. 2 des Generalvertrages an sie herantraten, um festzustellen, daß die Umstände die Ausübung der alliierten Verhältnisse forderten. Es heißt wörtlich:

"Der britische oder amerikanische Notchafther wird im Bundeskanzleramt vorsprechen, man wird sich einigen, daß der Notstandsfall gegeben ist und die Befugnisse aus dem Generalvertrag auf die Bundesregierung übertragen. Und dann wird mit den Gesetzen aus der Schublade regiert."

Der Artikel im "Deutschen Panorama" erweckt den Eindruck, als bestehe eine ausdrückliche oder stillschweigende Übereinkunft zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Drei Mächten, der Bundesregierung in einem bestimmten Fall durch ein abgekartetes Spiel ("die Deutschen bitten die Alliierten, ihnen das zu erlauben, was ihnen nach dem Grundgesetz verboten ist") Gesetzesvollmachten zuzuspielen, die sie auf legale Weise nicht erhalten könnte.

Wir bitten Sie daher, sehr geehrter Herr Generalbundesanwalt, ein Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Unbekannt einzuleiten, weil im Falle der Richtigkeit des oben geschilderten Tatbestandes eine Verletzung des...
§ 89 StGB vorläge. Nach dieser Vorschrift wird u.a. bestraft, wer es unternimmt, durch Mißbrauch oder Anmaßung von Hoheitsbefugnissen einen der in § 88 StGB bezeichneten Verfassungsgrundsätze zu beseitigen oder außer Geltung zu setzen.

Nach dem zitierten Artikel sollen die angeblich vorhandenen "Schubladengesetze" "viel weiter gehen als die Notstandsgesetze, die der Bundestag beschließen soll". Durch den Entwurf der Bundesregierung von 1962 für eine Notstandsverfassung (Bundesdrucksache IV/891) sollten für den Notstandsfall u. a. folgende Maßnahmen vorgesehen werden:

1. Eine Notstandsgesetzgebung nach Art. 115c des Entwurfs;
2. die Übertragung der Befugnisse der Bundesregierung auf einen Kabinettsausschuß, dessen Zusammensetzung vom Bundeskanzler bestimmt wird, gem. Art. 115d des Entwurfs;
3. die Verlängerung der Wahlperiode des Bundestages und der Amtsperiode des Bundespräsidenten gem. Art. 115g Abs. 3 des Entwurfs.

Da die angeblich vorliegenden "Schubladengesetze" über derartige Bestimmungen weit hinausgehen sollen, muß angenommen werden, daß sich in diesen Gesetzen mindestens gleiche oder ähnliche Bestimmungen finden. Durch die Verlängerung der Legislaturperiode des Parlaments und den Übergang der Gesetzgebungsbefugnis auf ein parlamentarisch nicht verantwortliches Gremium würde das Recht des Volkes, die Staatsgewalt in Taten und Abstimmungen auszuüben und die Volksvertretung in allgemeiner, unmittelbarer, freier, gleicher und geheimer Wahl zu wählen (§ 88 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 StGH) beeinträchtigt, das Recht auf die verfassungsmäßige Bildung und Ausübung einer parlamentarischen Opposition und die parlamentarische Verantwortlichkeit der Regierung wäre gefährdet (§ 88 Abs. 2 Nr. 3 und 4 StGH), Herrschaft wäre nicht auszuschließen (§ 88 Abs. 2 Nr. 6 StGH), wenn derartige oder ähnliche Maßnahmen nicht durch ordentliche Gesetze bestimmt würden, sondern sich auf geheime Vereinbarungen stützen.

Eine Beseitigung der geschützten Verfassungsgüter des § 88 Abs. 2 StGH liegt vor, wenn deren rechtliche Existenz vermindert ist, sie werden außer Geltung gesetzt, wenn sie faktisch nicht mehr ausgeübt, also nicht mehr befördert werden, wozu es genügt, daß ihre Ausübung zeitlich oder örtlich suspendiert ist (Schaeuffele, Das Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz, JZ 51, 609, 614). Das Beseitigen u.


München, den 6. Mai 1966

HUMANISTISCHE UNIK e.V.

gev. Rainer Heim
(Geschäftsführer)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

3 May 1966

TO: 801

SUBJECT: 155/2

At the farewell party for KOLLER on 29 April I became privy to a discussion between KOLLER and MUELLER concerning KOLLER's assignment to Vietnam. The subject of the discussion was actually the length of KOLLER's stay in Vietnam. Also, although all the CATIDErs play KOLLER's new assignment as if he was actually returning to the Army, the conversation made it quite clear that this is not the case at all. He is still with CATIDE and will remain so, and MUELLER will remain his boss during his assignment in Vietnam.

The current agreement between CATIDE and the Army is for a one year assignment of KOLLER to Vietnam, after which he is to return to CATIDE. KOLLER protested this arrangement to MUELLER stating that it was breaking his cover and that he should, in order to maintain his cover, stay at least for three years "like all other attaches do". MUELLER more or less indicated that he hoped KOLLER could get his promotion to full Colonel in this job and as soon as the job had accomplished that he was ready to call KOLLER back. KOLLER seemed on the whole somewhat put out over the treatment he had received from CATIDE in this job.

Later on when KOLLER became aware of the fact that I had overheard the conversation he said "I hope I can at least stay long enough to get my Colonelcy, otherwise this job will have been a complete loss. The only reason I want to get away from the compound is because I can't get ahead as long as the Doctor is here."
CONTACT REPORT

9 May 1966, 1000 hours
@Holm and UTILITY Offices

1. This meeting was to pass Holm the schedule of the Chief of Station. These were in Yellow Memorandum No. 34249. We discussed these briefly.

2. Then alias Holm asked me about my idea about briefing the senior CATIDE staffers on the structure of the U.S. intelligence community. I replied that although I still thought it was a good idea and proposed to bring it up again in the fall, it seemed to me that there was simply too many things going on at this time to work it in properly. I wouldn't want to put on any half-hearted performance.

3. Alias Holm said then that UTILITY wanted to speak to me. We went over to UTILITY's office, where he opened the conversation with a few rambling remarks on current affairs. These are included in Field Information Report MCO-142. He then came to the point. He mentioned the case. This was dealt with by cable MUNI-6049, which is filed in that case file.

4. UTILITY also took the occasion to thank me for the birthday card I had sent him.

5. Later in the day, I appeared again at UTILITY's office with [ ] and [ ]. The occasion was that of UTILITY's formal farewell to [ ] and his greeting to [ ]. Alias Holm was also present. This was a pretty social affair in which UTILITY made a lot of complimentary remarks about [ ] and presented him with a little silver card tray with a dedication on the back. Very pleasant time in the usual strained way; [ ] got a chance to exercise his not inconsiderable talents in German, which he had hidden under a bushel hitherto.

Distribution:
3-801 for forwarding
1-801 chrono
-UTILITY chrono
1-@Holm file
Dear General Gehlen,

I did it again this year. I forgot to send you congratulations on your birthday in April. I don't know what it is but I suspect it is my preoccupation with income tax matters during the latter part of March that causes me to forget that 4 April is your birthday anniversary. Be what it may, let me at this late date express all good wishes for another healthy and successful year.

I also want to thank you for your kind letter after Christmas. And I was especially glad to hear that the speedometer on your sailboat is working properly. I hope that you will get another chance to really sail this summer. Or perhaps you have already started sailing. I have heard that the Munich area has had a sunny, warm Spring. Unfortunately we have not. It has been quite cold with a warm day now and then but we are still having frost.

And in early February we were really snowed in. I was unable to drive my car for three days. As a matter of fact, I barely made it to the airport when I was scheduled to make a rather long trip. I visited Tokyo and Manila coming back by way of Hawaii. All in all the trip was much too fast, as usual, although I had several nice days attending a military conference in the Philippines.

I heard that Herr ... has semi-retired but I am sure that he is just as active as ever. I recall how I used to envy both you and him as far as your energy was concerned.

I also understand that Herrn ... I, II, and III will be visiting here but unfortunately I shall miss them. Heinz was kind enough to invite me to a reception for them but Ruth and I will be unable to attend.

It was interesting to read in a recent issue of Czech and Allied an article about coordination of intelligence activities in the German Federal Republic. I judge from that article that you are also still plagued with coordination problems in the business. I am still active in the coordination field in our community and it keeps me quite busy. There is always too much to be done.

Not long ago when Virginia Pleasants gave a concert at the German Embassy, I was surprised to hear that contrary to most expectations Herr ... was improving. Kindly extend to him my best regards should you see him.

Our warm greetings to your wife and family. We think of all of you and Munich very often.

Sincerely,

C


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**PERTINENT INFORMATION**

GEHELFINN. /GEN/  
SEX M. DOB ?  
CIT. 7  
OCC 7  
HEAD OF WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE  
NAME APPEARING IN BOOK BY JAN LITAN CALLED MEETING WITH THE SPIES. PUBLISHED BERLIN 1965.  

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTR. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE CRYPTOGRAM EXKPTION 3926 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURES ACT  
DATE 2005

FILE IN
We are forwarding under separate cover belated birthday greetings to [redacted] from [redacted].

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODEXEMPTION 3826 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005

Attachment: a/s u/s/c (TRUE NAME POUCH)

Distribution:
2 - C/MLB w/att u/s/c
1 - COS, Germany w/o/att

23 MAY 1966
CONTACT REPORT

18 May 1966
House 37, CATIDE Compound

1. The reason for this meeting was the general topic of SIGINT affairs. Before we went into that meeting, however, Holm, who appeared to greet the Chief of Station, and me, said that UTILITY would like to speak to me privately before the meeting began on a "couple of political matters."

2. With very few preliminaries UTILITY launched into something of a repeat performance of what I had reported in EGO-142. He did not mention point A of that discussion, namely, the concern about France, but he went somewhat more into detail about his concerns about German society. He contends that the society is softening, especially towards the East. He showed us a press release from the Humanistic Union of Geiselgasteigstr. 116, 8 Munich 90 (just down the street a bit from some staff housing). He read off some of the members of the committee of this union and described them in effect as a rather mixed bag of do-gooders and dupes, as I interpreted his comments. He thinks that the Humanistic Union is only an example of some of the organizations which are undermining German society with their willingness to deal with the East. He had received the press handout that he showed us from his student son-in-law, who is at the University of Munich. The press handout, he said, gave an entirely wrong impression about an aspect of the Emergency Powers Law being proposed.

3. He then went on to mention some articles by Hans Reiser, one of them called "Herr Gehlen ans Telefon." We had already reported this via EGMT-138407. I had not, however, seen another article by Reiser called "Vor Super Ministern wird gewarnt," also from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6th of May. The Herr Gehlen one was on the 11th. Apparently, both of these articles were put out in the absence of editor Birnbaum. They had been able to spike a third one. UTILITY said with something of a sly smile that although CATIDE didn't concern themselves with internal affairs when it came to such matters, they did, i.e., self-protection.
32W-2-29/1  C  and L  18 May 1966
(West Germ Govt)  with UTILITY, @Holm

4. Minister Heinrich Krone came in for some discussion in connection with the Reiser article of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung about super ministries. What UTILITY and Holm had to say about this and about Westrick is being forwarded to Headquarters and other addressees in EGMA-68578. As the meeting broke up, UTILITY invited C  and wife and (as interpreted it, although I did not hear the exchange) C  and wife, to be his guests as tea on the 23d of June.

Distribution:
- 3-801 for forwarding
- UTILITY file
- @Holm file
- extract
- 1-801 chrono
An FII to announce unofficial confirmation that UTILITY will remain an head of CATIDE for a period of three years after reaching mandatory retirement age in Apr 1967, and that the same informant believes that UTILITY's brother will be extended in his current position for a like period of time.
5. In a general discussion of the organization, Moeller said that CATIDE was split pretty well down the middle between people who were very firm advocates of UTILITY, and those who pooh-poohed his every word. This feeling permeated the entire organization and apparently is taken quite seriously by both sides. He did not identify any of the participants on either side.
On 13 June 1966 in an unusual letter signed in true name—also unusual—UTILITY forwarded the following message:

"13 June 1966

"To: [Redacted]

"From: [Redacted]

"The Chief of my Division I, Herr [Redacted] has reported to me on his trip to the United States, which took place from the 6th to the 23rd of May, 1966. The carefully prepared—and in end result so fruitful—conferences at your Headquarters and in Miami, there a considerable assistance to the further work of Division I. Above and beyond this, you have given my officers a look at the problems of the United States itself. This will widen their horizons and afford a basis for a greater understanding in our mutual endeavors.

"I am very happy about the visit, and I thank you for the professional courtesies and the generous hospitality afforded my gentlemen.

"The friendly personal greetings from (Chief, KUDOVE). I reciprocate very heartily. I hope to be able to greet him here in the not too distant future.

"(UTILITY)"

[Redacted]
ORIG: C/MLB
UNIT: C/MLB
EXT: 6%
DATE: 16 JUNE 66

TO: GERMANY INFO: FRANKFURT
FROM: MUNICH 6385
CONF: C/MLB
INFO: L/CE

REF: TRANSMITTAL MANIFEST F. NO 11288 FROM C--
ALIAS CASTROP CALLED MORNING OF 16 JUNE FOR UTILITY
TO THANK YOU VERY KINDLY FOR AN INVITATION TO BAD GODESBERG ON 4 JULY BUT REGRETS HE WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND
AS HE WILL BE ON LEAVE.

END OF MESSAGE